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ABSTRACT

ASPECTS OF TAX SPILLOVERS: IS THERE A “WORLDWIDE” TAX BURDEN?

By
Sandeep Bhattacharya

Committee Chair: Sally Wallace
Major Department: Economics

The objective of this dissertation is to develop a model to examine the concept of
a “worldwide” tax burden. The notion is that due to differential mobility of factors
developed nations may be passing on a share of their tax burden to less developed
countries while effectively indulging in a form of tax competition. This is important for
many reasons especially since it may affect the distribution of income between countries,
and influence the flow of capital. As globalization increases, “the race to the bottom” in
taxation (which implies tax-cutting) suggests that these spillovers should be reduced over
time. The traditional view of taxation implies that taxation imposes an excess burden and
increasing most types of taxes will increase this burden. But for whom does this burden
increase? Are developed countries passing on a burden to locations that are less able to
shift the burden forward?

V

If this phenomenon of tax spillovers can be quantified, we can examine the extent
and nature of shifting of the tax burden. Using a version of the famous general
equilibrium model first developed by Prof Harberger in 1962, we analyze the extent of
tax spillovers in the presence of a public input in an open economy setting. We model
two different taxes, the Capital Income Tax and a Consumption Tax and two different
types of expenditure patterns, a government input and a transfer payment.
The dissertation answers the following research questions:
Can the extent of tax spillovers be quantified using a general equilibrium model
that is not dependent on functional forms?
Does the extent of spillovers depend on the type of tax used?
Does the extent of spillovers depend on the use to which the taxes are put?
What are the policy implications?
We find that the tax cutting economy can gain from cutting a distorting tax only when
the expenditure pattern is neutral, while imposing a cost to the rest of the world in terms
of sources and uses of GDP. When revenues are used to provide productive public goods;
neither country gains from tax cuts that lower inputs.

VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………………………….

VI

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS …..…………………………………………………

VIII

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………

1

CHAPTER TWO: THE CAPITAL INCOME TAX ……………...………………

30

…………………………………………..

72

APPENDIX A

CHAPTER THREE: THE CONSUMPTION TAX ……………....…………….

75

CHAPTER FOUR: THE TRANSFER MODELS ……………………………..

106

CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ………………………………………………………..

161

CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS AND CONCLUSION ………………………………

203

APPENDIX B

……………………………………….

251

REFERENCES

……………………………………….

256

VITA

……………………………………….

269

VII

LIST OF TABLES
Table
1.
The Dissertation Compared To Important Existing
Studies……………………………………………………………………
2.
Ratio of U.S. GDP to GNI Based on WDI Data …...................................
3.
Ratio of Combined Euro-Zone GDP to GNI Based on WDI …..
4.
Results: Sources, Uses & Total Welfare Changes With Baseline Data.....
5.
Initial Assumptions Randolph (2006) ……………………………………
6.
Shares Consistent With Harberger (1995)……………………………….
7.
Initial Assumptions Following Harberger (2008) …………..…………...
8.
U.S. Shares Based on BEA (2007)…………………………….................
9.
Shares Based on Literature Review………………………………………
10.
Summaries of Parameters Used in CIT Models, Sources and
Simulations……………………………………………………………….
11.
Summaries of Parameters Used in Consumption Tax Models, Sources
and Simulations………………………………………..
12.
Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half (With
Transfer) on Sources and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP
(Welfare) Using Baseline Data………………………...............................
13.
Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half (With Input)
on Sources and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare)
Using Baseline Data………………...... ………………………………….
14.
Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half (With
Transfer) on Sources and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP
(Welfare) Using HOD Zero & Other Baseline Data ………………….…
15.
Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half (With Input)
on Sources and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare)
Using HOD Zero & Other Baseline Data………………………………….
16.
Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half on Sources
and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare) Using HOD
Zero &
17.

*

= *

= 0.5 [This is table 14 &15 combined]…………..

Page
14
18
18
156
162
162
164
167
173
196
199

213

214

220

221

223

Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half on Sources
and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare) Using HOD
Zero &

*

= *

= 0.3 …………………………………………….

VIII

223

Table
Page
18.
Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half on Sources
and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare) Using HOD
Zero & * = * = 0.1 ……………………………………………. 224
19.

20.

Changes in Tax Revenue (and the Government Input G) as Percentage of
G When the Excess Tax Rate is Reduced by Half in the OECD Country
and Demand is HOD Zero ………………………………………………..
Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and

21.

24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
B1.
B2.
B3.

*

= 0.1 ………..

233

*

=

*

= 0.3 ……….

233

Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and

23.

=

Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and

22.

*

229

*

=

*

= 0.5 [This is

the Same Table as 12&13 Combined] ………………………………….
Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X (Sx= Sy = - 0.6) [This is the Same
Table as 12&13 Combined] ……………………………………………
Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X (Sx= Sy = - 0.8) ………………….
Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X (Sx= Sy = - 1.0) ………………….
Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and Tax Change is 25% Points ….
Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and Tax Change is 50% Points
[This is the Same Table as 12&13 Combined] ………………………….
Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data From Chapter 5
With No HOD Zero Restriction on X and Tax Change is 75% Points.....
U.S. Shares Based on Randolph (2006) ………………………………
Adjusted Shares Based on Randolph (2006) …………………………….
Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data From Chapter 5
and Adjusted Factor Shares in OECD With HOD Zero Restriction on X
and

*

=

*

= 0.5 ………………………………………………..

IX

234

235
236
236
237

237
238
251
252

254

Table
B4.

Page
Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data From Chapter
5 and Adjusted Factor Shares in OECD With HOD Zero Restriction on
X and

B5.

*

= *

= 0.3 ………………

254

Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data From Chapter
5 and Adjusted Factor Shares in OECD With HOD Zero Restriction on
X and

*

= *

= 0.1 ………………

X

255

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1. Initial Tax in the CRS Case …………………………………..…………..
2. Taxes and Provision of G in CRS Case …………………….…………….

XI

42
43

1

CHAPTER I

-

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this dissertation is to develop a model to examine the concept of
a “worldwide” tax burden. The notion is that due to differential mobility of factors
developed nations may be passing on a share of their tax burden to less developed
countries while effectively indulging in a form of tax competition. This is important for
many reasons especially since it may affect the distribution of income between countries,
and influence the flow of capital. As globalization increases, “the race to the bottom” in
taxation (which implies tax-cutting) suggests that these spillovers should be reduced over
time. The traditional view of taxation implies that taxation imposes an excess burden and
increasing most types of taxes will increase this burden. But for whom does this burden
increase? Are developed countries passing on a burden to locations that are less able to
shift the burden forward?
There are two views of what might happen in situations of tax competition. The
first is the prediction from theory that countries competing for mobile factors like capital
will cut tax rates (this is only of the several different ways they might compete).
The other is the observation that the tax-cutting race to the bottom that the theory
predicts has not actually happened in practice, and tax rates have fallen little over the last
decade in many OECD countries. One explanation for the second feature is that
jurisdictions may be able to pass on some of their tax burden to other jurisdictions, and so
have little incentive to cut taxes.
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In this dissertation, we concentrate solely on the effects of one tax-competing
jurisdiction cutting its tax rates under four different scenarios to compete for mobile
capital. We examine the effects of this tax cutting on the competing country as well as the
rest of the world. In my opinion, this can answer questions raised by both views of tax
competition theory and actual practice discussed above. If the tax cutting country benefits
from cutting its taxes and the rest of the world loses, then we have the effect predicted by
theory, and have to look for other explanations for the observation that tax rates have not
fallen as predicted. If there are situations where the tax competing country can corner a
disproportionate share of reduction in the excess burden and make the rest of the world
worse-off while making itself better off, it has an even stronger incentive to compete by
cutting certain taxes.
However, if we find plausible circumstances where the tax competing country
loses income when cutting taxes, then this may explain the real-life observation discussed
above; even without assuming that the competing country is able to resist competing
because it is able to pass on some of its tax burden. It may be keeping its tax rates high
because it may actually lose in some situations rather than gain, not only because it is
explicitly passing on part of its current burden.
There is an extensive debate on tax competition and its effects in the literature and
the intention of this dissertation is not to investigate the origins of such competition or
whether it leads to a “race to the bottom” but to make explicit one of the effects of such
competition in a general equilibrium framework.1 By examining the effects of reductions

1

This dissertation also does not seek to model or explain specific forms of tax competition.
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of hypothetical taxes on all capital income and consumption in one country, we build
models to investigate the phenomenon of tax “spillovers.”
Traditional tax theory shows that taxation has a “burden” on the economy beyond
payment of the tax revenue. As Harberger (1962) showed, even if we were to return all
tax revenue to the economy, a tax still has a negative excess burden on the sources of
GDP. So, we should expect that when we lower a tax, we should see a reduction in the
excess burden. But is such a reduction of the burden inevitable, and does it mean an
improvement in GDP for everyone?
One aspect of tax competition involves providing mobile capital with lower rates
of taxation, especially in the early stages of a project. Whether tax relief is provided
directly by lowering tax rates (“preferential” rates), or indirectly through exemptions,
accelerated depreciation, rebates, or other tax expenditures or subsidies, we can think of
many forms of tax competition (ignoring other forms of non-tax competition) as reducing
the effective tax rate faced by a project. In this dissertation, we concentrate solely on this
aspect: tax competition is modeled as a reduction in the tax rate in the OECD country,
and we investigate its effects on the sources and uses of GDP worldwide. Obviously, tax
competition involves more than just a tax rate reduction, but that is the only aspect
considered in this dissertation as many other forms of tax competition have a similar end
result as a reduction in the effective tax rate.
In the present economic environment, one of the major policy objectives of many
countries is to increase public spending to stimulate aggregate demand. The constraint on
such demand management policies is the need to keep the deficit and public debt under
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control. Another issue being currently debated is the demand from several sections of the
economy to reduce certain taxes that are viewed as detrimental to competition. What if it
were possible to meet both policy objectives? If a country could increase its income while
reducing taxes, would this invariably be at the cost of the income of the rest of the world?
Would this depend on the type of tax? Does this mean that a large enough country could
have its cake and eat it too? If this phenomenon of tax spillovers can be quantified, we
can examine the extent and nature of shifting of the tax burden.
In this dissertation, we define “spillovers” in the following way: we develop a
proxy measure of welfare for the countries involved. The measure is based on the sources
and uses of income (GDP). “Spillovers” occurs when the “country” (ROW) not reducing
its tax faces a negative change in the proxy measure of welfare as a result of the OECD
country lowering its tax rate.
The Dissertation is divided into six chapters. In chapter one, we present an
overview of the problem and review the existing literature. The next five chapters
approach the problem in the following way:
First, we develop a three sector, two “country” open economy version of the
Harberger model of general equilibrium taxation incidence. The two countries are meant
to represent a very large open economy (such as the U.S. or the E.U. as a whole) and the
rest of the world taken together. We incorporate a publicly provided input to production
paid for out of current tax revenues. In this chapter, we examine the effects of a tax on all
capital in the large country. We develop the analytical model staying as close as possible
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to versions of the Harberger analysis (1962, 1995 and 2008). We derive analytical
expressions for the extent of spillovers without assuming functional forms.
Second, we develop a second model with government input in chapter three, this
time using a general consumption tax in the large country. We develop comparable
analytical expressions for this case using the same model structure. As in the previous
chapter, we measure spillovers by developing expressions to measure changes in GDP in
the large country and the rest of the world from the sources and uses sides.
The next chapter develops the capital income tax and consumption tax models of
the previous chapters using a different pattern of expenditure. Instead of a government
input, the model assumes that all tax revenues are returned as a lump-sum transfer
payment to the consumer in the taxing country.
The last two chapters examine existing literature and data with the purpose of
collecting a set of reasonable parameters to calculate the magnitude of spillovers. The
aim is to eliminate those parameters on which we have some sort of consensus in the
existing literature from the analytical expressions, so that we can concentrate on
answering the research questions in the final chapter. Using such “non-controversial”
data, we reduce the analytical expressions to unknowns in the variables of interest.
Closely following Prof Harberger‟s work and subsequent contributions, we analyze
changes in GDP that would result from variations in the remaining variables of interest
and draw conclusions with respect to the research questions.

6

POLICY ISSUES
There are many aspects of this question that are important for policy analysis. The
standard justification for lowering tax rates is summarized in Fullerton (1982). Tax
competition introduces another element: of tax rates that are too “high” in relation to
competing jurisdictions and the sharing of the fixed capital stock “pie.” A more
sophisticated version introduces the combined effect of taxation and expenditure on
public goods. We can think of this as a Tiebout (1956) model with jurisdictions being
countries and capital the mobile taxpayer.
A comprehensive recent treatment of issues involved in an optimal tax and spend
package is available in Benassy-Quere, Gobalraja and Trannoy (2007). If taxation is
linked to expenditure; can the ability to pass on part of the burden result in a
redistribution of income between countries or between owners of factors of production
worldwide? As Harberger (1995) has pointed out, high tax rates in developed countries
are not necessarily harmful to the rest of the world. When capital flows out from a taxing
developed country and into the non-corporate sector of a developing country, it might
happen that the returns to labor in the developing countries increase due to an increased
availability of capital. In that case workers in the non-corporate sector in a developing
country may actually benefit from a high corporate tax rate in the developed world! In
this situation, a reduction in excess tax rates in OECD countries will result in a loss in
welfare (income) for the rest of the world. This hypothesis was not explicitly tested by
Harberger (1995) but is examined in this dissertation.
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Another general policy objective in many countries is to increase public spending
to stimulate aggregate demand. The constraint on such demand management is the need
to increase public expenditure without increasing taxation. This issue and other reforms
pertinent to recessions have been reviewed and discussed by Slemrod (2009) and Viard
(2009). The issue of reducing taxes that are viewed as detrimental to competition has
been reviewed by Slemrod (2008).
Certain behavioral assumptions on policy issues are necessary to proceed. First, a
country is presumed to be interested in maximizing domestic welfare (or a proxy measure
based on sources and uses of GDP), and not just in attracting more capital or increasing
revenue. Therefore it will not consider a reduction that lowers its own welfare (GDP).
Second, the competing country is not interested in what this does to countries in
the rest of the world, or in the strictly long-run effects as long as domestic welfare
(sources and uses of GDP) increases. While we may assume that the growth of social
responsibility and altruism means that governments take into account global concerns, it
is reasonable to assume that such considerations are secondary to domestic welfare when
domestic tax policy issues are involved.
Third, a reduction in rates can take many forms. One way to think about this is a
rationalization of the tax base that allows us to reduce the statutory rate while maintaining
revenue; another could be eliminating differentials in tax rates.
Fourth, the models in this dissertation are static. We are not dealing with growth
and the accumulation of capital. The stock of capital is fixed worldwide, as is the stock of
labor, and the problem is one of allocation with perfect mobility of capital and perfectly
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immobile labor. There is no consideration of savings and possible growth of capital
stock. We ignore possible effects while recognizing that such effects do exist.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The main objective of this dissertation is to determine the worldwide tax “burden”
and the impact of changes (reductions) in taxes on capital and consumption under
different expenditure patterns. We analyze the changes to the worldwide tax burden by
comparing consumption taxes with taxes on capital when the tax revenue is either
refunded through a transfer payment or used to provide a public input to production.
The specific research questions that we examine are: (1) Can the extent of
spillovers in the case of a capital income tax (CIT) and a consumption tax be estimated
using reasonable assumptions and data in situations of tax competition? Using
definitions developed above: tax competition is confined to a tax rate reduction, welfare
is proxied by the sources and uses of income (GDP) and spillovers are defined as a
situation where one country reduces its taxes and the result is a lowering in the other
country‟s welfare as measured by sources and uses of GDP. (2) If “spillovers” are
quantifiable, how large are these effects and how are they distributed between the taxing
country and the rest of the world? (3) Does expenditure assumptions matter for
measuring the extent and type of spillovers and do the effects vary by type of tax in
addition to use of tax revenue? (4) Are results very sensitive to parameters used?
We model one “country” (like the U.S.A.) as a large open economy (calling it the
OECD country), and the other “country” as the Rest of the World (ROW). Secondly, we
focus on whether the reduction in taxes by the OECD country imposes a burden on the
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ROW while benefiting the OECD since we assume that the OECD country will reject a
policy change that reduces its own GDP. We abstract away from changes in the internal
distribution between corporate and non-corporate sectors and the distribution between
labor and capital.
The case of the home country being a small open economy and the ROW being a
large open economy consisting of everyone else has been examined by Harberger (2008)
and Gravelle and Smetters (2006). The unexplored part of this type of analysis is to
examine what would happen in reverse-if the ROW (in my model, a large open economy
called the OECD) were to impose or reduce taxes and we traced the effects on the small
open economy (ROW in this dissertation are small open economies-a rough
approximation for most developing countries). We will use the Harberger (1962) model
explicitly; its assumptions and notation as far as possible to intentionally keep our model
comparable to the original model.
Tax competition models (such as Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986) suggest that
competition between jurisdictions to attract mobile factors of production, especially
capital, lead to a lowering of tax rates across countries and regions within a country. This
phenomenon has been studied extensively and a definitive survey of the literature on tax
competition is available in Wilson (1999). The efficiency and welfare aspects of tax
competition have also been studied – one approach is to look at the use of tax revenuesassuming that all revenues are raised to provide public goods(s). If tax competition leads
to a lower than optimal tax rate on mobile factors, then this could lead to either a higher
than desired tax rate on relatively immobile factors (land, and to some extent, labor) or an
inefficient under-provision of public goods. If welfare/efficiency is measured based on
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the change in national income/consumption, and the consumption of the public good is
part of the income/welfare of the jurisdiction, this leads to a lower level of welfare than
may have been possible otherwise.
However, Wilson and Wildasin (2004) have also discussed cases in which tax
competition may be welfare enhancing. One of these is the case where tax competition
can enhance welfare by allowing jurisdictions to attract capital and thereby “transfer” a
part of the burden to non-residents.
TYPES OF TAX CHANGES THAT RESULT IN SPILLOVERS
There are two classes of possibilities in trying to model tax changes that lead to
spillovers: The first possibility is suggested by Noiset (2003). If competition drives tax
rates to zero in the limit, and maximizes the base by attracting all foreign capital etc.
possible; with the tax rate equal to zero, revenue equals zero. If rates are raised from zero
to some positive rate, some capital leaves the jurisdiction-the positive tax rate is applied
to a smaller base, but tax revenue is non-zero. If all capital leaves the jurisdiction for
some rate that is high enough, then the base is zero, and revenues are again zero. For all
values of the tax base and tax rate in between, we get positive tax revenues, and as long
as non-residents own some of the capital or there is some change in the returns to labor or
capital world-wide, we get tax spillovers (the quantity of such spillovers depends on
many factors, however, including whether the changes cancel out). When there are
changes in returns to labor and capital, we get effects beyond the tax revenue itself,
depending on the model used. These effects can be measured either as changes in the
sources of income or the uses of income.
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The Harberger model (1962) analyzes this case–the distribution of burdens when
a new tax is imposed on the sources side of national income. All taxes are zero to begin
with, and a tax is imposed. The net incidence of this tax (such as the corporate income
tax) on the rest of the world (ROW) constitutes tax spillovers in the international case.
The important issue here is that when a non-lump sum tax is imposed, we have an
increase in excess burden. When a tax is lowered, there should be a reduction in this
burden, and/or an increase in output. Harberger concentrates on the sources side of
income in the 1962 model since there is only one consumer in the closed economy
version, so relative price changes on the uses side cancel out for the single consumer.
However, relative prices matter in the international case since there are two
consumers. Even if income effects are absent, as long as one consumer consumes more of
one good/some goods relative to the other, there are distributional effects based on
relative price changes. The existence of non-traded goods in the open economy ensures
this. Indeed, Harberger (2008) considers the impact on both the sources and uses sides.
The second case (following Wilson and Wildasin, 2004) is that the jurisdiction
may have target revenue, and be imposing a tax rate that is too high to attract foreign
capital. It may then lower tax rates in some form of tax competition, and thus broaden the
base. This attracts foreign capital and for some values of the relevant elasticity, could
increase revenue with a lower rate. An important underlying assumption is whether we
may or may not care about short-run or long-run effects on revenues, or are willing to
sacrifice short-term revenues for expansion in activity.
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The case of a jurisdiction willing to accept a permanent decline in revenue
without expecting that increased investment will lead to more revenue in the future is
rather unlikely. The jurisdiction then also spills over part of its revenue burden by taxing
capital owned by non-residents and can increase welfare by providing more public goods
to its residents. Beyond the tax revenue itself we can even ignore the effects of
ownership; if there is a change in world-wide returns to labor or capital, some excess
burden is exported.
If we include the uses side of GDP, a change in relative consumption prices with
no corresponding income compensation also constitutes part of the burden. Even if tax
revenues are fully refunded, if relative prices are allowed to change, there are
distributional effects depending on who consumes more of which commodity. To model
this, we can start with an initial tax, and lower the rate.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Two major studies that have given form to the models in Harberger (1995, 2008)
are Gravelle and Smetters (2006) using a CGE framework and Randolph (2006) using an
analytical solution based on Jones (1965). These models use an open economy
framework, but model a corporate tax without an intermediate government input. They do
not explicitly focus on the consumption tax but Randolph (2006) does discuss the effects
of several taxes besides the CIT.
Several earlier versions of government and taxes in the Harberger model are
available; one early model within the Harberger framework is McLure (1969), where tax
revenues are used to fund government expenditures that impact final demand since
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government procures either final goods or factors of production. Models with
externalities in the general equilibrium framework are also available, such as Fullerton
and Metcalfe (2001) and are related in the sense that provision of a public good also
involves externalities, albeit positive. Further explorations of the general equilibrium
nature of environmental taxes and mandates in the context of un-priced inputs in
production like pollution are provided in Fullerton and Heutel (2005, 2007). Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986) have examined the issue of under-provision of public goods in the
context of tax competition and their studies have also led to several important extensions
such as by Matsumoto (1998, 2000), Noiset (1995, 2003) and Benassy-Quere, Gobalraja
and Trannoy (2007).
We extend the existing literature in two ways. We explicitly introduce a nonneutral government within the Harberger model to examine tax spillovers and tax
competition-the focus is not on optimal taxation or forms of competition but on modeling
spillovers. We introduce the public good as in input into production and then compare
models of two taxes with active public input with two models of taxes with no active
government input. The introduction of an active or non-neutral government input was
first suggested explicitly to me by Prof Glenday. The idea is also discussed in McLure
(1975, sec 6.2, pg 150)…. “But it would be useful to investigate in a formal model just
how the relationships between demands for public and private goods interact with the
various other parameters in the model. In a similar vein, we could examine the effects of
public expenditures that tend to substitute for or be complementary to, one or the other of
the factors of production. But we cannot consider government capital formation without
using a growth model.”
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In most cases, if we follow the original Harberger model, it is assumed that
expenditure effects are absent, or neutral in terms of incidence. If, however, issues of
expenditure incidence/tax price are brought in, there can be welfare effects beyond those
caused by the tax. McLure (1969) has examined cases in which government expenditures
can be incorporated into the standard Harberger analysis. He has considered the cases
where the government either buys final goods, or factors of production. A comprehensive
analysis of cases involving a tax on labor is available in Wallace (1993). To highlight
how this dissertation is different from Randolph (2006) and Gravelle and Smetters (2006)
a brief comparison of the modeling is presented below. Our model seeks to extend and
improve on the existing literature since we have not assumed functional forms as the
CGE model of Gravelle and Smetters does, and we have formalized the Harberger (1995,
2008) models while adding a non-neutral government using the same model structure as
Harberger (1962) unlike in Randolph (2006) which is based on Jones (1965):

Table 1

The Dissertation Compared to Important Existing Studies

Dissertation

Randolph(2006)

Gravelle and Smetters(2006)

Analytical

Analytical

CGE

2 countries: domestic (OECD)
and foreign(ROW)

2 countries: domestic (OECD)
and foreign(ROW)

2 countries: domestic (OECD)
and foreign(ROW)

2 sectors OECD, 1 Sector
ROW

5 sectors per country

4 sectors per country

3 factors: labor, capital and
government services vs.
models with two factors

3 factors: land, labor and
capital; land is only used in
non-corporate tradable
(agriculture) sector in each
country

3 factors: land, labor and capital
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Constant Returns to Scale and
product exhaustion for labor
and capital, with IRS in
government input models

Constant Returns to Scale and
product exhaustion

CES production functions

Producer level perfect
competition, combined with
country level market power

Producer level perfect
competition, combined with
country level market power
and perfect substitution

Producer level perfect
competition, combined with
country level market
power/perfect substitution

Labor perfectly mobile within
countries, not internationallysupply fixed in each country

Labor perfectly mobile within
countries, not internationallysupply fixed in each country

Labor perfectly mobile within
countries, not internationallysupply fixed in each country

Capital perfectly mobilesupply fixed worldwide

Capital perfectly mobilesupply fixed worldwide

Capital perfectly mobile and
substitution elasticity based on
rates of return-supply fixed
worldwide ( but also consider
variations)

No ownership, GDP studied
and not GNP

Ownership of factors of
production allowed-labor
confined to own country,
capital deployed in either
country, but capital owners
can‟t move

Ownership of factors of
production allowed- labor
confined to own country, capital
deployed in either country, but
capital owners can‟t move

Consumers identical, can
consume all home goods and
traded goods

Consumers identical, can
consume 5 home goods and/or
3 foreign goods

Nested CES consumption
functions. Consumers identical,
can consume 4 home goods
and/or 2 foreign goods

Marginal return to investment
same (excluding producer level
taxes and risk premia)
everywhere in the world

Marginal return to investment
Case of imperfect capital
same (excluding producer level substitution across countries,
taxes) everywhere in the world domestic and foreign rates of
return not same considered

No perfect substitutes, each
country produces unique goods

Outputs of sectors One and
Four (1st corporate tradable
and the non-corporate tradable
sectors) in each country are
perfect substitutes; output of
sector two (2nd corporate

Imperfect product substitution
in sector one(traded corporate),
perfect substitution in traded
non-corporate good
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tradable sector) in each
country are unique
Production and consumption
shares based on literature
review

Initial consumer expenditures
on all 6 consumed goods in
each country proportional to
shares of worldwide
production

Domestic consumption and
exports of sector one equal to
output for each country,
worldwide production of sector
two equal to worldwide
consumption, and consumption
equal to output in non-traded
goods for each country

Government expenditures to be Neutral government
examined and two alternatives expenditure – no government
compared
expenditures effects

Neutral government
expenditure – no government
expenditures effects

No country capital investment
risk

No risk

Portfolio substitution elasticity
that is not infinite

Existing Capital Income Tax,
Consumption tax

New Corporate Income Tax
and several Replacement
Taxes (income from capital,
wages and consumption)
discussed

Corporate Income Tax

Sources and Uses side impacts

Sources and Uses side impacts

Sources and Uses side impacts

Income effects included

No income effects

Real burdens calculated using
different weighted price indices

ROW single product is
numeraire

Sector One output in each
country identical and its price
is set as numeraire

Sector Two output in each
country identical and used as
numeraire

Data driven

Share of capital and labor
explicitly the same for sector
one in each country

Factor shares and output shares
same for all 4 sectors in each
country

Data driven

Input Substitution Elasticities
the same across all sectors and
both countries

Initial Input Substitution
Elasticities the same across all
sectors and both countries and
equal to one, simulations done
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GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS USED IN ALL MODELS
If only one representative consumer is assumed per economy and we do not
consider issues of cross-border ownership of factors of production, then distribution
issues can be considered only between countries. All income generated in a country will
go to the same consumer, regardless of ownership of factors of production. Even if
ownership of factors of production is introduced, the one consumer in a country gets all
the labor income accruing to that country, since labor is internationally immobile. The
difference is in the case of capital, which is mobile across countries. Here the distinction
between GDP and GNP can have significant effects, depending on whether we assume
substantial cross-border ownership of capital relative to total stocks or not and whether
the jurisdiction is a net importer or exporter of capital.
If ownership or deployment of either resource is substantially more skewed across
countries than relative income then redistribution between capital and labor will impact
national incomes, and at the national level overall welfare still can change significantly
due to taxes and expenditures. For our dissertation, we have used GDP. In the base case,
if the OECD country is not a net exporter or importer of capital, GDP equals GNP in this
type of model. Secondly, while acknowledging that GNP is the more appropriate measure
of national income, with immobile labor and equal proportions of cross-border
investment in both countries to start with, the difference is negligible. It also allows us to
abstract away from issues such as home bias and risk premia and focus on the effects of
spillovers. For the U.S., as well as the E.U. (the two jurisdictions large enough to change
the worldwide rate of return to capital by their actions alone) the difference is not very
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significant. A quick comparison for the U.S. based on WDI data is presented in table 2
below.
The only other entity as large as the U.S. in the sense that it could affect the world
return to capital unilaterally would be the E.U. taken together, or at least the countries of
the Euro zone. Perhaps one can see that other countries such as China may be large
enough to be included in this category in the future, but in my opinion it is not so large at
present.
Table 2

Ratio of U.S. GDP to GNI Based on WDI Data

Series Name
GNI (current U.S.$) MILLIONS
GDP (current U.S.$)
MILLIONS

YR2003
YR2004
10916100 11687900

YR2005
12439300

YR2006
13209000

YR2007
13827247

10908000 11630900

12376100

13132900

13751395

RATIO OF GDP TO GNI

0.99926

0.99492

0.99424

0.99451

0.99512

SOURCE: World Development Indicators Online (Provided by the World Bank)
available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2,
accessed through GSU library on 5/1/2010
The same comparison is presented below for Euro-Zone countries from WDI data,
and for the Euro-Zone countries the results are similar, there is almost no difference
between the GDP and GNI.
Table 3 Ratio of Combined Euro-Zone GDP to GNI Based on WDI
Series Name
GNI (current U.S.$) MILLIONS
GDP (current U.S.$)
MILLIONS

YR2003
8472745
8527649

YR2004
9766332
9765862

YR2005
10132559
10148194

YR2006
10757603
10743647

YR2007
12300256
12319397

RATIO OF GDP TO GNI

1.006480

0.999952

1.001543

0.998703

1.001556

SOURCE: World Development Indicators Online (Provided by the World Bank)
available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2,
accessed through GSU library on 6/1/2010
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Harberger (1995 and 2006), Gravelle and Smetters (2001 and 2006) and Randolph
(2006), have used up to three factors of production in their models: land, labor and
capital. Adding government introduces a fourth factor. In our models, we have omitted
land, and introduced an active government in two models and a passive or neutral transfer
program in the other two.
Harberger (1995 and 2006), Gravelle and Smetters (2001 and 2006) and Randolph
(2006) use four or five sectors in their models. The five sectors per country assumption
have specific effects on the derivation of results for the analytical model, and the
introduction of land as a factor of production into the non-corporate tradable sector
(agriculture) also has a specific reason. Dropping the distinction between corporate and
non-corporate sectors in the OECD country and collapsing the rest of the world into one
sector allows us to concentrate on the issue of spillovers across countries while allowing
for the existence of non-traded goods. It also allows us to abstract away from the problem
of mobility of labor within the consolidated ROW, since farmers in China could not
actually work on farms in Armenia.
This dissertation explicitly follows the Harberger model as laid out in Harberger
(1962, 1995 and 2008) as closely as possible to keep results comparable. The basic
Harberger (1962) model has the following sets of equations:
(a) Demand

(b) Supply

(c) Price formation

(d) Substitution

(e) Adding-up or balance equations.
The steps envisaged in each of the chapters that follow are (1) The assumptions
of the model in general will be laid out (2) The assumptions for deriving each set of
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equations will be discussed in detail and each set of equations derived (3) The model will
be reduced by eliminating unknowns and equations to a set of 4 equations in 4 unknowns
(4) The equations for estimating GDP and welfare effects will be derived (5) Solutions
for the model will be discussed and the procedure to use these for analysis will be
discussed. Subsequent chapters will compare the capital income tax model and the
consumption tax model with the more traditional case where the government provides a
transfer payment instead of an input into production; discuss data and finally analyze
solutions and draw conclusions.
GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS
There are two “countries,” an OECD country such as the U.S. that is large enough
to be treated as a large open economy, and the Rest of the World (ROW). The subscript
“O” will be used to denote variables particular to the OECD country and “R” for the
other. When no country subscript is used, it can be assumed that the variable is common
to both or encompasses both.
There are two productive sectors in the OECD country, X (the tradable goods
sector) and Y (the non-tradable goods sector). The ROW has one consolidated sector Z,
and no assumption is made about it except that the good is tradable. The only difference
from the standard analysis is that since there is no separate corporate and non-corporate
sector, the corporation tax is replaced by a capital income tax that applies to both the
tradable and non-tradable sectors of the OECD country.
Capital is perfectly mobile all over the world. Following Harberger (1962) we
assume that the net rate of return to capital is always equal around the world. This does
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not imply that there are no risk differentials across countries, but that given those
(known) differentials; we are able to isolate the pure, risk-free rate of return. This helps
us to focus on the gross rate of return in the OECD country including the capital income
tax, which is expressed as an ad valorem rate.
The tax rate on capital in OECD is Tko initially, and is assumed to be a known
parameter, as is the proposed rate change dTko. As pointed out in Ballentine and Eris
(1975), the expression Pk*(1+Tko) reduces to Pk only when Tko =0, and the change in
gross price d[Pk*(1+Tko)] = dPk + Tko only when the initial tax is zero. We are interested
in modeling the case when the OECD country decides to lower its capital income tax to
attract a greater share of the world‟s capital (simulating tax competition); and so the
existing tax is not zero.
The gross rate of return to capital in the OECD country is defined as Pk*(1+Tko),
and is the same in both OECD sectors, X andY. The rate of return to capital in the ROW
is simply Pk. Thus, we do not use any country or sector subscript when we talk about
capital‟s net rate of return; it is the same across all sectors and countries. The same
reasoning applies to the consumption tax or TCo. While the price of capital remains Pk or
Pk + dPk , the consumer prices in the OECD country are Px*(1+TCo), Py*(1+TCo),
Pz*(1+TCo), and are Px and Pz in ROW to begin with.
The total amount of capital is fixed worldwide; there is no saving, capital
accumulation or growth in productive resources.

= Kx + Ky + Kz is fixed. While dKx ≠

0, dKy ≠ 0 and dKz ≠ 0 in general, we get the relationship dKx + dKy + dKz =0 for the
world as a whole. Since Tko ≠ 0 and dTko ≠ 0 and (Tko + dTko) ≠ 0 in general (though we

22

may assume it to be so if necessary), we always have a positive tax on capital as well as
on consumption. Note that this does not need to be interpreted literally. This could simply
be the excess or differential tax on capital in the “taxing” country, which it views as too
high and seeks to reduce it to compete more effectively with other countries for mobile
capital. In case countries feel their consumption tax rates are too high, they may consider
reducing these to attract investment as well, or to stimulate aggregate demand.
Labor is constant and confined within each country. Since the ROW is treated as
one country and one sector (Z), the total labor available to sector Z is equal to the total
ROW labor and is fixed at

which is equal to Lrow. The total labor available to the

OECD country is Loecd and this is also fixed as the sum of the labor employed in sectors
X and Y. Thus Lx + Ly = Loecd and

is fixed. This leads to two prices for labor: Plo

and Plr for OECD and ROW respectively that are not in general the same. While we have
assumed a fixed worldwide labor supply and abstracted away from issue of (a) mobility
within the ROW (b) less than full employment and (c) taxes lost when there are taxes on
labor: since the return to labor falls as a result of a tax on capital due to capital flight this
implies lower yields from labor taxes as well if they are not reduced if the total income of
labor falls.
Adding up of a diverse set of countries (developed, newly industrialized and
developing) into a consolidated ROW with one sector where full employment is assumed
is an abstraction from reality to keep our model simple and follow the existing literature.
Doing so ignores issues of labor immobility in the unskilled labor market, extensive
under-employment in the developing countries and effects of labor taxation in developed
countries. Introducing such complications is left to further research, and the focus here is
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on the main contribution – adding a non-neutral government. Further, the consumption
tax does tax labor input as well, and presents some contrast to the CIT. This again does
not imply that adding more realism to the labor side of the models is not desirable, but
effects in the simpler models we deal with will be present in more advanced models as
well, and it is standard to abstract away from more complicated reality in theory to focus
on effects we are more interested in to begin with.
The labor assumptions also lead to two further balancing or adding up equations,
namely that dLz =0 and that dLx + dLy = 0. Therefore each labor price can also change
independently implying dPlo ≠ 0 and dPlr ≠ 0 in general. However, as we shall see later,
due to the dLz =0 assumption, in our model Plr is effectively a residual. This is not at all
necessary, it is purely for convenience. All models have assumed labor immobility across
countries, as well as full employment in each country. To introduce market pricing for
labor and substitution of inputs in ROW, we simply need to have two sectors in ROW as
well, a tradable and non-tradable sector. This has been avoided only to simplify the
analytical solutions of the reduced form models. Since the results are derived using the
extended version of each model in MATLAB, it is relatively easy to introduce these
elements if desired.
There is one consumer in each country. The consolidated demand function refers
to the OECD single consumer and the ROW single consumer. The country superscript is
interchangeable with the consumer subscript. We also ignore ownership issues by using
GDP instead of GNP. This allows us to treat income generated in a country as income
belonging to the consumer in that country. In a GDP based measure, income earned
within the geographical area of a country counts as GDP, even if the income belongs to
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non-residents. Similarly, income earned by nationals outside the geographical limits of
the country is not included in home GDP. A GNP measure (and national income usually
relates to GNP and not GDP) would consider income earned by nationals abroad, and
exclude the income of foreign nationals earned in the home country. However, the
distinction in terms of our model is not quite so sharp. Since labor is immobile between
countries by assumption, the only difference is in the return to capital.
It is possible to use a GNP measure as well in this model, and it is not used
mainly for analytical convenience even though it is a better measure of welfare. One
issue that arises is that for the U.S. and Euro-zone, GDP and GNP are almost the same.
This implies that net factor income from abroad is either negligible, or that net labor and
capital income balance each other. We have assumed that labor is immobile and lives,
earns and consumes in their domestic area. If we continue to assume that capital owners
earn capital income from abroad, we ignore the balancing factor seen in the data and we
then have a model where we consider the effects on one source of factor income from
abroad and ignore the equal and opposite other source.
If we had used GNP (as in Randolph 2006), we would make a data-based
allocation of capital ownership between residents of the OECD and ROW that would
have to be static in the sense that we would have no way to tell beforehand how capital
owned by residents of OECD would behave differently from capital owned by ROW
residents. Using GDP also allows us to abstract away from issues of “home bias” in
capital investment that has been extensively documented which, in my opinion, does
some damage to a model with perfectly mobile capital and ownership that does not
include risk.
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In the base case the two measures (GDP and GNP) are equal given no net capital
importing and spillovers if labor is immobile. For the U.S. and E.U. the tables above
show that that is also statistically the case. Given perfect mobility of capital and an
equalized rate of return and no risk premium, using a GDP measure is a close
approximation of GNP based welfare (income) and reduces the complexity of assigning
capital income without accounting for other effects seen in the data.
When we use a GNP measure, foreigner‟s capital attracted to the home country
still counts as foreign capital and the income still counts as foreign capital income. In a
GDP measure, capital attracted from one country to another counts as a diversion of
capital and its earnings. If we think of spillovers as foreigners paying our tax, a GNP
based measure would capture this. A GDP measure however, does not. The income from
capital that moves to another country now becomes part of the other country‟s GDP and
the effect on the ROW depends on the change in earnings of labor and loss of capital
income.
A perfect capital income tax that works on the GNP principle would tax residents‟
capital income regardless of where that capital is located. However, as discussed by
Randolph (2006) this condition of Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) is violated in practice
by the U.S. and most foreign corporate income taxes. Other studies based on actual
investment behavior by corporations such as Grubert (2004) and Altshuler and Grubert
(2008) also support the view that CEN is not achieved in practice by the U.S. tax system
as a result of international tax rules, transfer pricing, shifting of assets and corporate
behavior in general. Therefore, it does not do great violence to the model to use GDP
instead of GNP for this reason either.

26

The production functions in each sector X, Y and Z are homogenous of degree
one (HOD 1) in capital and labor. When the Government input G is added in the OECD
sectors, the production functions behave like they are homogeneous of degree greater
than one (increasing returns to scale) in all three inputs. This can be modeled as a case
where the government input is both labor and capital augmenting, or where the addition
of G acts a shift factor to the supply curve which is drawn for capital and labor. A
somewhat similar formulation is the technology-augmented version of the Solow growth
model discussed in Romer (2006) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). This point is
illustrated more fully in each relevant chapter.
Perfect competition is assumed and taxes are the only distortion. Adjustments to
changes in discretionary parameters are instantaneous. Like the literature before us, we
also extend the model from infinitesimally small changes to slightly larger, discrete ones,
concentrating only on first round effects and ignoring higher order terms.
Following Harberger (1962), we assume that all prices are unity to begin with,
and that all quantity units are defined accordingly to make their prices equal to one. This
allows us to measure quantities as dollar amounts. Accordingly, Pk, Plo and Plr (factor
prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output prices) are all equal to 1 and to each other to begin with.
Since our existing tax is ≠ 0, this implies that Pk*(1+Tko) ≠ 1 and analogously,
Px*(1+TCo) ≠ 1.
No assumption is made about how the historical (excess) rate of tax on capital in
the OECD country was set. Zodrow and Meiszkowski (1986), Noiset (1995), Matsumoto
(1998, 2000) and Benassy-Quere, Gobalraja and Trannoy (2007) have examined the issue
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of the optimal provision of public goods and the optimal tax rate in situations of tax
competition in some detail, and this is not the objective here. We assume that a known
historical rate exists, whether optimal or not, and that a policy decision is made to reduce
it, with the intention of making the OECD country more competitive in attracting capital
vis-à-vis the ROW.
The total amount of the public good provided, G is simply equal to the tax
revenue or government expenditure. It is assumed that every dollar of expenditure on the
government good leads to one unit of increase in the level of G (and the reverse is also
true). There is no price for the government good since it is not a produced input, there are
no compliance or administrative costs.
We also assume that the government good G is an input into production in the
OECD sectors X and Y, it is a non-rival and non-excludable public good and its quantity
is dependent solely upon available tax revenues in the current period. In the chapters with
transfer payments, there is no active government input. We can assume therefore that it is
government current services (perhaps maintenance) and not new investment that is being
provided with the tax revenue. Alternatively, we can assume that it is infrastructure that
does not last beyond one period, and that does not add to the stock of capital.
The CIT tax is collected like an excise tax on capital employed by the X and Y
sectors only. The consumption tax is collected on sales of final goods in the OECD
country only and includes imports. It is not applied to OECD exports. The ROW sector
has no tax on its capital, consumption and no government input in its production function.
The government good G, once provided, can be used by both X and Y in the same
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quantity, and no separate payment is made for its use, other than the tax on capital
employed by X and Y, or the consumption tax paid.
No explicit restrictions are imposed on demand curves other than that they can be
separated into OECD and ROW demand. The equations are derived without assuming
that they are HOD Zero in prices and incomes, and any set of elasticities that satisfy
consistency conditions for Walrasian general equilibrium are possible. In practice,
however, it is demonstrated that the HOD Zero retriction with matching elasticities may
be crucial to the results, and a review of the literature does not support clearly any stand
on this issue.
In chapter two, we develop the model of the capital income tax with government
input. In chapter three, we model the consumption tax with government input. In chapter
four, we present both models with a transfer payment only. Chapter five is used to
conduct an extensive literature review to obtain usable parameters. The analytical
solutions of chapters two, three and four and the data from chapter five are used to
simulate results and draw conclusions with respect to our research questions in chapter
six.
One last caveat is inserted here to ensure that we do not pre-judge what follows in
this dissertation by using terms such as “burden” in conjunction with spillovers. This is
simply with reference to the most famous result in public economics based mostly on
several papers by Prof Harberger that show that imposing a tax (or raising it) in the initial
state without distortions imposes an excess “burden.” We take this result as given for the
models specified in his work, and base our work on modifications of the models that gave
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rise to this result. In light of the result (Harberger, 1962) that when there are no other
distortions, imposing a tax (or increasing it) should reduce GDP in a closed economy (our
excess “burden”): we have gone on to investigate the opposite case. Reducing a tax or
removing it should have the opposite relative effect to this base case; it should increase
GDP and lower the excess burden. We state this only with reference to and relative to the
existing literature, and not to anticipate results.
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CHAPTER II

- THE CAPITAL INCOME TAX

The purpose of this chapter is to extend the Harberger model to the case of tax
competition in an open economy setting where the OECD country lowers its capital
income tax to compete with the rest of the world for mobile capital. The intention is to
follow the Harberger model as laid out in Harberger (1962, 1995 and 2008) as closely as
possible to keep results comparable. As noted earlier, this treatment is new in three
respects. First, no distinction is made between corporate and non-corporate sectors and
the distribution of income within a country. A tax on all capital deployed in the OECD is
used. Second, a government-provided public input paid for out of tax revenues is used in
the production of goods in both sectors in the tax-imposing country. Third, in later
chapters, the model of this chapter is compared to models with a consumption tax and to
two models without the government input. These comparisons allow us to isolate burdens
on both the sources and uses sides of GDP in both jurisdictions.
This chapter focuses on setting up the capital income tax model with government
input and deriving the necessary equations. We also reduce the model to 4 equations in 4
unknowns and discuss how an analytical solution may be obtained for reductions in the
tax on capital. The complicated nature of these solutions for the unknown terms (as can
be seen from symbolic solutions in the appendix) makes such an exercise hard to
interpret. In later chapters we will arrive at possible values for parameters and discuss
solutions based on estimates available in the literature. In chapters 2-4, the models are set
up and derived; chapter 5 discusses data possibilities, and chapter 6 discusses results and
solutions based on this data. We shall reiterate the assumptions made for this model, and
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when general assumptions specified in chapter one are used they shall not be elaborated
further.
ASSUMPTIONS
There are two “countries,” an OECD country such as the U.S. that is large enough
to be treated as a large open economy, and the Rest of the World (ROW). There are two
productive sectors in the OECD country, X (the tradable goods sector) and Y (the nontradable goods sector). The ROW has one consolidated sector Z, and no assumption is
made about it except that the good is tradable.
Capital is perfectly mobile all over the world. Following Harberger (1962) we
assume that the net rate of return to capital is always equal around the world. Since we
assume ( as in Harberger 1962) that the pure, risk-free rate of return to capital can be
isolated in the large OECD country while the rest of the world pays a risk premium for
capital, the OECD country cannot tax the premium at all with its differential existing tax,
only the pure rate of return is taxed.
If we were to include a risk premium for any sectors or the ROW or OECD
country, it would have been added to the pure rate of return, and it need not be constant.
We could have a risk premium/premia that is/are increasing in the proportion of capital
stock attracted by a particular country or sector(s) as implied in Gravelle and Smetters
(2006). To the extent that such risk premia are paid in some sector of the OECD country,
they are taxed by the (differential) tax on capital, when they apply to the ROW
exclusively; they are not taxed. This need not be taken literally to mean that the ROW
never taxes its capital. We have discussed in earlier sections how the tax on capital in
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OECD may be viewed as an excess or differential tax, over and above the worldwide
rate.
The tax rate on capital in OECD is Tko initially, and is assumed to be a known
parameter, as is the proposed rate change dTko. The gross rate of return to capital in the
OECD country is defined as Pk*(1+Tko), and is the same in both OECD sectors, X and Y.
The rate of return to capital in the ROW is simply Pk. The total amount of capital is fixed
worldwide and the model is static; there is no saving, capital accumulation or growth in
productive resources.

= Kx + Ky + Kz is fixed. While dKx ≠ 0, dKy ≠ 0 and dKz ≠ 0 in

general, we get the relationship dKx + dKy + dKz =0 for the world as a whole. Since Tko ≠
0 and dTko ≠ 0 and (Tko + dTko) ≠ 0 in general, we always have a positive tax on capital.
Labor is constant and confined within each country. Since the ROW is treated as
one country and one sector (Z), the total labor available to sector Z is equal to the total
ROW labor and is fixed at

which is equal to Lrow. The total labor available to the

OECD country is Loecd and this is also fixed as the sum of the labor employed in sectors
X and Y.
There is one consumer in each country. The consolidated demand function refers
to the OECD single consumer and the ROW single consumer. The country superscript is
interchangeable with the consumer subscript. The issues of factor ownership and income
calculation have been discussed in chapter one and are not repeated here.
We also assume that the government good G is an input into production in the
OECD sectors X and Y, it is a non-rival and non-excludable public good and its quantity
is dependent solely upon available tax revenues in the current period. We can assume
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therefore that it is government current services and not investment that is being provided
with the tax revenue. Alternative construction is possible as in McLure (1969). This
would involve G being produced using K and L, and would have a price that would be a
weighted average of the prices of K and L. The total amount of G produced, weighted by
the price of G or PG would be equal to tax revenues. The demand for G would not be
derived demand since producers don‟t pay directly for G.
However, implications of the simpler model would also exist in a more
complicated one as well, there would of course be further elements added to the analysis
by fully defining production of G. In the interests of simplicity and transparency, and
keeping in mind that we can gain the essentials without repeating McLure‟s (1969) more
developed analysis of G where G was a final consumption good and not an input, we
have chosen not to model production of G fully and left this for future models.
The differential tax on capital in the OECD is collected like an excise tax on
capital employed by the X and Y sectors only. The ROW sector has no tax on its capital
and no government input in its production function. The government good G, once
provided, can be used by both X and Y in the same quantity, and no separate payment is
made for its use, other than the tax on capital employed by X and Y.
The production functions in each sector X, Y and Z are homogenous of degree
one (HOD 1) in capital and labor. When the Government input G is added in the OECD
sectors, the production functions behave like they are homogeneous of degree greater
than one (increasing returns to scale) in all three inputs. This can be modeled as a case
where the government input is both labor and capital augmenting, or where the addition
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of G acts a shift factor to the supply curve which is drawn for capital and labor. If we
define the production functions as Cobb-Douglas, the G would enter as a scale or shift
factor, in a manner similar to technology or human capital in growth models. This point
is illustrated more fully below.
Perfect competition is assumed and taxes are the only distortion. Changes are
instantaneous, the model is an exercise in comparative statics, and there is no time
dimension or dynamic factors such as savings, accumulation and growth. Following
Harberger (1962), we concentrate only on first difference terms based on small changes.
To illustrate, this means that for a pair of variables P*X that can both change, the total
change is calculated thus: d(P*X) = (P+ dP)*(X+dX) – P*X = dP*X + dX*P + dX*dP.
However, if both dP and dX are small, their product dX*dP is even smaller and is
ignored.
Following Harberger (1962), we employ the convenient formulation that all prices
(output and input) are set to unity to begin with and are allowed to change with respect to
the numeraire (Pz), and that all quantity units are defined accordingly to make their prices
equal to one. We can do this since we use quantities only as ratios in our equations, and
so their units do not matter. This allows us to measure quantities as dollar amounts in the
initial state. Accordingly, Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output prices)
are all equal to 1 and to each other to begin with and are allowed to change with respect
to the numeraire. There is no price for G, so we are in effect formulating G as invariant to
inflation. Since our existing tax is ≠ 0, this implies that Pk*(1+Tko) ≠ 1.
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The total amount of the public good provided, G is simply equal to the tax
revenue or government expenditure. It is assumed that every dollar of expenditure on the
government good leads to one unit of increase in the level of G (and the reverse is also
true). There is no price for the government good since it is not a produced input.
Lastly, we take the price of the ROW tradable good Pz as the numeraire good, so
dPz = 0. We have effectively imposed the condition that imports equal exports while
formulating the demand equations and choosing elasticities in chapter five. We could
have instead had trade imbalance with BOP balance. To do this, we could have borrowed
an idea from open economy macroeconomics where the capital account balances the
trade account. The capital account in this model could have been represented by net
capital inflows or outflows that balance the trade deficit or surplus. BOP balance
conditions have been imposed in some of the other models cited but has not been
attempted here, and the simpler formulation of trade balance has been used instead. This
allows us to retain the real model with no currency considerations, and the use of the
single foreign good Pz as the numeraire allows us to treat other goods prices Px and Py as
some measure of terms of trade between OECD and ROW.
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION BEHAVIOR BY FIRMS (SECTORS)
The production functions for each sector can be written as a function of productive
resources:
X = f (Kx , Lx, G)

Y = g (Ky, Ly, G)

Z = h (Kz, Lz)

{Where the amount of G is common to both X and Y, G is a public good}

36

The sector is synonymous with the firm. Since CRS industries imply that the size
of the firm is indeterminate, we speak of the sector and firm interchangeably, like each
sector were one giant firm. However, we have also assumed perfect competition, so each
firm (sector) acts like an atomistic price-taker in all markets. Specifically, we assume that
firms do not recognize the externality associated with paying taxes that support the public
good G. When sector X employs more capital, this implies more tax revenue and thus
more of the public good, provided sector Y does not employ less capital. However, we
assume that each sector behaves as if it cannot predict what the other would do.
Thus, each firm behaves in the following way in the OECD country: they take as
given the present or historical level of G, they believe that production function they face
is CRS (HOD 1) in capital and labor employed by them for this fixed given level of G,
they ignore the effect of their actions in employing capital on the level of G since they
cannot tell if the other firm (sector) will free ride and reduce the amount of capital hired,
they take all factor and output prices as given, and they take the price of capital in OECD
as Pk*(1+Tko). Firms then try to maximize profit by choosing the levels of capital and
labor they can employ.
Following Matsumoto (1998), the firm‟s choices can be modeled in the following
way. The firm perceives the production function faced by it as:
X = f (Kx , Lx, )
Where

Y = g (Ky, Ly, )

Z = h (Kz, Lz)

is taken as fixed and given at the historical level which is assumed unchanged.

The profit maximization problem can then be set up in the following way.
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FIRM (SECTOR) X
Maximize Π (profit) = { Px* f (Kx , Lx,

) - Pk*(1+Tko)*Kx – Plo*Lx } with respect to Kx

and Lx
First order conditions:

1.

Px*

- Pk*(1+Tko) = 0

And
2. Px*

- Plo = 0

Since Px = 1, this implies that

= Pk*(1+Tko) and

= Plo

Each firm pays each factor its marginal product at the current level of provision of
the public good. In the case of capital in OECD, this is the gross of tax rate of return.
Firms do not have to pay for G directly.
FIRM (SECTOR) Y

Behaves in exactly the same way as X, and so we get

= Pk*(1+Tko) and

FIRM (SECTOR) Z
Since there is no government good or tax in the ROW we have only the production
function Z = h (Kz,

) and the problem for firm Z:

= Plo
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Maximize Π (profit) = { Pz* h (Kz ,

) - Pk*Kz – Plr*

} with respect to Kz { since we

assume full employment always in both countries, choosing Lz is not a decision variable
} and we get

= Pk

Suppose alternatively that each firm had recognized that G is a function of K employed
by it and that by choosing K, it was also choosing the level of G. For firm X, the first
order condition would then have been:

Px*

+ Px*

*

- Pk*(1+Tko) = 0

Both firms in the OECD (X and Y) ignore the externality implied by the second
term since they view G =

or

= 0 and /or

= 0. This is also possible since they

do not have to make any payment for the use of G once it is provided; they only have to
pay the tax on capital employed by them. Each firm is also not sure of how their use of
capital is related to the others. If each firm assumes the other will be a free rider, then
increasing use of K by one may lead to no change in total K in OECD if the other firm
(sector) reduces its capital use.
CHANGES IN THE AD VALOREM TAX RATE
We represent the ad valorem tax rate as Pk*(1+Tko), with Pk =1 but Pk*(1+Tko) ≠
1. When Pk = 1, Pk*(1+Tko) = 1 + Tko and when we want to know d(Pk*(1+Tko)) we use
the expansion d(Pk*(1+Tko)) = d(Pk + Pk*Tko) = (1 + Tko)*dPk + dTko . In the Harberger
(1962) model, Tko is zero initially and dTko = Tko when the tax is set, leading to the
expression d(Pk*(1+Tko))= dPk + Tko when Pk =1 for this model. As discussed in
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Ballentine and Eris (1975), this is not the case when the initial tax is not zero, and thus
dTko ≠ Tko in general. We use d(Pk*(1+Tko)) = d(Pk + Pk*Tko) = (1 + Tko)*dPk + dTko
GOVERNMENT
We have assumed that the government good G does not suffer from loss in value
due to inflation, and that the dollar value of expenditure on G equals the amount of G
available. Thus, in the initial case G = Pk*Tko*(Kx + Ky) or G = Tko*(Kx + Ky) since Pk =
1 to start with. We do not have a derived demand for this factor due to two reasons; the
factor does not have a direct price, and neither firm can control how much is provided
since both pay for the input through tax revenue. Since G actually equals tax revenue
collected, the only decision variable for the government is the tax rate. Once the rate is
set (arbitrarily) the tax revenue and thus the amount of G is determined by the economy.
Now we want an expression for dG = d(Pk*Tko*(Kx + Ky))
dG = Tko*(Kx + Ky)* dPk + Pk*(Kx +Ky)*dTko + Pk*Tko*(dKx + dKy)
Expressing this as a proportional change:

= dPk +

+

*

+

*

SUPPLY
The production functions for the three sectors are:
X = f (Kx , Lx, G)

Y = g (Ky, Ly, G)

Z = h (Kz, Lz)

{Where the amount of G is common to both X and Y, G is a pure public good}
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SECTOR X
X = f (Kx , Lx, G)
The total change in supply (output) or the total differential can be split into:
dX =

* dKx +

* dLx +

* dG

Remembering that firms in sector X (at the existing level of G) equate
Pk*(1+Tko) and

=

= Plo and that Px = 1

*

Writing θkx =

And

=

θlx =

S1…………………..

+

*

+

*

*

the tax-inclusive share of capital‟s product in sector X

the share of labor‟s product in sector X, we get

= θkx *

+ θlx *

+

*

*

The last term in this equation works a little like a “Solow residual” in the sense
that like technology, the factor augmenting government good provides a third path for
output to grow, beyond what would have been captured by growth in capital and labor
alone (Solow 1957, Romer 2006). When production is CRS in K and L, and factor shares
θkx + θlx = 1, this term shows the growth in output that cannot be accounted for by
changes in K and L.
Similarly, for SECTOR Y we have:
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S2………...............

Where

θky =

And

θly =

= θky *

+ θly *

+

*

*

the tax-inclusive share of capital‟s product in sector Y

the share of labor‟s product in sector Y.

SECTOR Z
There is no tax and no government good in the ROW, so the relevant terms for this
sector:
S3a………...............

= θkz *

But dLz = 0 by assumption (Lrow =
S3………...............

+

*

*

is fixed), so we can write the above as:

= θkz *

This gives us our three supply equations.
PRICE FORMATION
When the firm (sector) has a production function that is HOD 1, and the supply
curve exhibits CRS technology, the market equilibrium can be shown by the following
graph that shows what would happen in the CRS situation when a fresh tax is imposed
but no G is provided:
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FIGURE 1

Initial Tax in the CRS Case
At equilibrium, payments to factors of production exhaust total
product when technology is CRS, shown by the shaded area.
Each factor is paid its marginal product. This is drawn assuming
no government G and no taxes, only factors are capital and
labor. There is no producers’ surplus (profit) and so changes in
factor prices will cause costs and equilibrium price to change.
The tax shifts supply price up and causes quantity to fall and
price to rise by the full amount of the tax. The marble shaded
area representing the tax paid is not paid to factors.

Price

Pe TAX

Supply TAX

Pe

Supply

Demand

o
Qe TAX

Quantity
Qe

However, what happens when we have a certain level of G? Here we assume that
G increases productivity of both factors such that it shifts the entire supply curve down
without changing the shape. It is this supply curve with the fixed G =

that the firms

(sectors) X and Y in OECD took as given and paid capital and labor their marginal
product. Suppose G were to increase in such a way as to leave the CRS supply curve‟s
shape unchanged, this would lead to a lowering of price and an expansion of equilibrium
output. The reverse would happen if G were lowered.
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Thus, there are two sources of change in price: one caused by changes in the price
paid to capital (inclusive of the tax) and labor and the second when output expands or
contracts due to change in the level of G. Suppose the level of G is increased so as not to
change the slope of the supply curve, so that factors of production (capital and labor only
since G is not paid for directly by the sector) are still paid the total product at the new
level of G. If the total productivity increase due to G is exactly equal to total loss in
income due to a tax, and total product is exactly equal to total income the result is no
deficiency in aggregate demand. Since we have no savings and investment, all product
must eventually return to capital and labor.
FIGURE 2 Taxes and Provision of G in the CRS Case

There are two sources of shift in the supply curve. First, if
factor prices were to change and stay lower, the supply
curve would shift down, and the same would happen if
marginal productivity changes with the introduction of the
factor augmenting G. All this is assumed not to change the
shape and slope of the supply curve. The new G returns
the supply curve to where it was earlier before the tax was
imposed; even at the tax inclusive factor price. This is
obviously an assumption, for a public good provided to all
sectors need not be equally productive in each sector.

Price

PeTAX

Supply TAX
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We do not know a priori if total payments to factors are equal to, less than or
more than the previous case when G is changed. When we impose a tax, VMP would
increase if G is provided. However, what prevents a corner solution is the fact that (a)
imposing the tax also has an excess burden that reduces VMP and (b) the fact that the
marginal efficiency of investment/capital is not constant. Therefore, a tax would only be
imposed to the extent that the net increase in VMP was positive. If we have a declining
MEI and an increasing excess burden of taxation that should be sufficient for a large
enough economy to ensure that we do not have a corner solution.
Even the proposition that the change in tax and provision of G causes no change
in the CRS shape of the supply curve but shifts it can be modified as shown below to
accommodate IRS or DRS effects. However, the assumption that changes in factor prices
are passed on to output prices in the same proportion as existing factor shares that is
characteristic of Harberger (1962) and variants based both on his famous model and
Jones (1965). Without CRS, we cannot have a one-to-one correspondence between the
tax rate and supply price changes.
We continue to use this feature for price formation, with the caveat that there is
now an extra term, that of change in output price caused by the variation in G in addition
to the changes in factor prices caused by variation in the tax. The increase in G is
assumed to add back to factor returns through the increased product exactly as much as
the initial tax had taken away (without G). While this is only required to hold in the
aggregate for total incomes to equal total product, whether this holds in each industry is
open to debate. Keynesian economics is based on the contention that aggregate factor
incomes are too little to purchase output, but when we eliminate money, savings,
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investment and force trade balance, such an assumption (inequality in each industry)
implies specific knowledge of the productivity of government input by sector, which we
may not have.
SECTOR X
Suppose we did not know what the production function for X looked like when
we included all factors K, L and G. If it is CRS for K and L alone, we can think of it as
IRS with all three being varied. From Euler‟s law we can write this as:

* Kx +

* Lx +

* G = A*X (where A > 1 and A is the degree of homogeneity)

Now we know that sector X does not have to pay for G, but has to pay the tax on
K used. If K and L are paid their marginal products with no tax, and if G had to be paid a
user fee equal to its marginal product, then payments to factors would equal A*X> X,
total product would be more than exhausted. However,

would have been equal to Pk

and not Pk*(1+Tko), so more capital would have been employed. Since G is not paid for
and we pay a tax on capital instead while assuming that for the economy as a whole the
total tax revenue equals the size of the government input which in turn is at least as
valuable as the tax revenue, we are interested in what the tax inclusive payment for
capital and payments to labor add up to in each sector. Let us say that:
* Kx +

* Lx = B*X (where X is a function of K, L and G, and the marginal

product paid to K includes the tax)
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We don‟t know what B is. B could be <, > or = 1 and < or = A. If we were to proceed
with B being unknown:
* Kx +

* Lx = B*Px*X

since Px =1 and if B is further assumed to be a

constant, then:

d(B*Px*X) = B*d(Px*X) = B*[ Px*dX + X*dPx] = d[

* Kx +

* Lx]

If we then continue with our assumption that firms pay marginal products:
B*[ Px*dX + X*dPx] = d[Pk*(1+Tko)* Kx + Plo* Lx]
⇨

[ Px*dX + X*dPx] = ( )* d[(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + Plo* Lx]

⇨

Px*dX + X*dPx = ( )* [d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + (Pk+Pk*Tko)* dKx + dPlo* Lx

+

Plo* dLx ]
From the supply equations and assumptions Px = 1 we know that Px*dX = dX and
dX =

⇨

* dKx +

* dLx +

* dG

Px*dX = Pk*(1+Tko)* dKx + Plo * dLx +

* dG

Substituting in our original equation:
Px*dX + X*dPx = ( )* [d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + (Pk+Pk*Tko)* dKx + dPlo* Lx + Plo* dLx ]

X*dPx = ( )* [d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + (Pk+Pk*Tko)* dKx + dPlo* Lx + Plo* dLx ] - Px*dX
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⇨

X*dPx = ( )* [d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + (Pk+Pk*Tko)* dKx + dPlo* Lx + Plo* dLx ] –

Pk*(1+Tko)* dKx - Plo * dLx -

* dG

Now, if we make the “heroic” assumption that factor payments to K and L
continue to just exhaust output, this implies that B =1. While we require that for the
economy as a whole, total payments to factors have to equal the value of total output to
prevent Keynesian deficiency of demand, we do not have to have this equality in each
sector. The total amount of G has to equal tax revenue for the economy, and the amount
of G is the same for each sector, but we can have that equality constraint for the economy
as a whole while total payments in each sector do not equal product in that sector. This
may be viewed as G having differential impacts on productivity across sectors, but it can
be seen that this can be easily incorporated into the model by placing suitable restrictions
on B in each sector. Continuing with B = 1:
X*dPx = [d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + (Pk+Pk*Tko)* dKx + dPlo* Lx + Plo* dLx ] –
Pk*(1+Tko)* dKx - Plo * dLx -

⇨

X*dPx = d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + dPlo* Lx -

⇨

X*dPx = Kx*dPk+ Kx*( dPk*Tko + Pk*dTko) + dPlo* Lx -

⇨

X*dPx = Kx*{(1 + Tko)* dPk + Pk*dTko} + dPlo* Lx -

Using Pk = 1, Plo = 1 and Px =1:

* dG

* dG

* dG

* dG
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dPx =

*dPk +

⇨

*

dPx = θkx * dPk + θkx *

+

*dPlo -

*

+ θlx * dPlo -

*

*

+ θly * dPlo -

*

*

*

…………………(P1)
Similarly for SECTOR Y
⇨

dPy = θky * dPk + θky *
…………………(P2)

SECTOR Z
There is no tax here. Suppose that total payments to capital in Z are a constant
proportion of the product. The residual is paid to labor. If b represents the baseline
payments proportion to capital in Z, and if b is assumed to be a constant, then:
b* Pz* Z = Pk * Kz : b<1and b is constant
[ Pz*dZ + Z*dPz] = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ]

Now from the supply equation for Z we know that: Pz*dZ = dZ (since Pz = 1) = Pk * dKz
⇨ Z*dPz = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ] - Pz*dZ

⇨ Z*dPz = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ] - Pk * dKz

⇨ dPz = ( )* [θkz *dPk + θkz *

] - θkz *

(Since Pk and Pz = 1, and θkz is tax-exclusive)
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⇨ dPz = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

)* θkz *

Now since we have chosen Pz as our numeraire (dPz = 0), we get a relationship between
dPk and

and ultimately between dPk and

0 = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

= - ( )*

- ( )*

)* θkz *

…………………(P3)

dPk = (b - 1 ) *

Though we have assumed that the proportion of product that goes to capital in
sector Z is a constant (b), this is not a necessary assumption. We could have proceeded as
if b was a variable. However, to be able to derive an exact expression for the change in b,
we need to know the functional form, and to maintain generality, we assume b is
constant. The alternative is to introduce the nontradable sector in ROW, and have the
market determine Plr ; in that case no further assumptions are necessary to fix b. This is
not a departure from the various versions of the Harberger model or the Jones version,
since b is replaceable by θkz , which is usually assumed fixed. From these expressions we
can see that Plr and dPlr can be derived in terms of either total product Pz*Z, a
combination of Pz*Z and Pk*Kz or Pk*Kz alone:
Plr = (1 – b)* Pz*Z

Or

dPlr = (1 – b)* [Pz*dZ]* ( )

Or

Plr = Pz*Z - Pk*Kz

Or

Plr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

since dPz = 0
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⇨ Plr = (

)* [Pk* Kz ]* ( )

⇨ dPlr = (

)* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ]* ( )

SUBSTITUTION
The direct elasticity of substitution is (with CRS and competition) defined as:

Sx =

This can be rewritten as:

= Sx *

Since the amount of G is taken as fixed and given by the firms, and once provided
the fixed amount of G is available to both firms, there is no substitution between G and
other factors of production. This is also especially true since the amount of G cannot be
varied by the firm since the firm ignores the externality from paying the tax on capital,
and no payment has to be made for G. Therefore, we have a single elasticity of
substitution per sector. Since the derivation follows exactly the same steps as in Tresch
(2002) it is not derived here, the results are stated, noting that we have defined it to be
negative:
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SECTOR X

-

= Sx * (dPk +

- dPlo)

………………………………….(U1)
SECTOR Y

-

= Sy * (dPk +

- dPlo)

……………………………………(U2)
SECTOR Z
In the ROW dLz = 0 by assumption, so any amount of capital is combined with
the fixed amount of labor, which is not varied at all. Therefore, there is no substitution
elasticity or equation for this sector.
DEMAND
There are two alternative formulations considered for the demand functions.
Firstly, following Ballentine and Eris (1975) and Alm (1985), we cannot work with
income compensated demand curves when we have an input financed by taxes. In the
original Harberger (1962) formulation, the assumption is that the government either
consumes out of tax revenues in exactly the same way as the consumer would have or
that the government returns lump-sum to the consumer the proceeds of the tax. Either
way, demand for output is assumed to not be affected at all by the change in income
caused by the tax (though it is affected by any price changes). This allowed the demand
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functions to be treated as if they were income compensated demand functions, and
elasticities to be considered Hicksian (or “Harbergerarian”).
However, when there are two countries, and the proceeds are spent on providing
an input used only by the taxing country rather than purchasing final output or even
returning money lump-sum to consumers, we cannot ignore income effects. There is a
second reason for this. One way of thinking about “who pays the tax” is to identify where
the tax revenue comes from.
The second way, followed by Harbereger (1962) is to identify who faces changes
in factor income as a result of the tax. If the tax changes the worldwide income of capital
or labor, the ROW also “pays” for the OECD tax in the Harberger sense. Secondly, as
pointed out in Ballentine and Eris (1975), when the initial tax is not zero, a reduction in
the tax has an income effect as well. The tax on capital is part of factor income, and
disposable income changes due to the tax change. However, total factor returns are also
affected by the government input, since we have assumed that total factor payments with
input exhaust the product with input.
In our models, either tax revenue is not returned to the consumer due to provision
of G, or a transfer payment is provided. In both cases we introduce income effects in the
demand curves.
There is a third and fourth issue here. With two countries, we have two income
effects, not one (unless we take total world income, which would defeat a lot of interest
in this dissertation). The fourth issue is that when the tax is spent on providing a
government input, what enters the demand curve is disposable income and not national or
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total income- simply because the tax revenue is not spent on purchasing final output.
However, due to the national income identity, total output has to equal total income, as
well as disposable income since there is no transfer payment when G is provided.
Otherwise, with disposable income being less than total product, we have a tendency
towards recession built in. If total output were more than national income or total returns
to factors, this would be similar to assuming that there is an effect of government input
on total product but the increased product returned to factors of production does not
compensate for the tax lost. Therefore we have to assume that even if disposable income
falls due to a tax, it is returned to the consumer due to higher productivity.
We need not make this assumption at all if we did not want to have CRS price
changes. As we have discussed earlier, modeling commodity price changes depends on
what we assume about the productivity of government input and the assumptions we
make about total factor payments. We therefore assume that in the absence of saving and
abnormal profits, and the fact that perfect competition prevails and supply functions are
HOD one in capital and labor, all domestic product has to be returned to either capital or
labor as factor income.
Therefore, the modifications to the demand curve can be considered in two ways.
We either have one consolidated demand curve each for the two tradable goods X and Z
representing total world demand or we have two separable components representing each
country‟s demand. If we work with a consolidated demand curve, we still have two
separate income effects representing OECD and the ROW, and if we have additive and
separate demand curves, we assume that they do not interact with or affect each other,
other than through the joint determination of incomes. The demand curve for Y (the non-
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tradable good) is completely dependent on the OECD country since the assumption is
that it is not consumed at all by the ROW. We proceed by assuming separate and additive
demand curves to begin with, but can later consider how these may be related to the
single equation case as well.
SECTOR X
X = Xo(Px, Py, Pz, Mo) + Xr(Px, Pz, Mr)
Xo represents OECD demand for X. it is a function of all three prices since the
OECD consumer consumes the products of all sectors. Mo is OECD consumer‟s
disposable income; we have formulated it such that it equals GDP for reasons discussed
in chapter one, but other equations are possible. This is a Marshallian demand curve. Xr is
the ROW demand for X. it is a function of prices of only the two tradable goods since the
ROW does not consume Y. Mr is the disposable income of the ROW consumer. Since
there are no taxes in the ROW, disposable income is obviously equal to GDP. This is also
a Marshallian demand curve. Explicit formulations for consumer income follow.
We note that when a tax is imposed, the tax revenue is not returned to the
consumer, but the input provided out of the tax revenue raises the total product to at least
the previous level without the tax. If this were not so, then there was no justification for
the tax or input in the first place. The only extra assumption made in the context of
retaining CRS industries is that it holds for each industry with equality and not just for
the economy as a whole.
Mo = Pk*(1+Tko)* (Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)
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dMo = (1+Tko)* Pk*(dKx + dKy) + (1+Tko)* (Kx + Ky)*dPk +(Kx + Ky) *dTko +
Plo*(dLx + dLy) + (Lx + Ly)*dPlo
But dLx + dLy = 0 by definition, so
dMo = (1+Tko)*Pk*(dKx + dKy) + (1+Tko)*(Kx + Ky)*dPk +(Kx + Ky)*dTko +
(Lx + Ly)*dPlo
dMo = (1+Tko)*Kx*

+ (1+Tko)*Ky*

+ (1+Tko)*(Kx + Ky)*dPk + (Kx + Ky)*dTko

+(Lx + Ly)*dPlo
For Mr there is no tax, so GDP is the same as disposable income:
Mr = Pk * Kz + Plr * Lz
But Plr * Lz =

Plr = Pz*Z - Pk*Kz = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Mr = Pk * Kz + ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Mr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]

dMr = ( )* [Kz*dPk + Pk*dKz]

…………………(P3)

But dPk = (b - 1 ) *

⇨ dMr = ( )* [Kz*(b - 1 ) *

+ Pk*dKz]
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⇨ dMr = ( )* [(b - 1 )*dKz + dKz]
⇨ dMr = dKz
⇨ dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

Taking the total differential of the demand for X we get:

dX =

* dPx +

* dPy +

* dMo +

* dPz +

* dPx +

* dPz +

*

dMr
Dividing by X we get:
⇨

=

*

* dPx +

*

*

* dPy +

*

* dPz +

* dMo +

* dPz + ( )*[

*

* dPx +

* dMr ]

Remembering that all prices are = 1 to begin with, we can write the above as:
⇨

=[
dPz

*
+

+

*
( )*[

] * dPx + [
* dMo +

Since Y is not consumed by ROW,

*

*

]* dPy + [

*

+

*

]*

* dMr ] …………………………..(D1)

= Exy

We have not imposed the restriction that demand curves are HOD zero in all
prices and income here. If we are willing to use that very reasonable condition, we can
substitute out some elasticities using the Euler equation, the relation being that the sum of
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all income and price elasticities for an HOD zero demand curve add up to zero. Further,
the Marshallian elasticities can also be converted to Hicksian elasticities using the
Slutsky equation in elasticity form as in Ballentine and Eris (1975). A third possibility is
to write the weighted partial elasticities as total elasticies as we would have obtained
from a unified demand curve.
SECTOR Y
Since Y is non-tradable, the demand curve consists of demand only from the OECD
country.
Y = Yo(Px, Py, Pz, Mo)

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + Eyz *dPz + ( )*[

* dMo]

……………………………………(D2)
SECTOR Z

[

=[

*

*

+

+

*

*

]* dPz

] * dPx + [

+

( )*[

*

]* dPy +

* dMo +

* dMr ]

…………………………..(D3)
SUMMARY OF EQUATIONS FOR THE MODEL SO FAR
Supply
= θkx *

+ θlx *

+

*

*

.... (S1)
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= θky *

+ θly *

+

*

… (S2)

*

= θkz *

… (S3)

Price Formation
dPx = θkx * dPk + θkx *

+ θlx * dPlo -

*

*

…. (P1)

+ θly * dPlo -

*

*

… (P2)

(Where θkx is tax inclusive)
dPy = θky * dPk + θky *

(Where θkyis tax inclusive)
dPz = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

)* θkz *

… (P3)

Substitution
-

= Sx * (dPk +

- dPlo)

… (U1)

-

= Sy * (dPk +

- dPlo)

… (U2)

Demand

[

=[

*

*

+

+

*

*

]* dPz

] * dPx + [

+ ( )*[

*

]* dPy +

* dMo +

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + Eyz *dPz + ( )*[

* dMr ] ………… (D1)

* dMo ]

……………(D2)

59

[

=[

*

*

+

+

*

*

] * dPx + [

]* dPz

+ ( )*[

*

]* dPy +

* dMo +

* dMr ] ….……… (D3)

Where elasticities are Marshallian and income effects Mo and Mr is disposable income.
Adding up
dKx + dKy + dKz =0

………….(A1)

dLx + dLy = 0

………….(A2)

dLz =0

………….(A3)

dPz = 0 [Numeraire]
Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output prices) are all equal to 1 and to
each other to begin with
Other relationships
d(Pk*(1+Tko)) = dPk + Tko*dPk + Pk*dTko = dPk + Tko*dPk + dTko

…..(O1)

G = Pk*Tko*(Kx + Ky)

dG = Tko*(Kx + Ky)* dPk + Pk*(Kx +Ky)*dTko + Pk*Tko*(dKx + dKy)

= dPk +

+

dMo = (1+Tko)*Kx*

*

+

+ (1+Tko)*Ky*

*

…..(O2)

+ (1+Tko)*(Kx + Ky)*dPk + (Kx + Ky) *dTko +
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(Lx + Ly)*dPlo
dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

Plr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

Plr = (

)* [Pk* Kz ]* ( )

dPlr = (

Or

)* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ]* ( )

dPlr = (1 – b)* [Pz*dZ]* ( )

( )* θkz *dPk + (

)* θkz *

since dPz = 0

=0

dPk = (b - 1 ) *

SOLUTION PROCEDURES
Using dKx + dKy + dKz =0

= - ( )*

………….(A1) we can write:

- ( )*

And using dLx + dLy = 0

………….(A2) we can write:

= - ( )*

Then we equate the demand and supply equations for sector X and Y,
remembering that due to Walras‟ Law, the market for Z is in equilibrium when the first
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two are balanced. We substitute dPz = 0 from the numeraire equation in the demand
functions and dLz = 0 wherever it appears. We also substitute dPk = (b - 1 ) *
= (b - 1 ) * [- ( )*

- ( )*

or dPk

] where we can. Now the substitution equations are

rewritten as:

-

= Sx * (dPk +

… (U1)

- dPlo)

⇨

+ ( )*

= Sx *(b - 1 ) *

⇨

+ ( )*

= Sx *(b - 1 )*{ - ( )*

-

⇨

= Sy * (dPk +

-

+ Sx *

- Sx *dPlo

- ( )*

}+ Sx *

… (U2)

- dPlo)

= Sy *(b - 1 )*{ - ( )*

- Sx *dPlo

- ( )*

} + Sy*

- Sy*dPlo

Next we equate the supply and demand for X, and remembering that dPz = 0 and

= - ( )*

θkx *

:

- θlx * ( )*

+

*

*

* dMo +

]* dPy + ( )*[

=[

*

+

*

] * dPx + [

*

* dMr ]

Equating demand and supply for Y:
θky *

+ θly *

+

*

*

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + ( )*[

* dMo ]
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We now have 4 equations in the following unknowns:

,

,dPx ,dPy , dMo,

, dMr, dPlo and dPk . We can substitute for some variables using:

dPx = θkx * (b - 1 ) * [- ( )*

- ( )*

] + θkx *

+ θlx * dPlo -

*

*

] + θky *

+ θly * dPlo -

*

*

(Where θkx is tax inclusive)

dPy = θky * (b - 1 ) * [- ( )*

- ( )*

(Where θkyis tax inclusive)

= (b - 1 ) * [- ( )*

dMo = (1+Tko)*Kx*
( )*

- ( )*

]+

+ (1+Tko)*Ky*

+

*

+

*

+ (1+Tko)* (Kx + Ky)* (b - 1 ) * [- ( )*

] + (Kx + Ky) *dTko +(Lx + Ly)*dPlo

dMr = ( )* [Kz*(b - 1 ) *

+ Pk*dKz]

⇨ dMr = ( )* [(b - 1 )*dKz + dKz]
⇨ dMr = dKz
⇨ dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

And we are left with 4 equations in 4 variables, namely:

,

and dPlo

-
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Next we use symbolic notation for some of the parameters involved:
Єxx = [

*

+

*

]

Єxy = [

*

]

These weighted elasticities are Marshallian and are derived assuming the demand
curves are separate for OECD and ROW. However, if the two are not separable, they can
be replaced by a joint elasticity from a combined demand curve, which the Є represent.
The elasticities would still be Marshallian, only the marginal income effects would be
modified to reflect that they are income effects from a combined demand curve. There
will still be two income effects for OECD and ROW disposable income. Further, there is
no elasticity of demand for ROW for X with respect to price of Y since ROW does not
consume Y. The elasticities here are not necessarily symmetrical either, since they are not
Hicksian. Following Ballentine and Eris (1975) they can be decomposed using the
Slutsky equation and re-written as Hicksian elasticities that are symmetric; this will
involve a few extra income effect terms. At present, we only note that either
representation is possible, and move on. We can write for symmetry since Yo = Y:
Єyx = Eyx

and

Єyy = Eyy

REDUCED FORM VERSION OF THE MODEL
[1+ Sx*(b - 1 )*( )]*

+ Sx *(b - 1 )*( )*

+ ( )*

+ Sx*dPlo = Sx *

…..(1)

Sy *(b - 1 )*( )*
…..(2)

+ [1+ Sy*(b - 1 )*( )]*

-

+ Sy*dPlo = Sy*
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{θkx + [ *

*(1+ Єxx) +

*Єxy ]*[

*

[θkx* Єxx + θky* Єxy]*[(b-1)*
*(b-1)*

*(1+ Єxx) +

{[ *

]+

*

*

}*

*

]+

*

}*

}* dPlo = - {

*

{Єxx* θkx + Єxy* θky +[θkx+

{[ *

*(1+ Єyy) +

*

*(b-1)*

{θky + [

*

*(1+ Єyy) +

*

[θkx* Єyx + θky* Єyy]*[(b-1)*

+

- { Єxx* θlx + Єxy* θly +
*

}*

*

]+

+

+

*Єyx ]*[

- (b-1)*

*

+

…..(3)

}*

- (b-1)*

]-

]-

]+

-

*(1+ Єxx) + Єxy*

}*

*

+

- θlx * ( )*

*Єyx ]*[

*

–

- (b-1)*

*(1 + Tko)]*

[θkx* Єyx + θky* Єyy]*[(b-1)*

]+

+

*Єxy ]*[

[θkx* Єxx + θky* Єxy]*[(b-1)*

*(b-1)*

*

- (b-1)*

+

]+
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*(b-1)*

θly*

-{

*

}*

+

- { Єyx* θlx + Єyy* θly +

*

*(1+ Єyy) + Єyx*

{Єyx* θkx + Єyy* θky + [θky +

*

*

}* dPlo =

}*

+

*(1 + Tko)]*

….(4)

}*

These, as before are 4 equations in 4 variables. If variables are denoted in the
following order by subscript j = 1, ..., 4;

,

,

, dPlo and subscript i = 1, ..., 4

represents the equation, the 4 equations above can be written in symbolic form with aij
representing coefficients attached to the left hand side variables and bi the constants on
the right hand side.

A11*

+ A12*

+ A13 *

+ A14*dPlo = B1

…………

(1)

A21*

+ A22*

+ A23 *

+ A24* dPlo = B2

…………

(2)

A31*

+A32*

+ A33 *

+ A34* dPlo = B3

………….

(3)

A41*

+ A42*

+ A44*dPlo = B4

…………

(4)

A12 = Sx *(b - 1 )*( )

A13 = ( )

A14 = Sx

+ A43 *

Where

A11= [1+ Sx*(b - 1 )*( )]
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B1 = Sx *

A21 = Sy *(b - 1 )*( ) A22 = [1+ Sy*(b - 1 )*( )]

A23 = -1

A24 = Sy

B2 = Sy*

A31 = {θkx + [ *

*(1+ Єxx) +

[θkx* Єxx + θky* Єxy]*[(b-1)*
*(b-1)*

A32 = {[ *

*

*(1+ Єxx) +

]+

-

–

*

+

- (b-1)*

*(b-1)*

]+

*

}

A34 = - { Єxx* θlx + Єxy* θly +

*(1+ Єxx) + Єxy*

{Єxx* θkx + Єxy* θky +[θkx+

A41 = {[ *

]+

]+

+

*

- (b-1)*

*Єxy ]*[

*

A33 - θlx * ( )

B3 = - {

*Єxy ]*[

}

[θkx* Єxx + θky* Єxy]*[(b-1)*

*

*

*(1+ Єyy) +

*

}*

*(1 + Tko)]*

*

*Єyx ]*[

+

}*

- (b-1)*

]+

*

}
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[θkx* Єyx + θky* Єyy]*[(b-1)*

*(b-1)*

A42 = {θky + [

*

]-

*

*

[θkx* Єyx + θky* Єyy]*[(b-1)*

A43 = θly

B4 = - {

*

+

}

*(1+ Єyy) +

*(b-1)*

*

*Єyx ]*[

]-

- (b-1)*

*

+

}

A44 = - { Єyx* θlx + Єyy* θly +

*

*(1+ Єyy) + Єyx*

{Єyx* θkx + Єyy* θky + [θky +

]+

*

}*

*(1 + Tko)]*

*

}

+

}*

Now this system can be solved in at least 3 ways, namely using Cramer‟s rule, or
by directly inverting the coefficients matrix, or by solving the system of simultaneous
equations using MATLAB. The third route is followed in this dissertation, and the
symbolic solutions are provided in the appendix. The reason that this was done was to
retain one of the greatest benefits of the Harberger model; simplicity and transparency
achieved through the use of minimum necessary assumptions. CGE models assume
functional forms and have underlying assumptions about utility maximization and
specific forms of production functions etc., all of which are avoided in the Harberger
models.
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As can be seen we need to replace coefficients for which we have some agreed
numerical values to be able to analyze the results in terms of the unknowns we are
interested in. Fortunately, we can substitute numbers for elasticities, factor shares, capital
and labor amounts and ratios, and we can choose to represent the tax rates symbolically
or use prevailing values from the U.S. (or any OECD country that is large). Data issues
are discussed in detail in chapter V, and at this stage it can be noted that the reduced form
equations can also be solved symbolically without using parameters. For interpretation of
effects, however, we need to reduce the number of unknowns.
CHANGES IN GDP AND USES SIDE
GDPo (OECD) = Pk*(1 + Tko)*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)
dGDPo = Pk* dKx + dPk* Kx + Pk*Tko*dKx + Pk*dTko*Kx + dPk*Tko*Kx + Pk*dKy +
dPk*Ky + Pk*Tko*dKy + Pk*dTko*Ky + dPk*Tko*Ky + dPlo*(Lx + Ly) +
Plo*d(Lx + Ly)
But d(Lx + Ly)= 0, so we ignore the last term:
dGDPo = dPk*(1 + Tko)*(Kx + Ky) + (1 + Tko)*(dKx + dKy) + dTko*(Kx + Ky)
dPlo*(Lx + Ly)
GDPr = Mr = Pk * Kz + Plr * Lz
dGDPr = dMr = d(Pk * Kz + Plr * Lz)
But Plr * Lz =

Plr = Pz*Z - Pk*Kz = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

+
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⇨ Mr = Pk * Kz + ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Mr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]

dMr = ( )* [Kz*dPk + Pk*dKz]

…………………(P3)

But dPk = (b - 1 ) *

⇨ dMr = ( )* [Kz*(b - 1 ) *

+ Pk*dKz]

⇨ dMr = ( )* [(b - 1 )*dKz + dKz]
⇨ dMr = dKz
⇨ dGDPr = dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

Next we formulate a measure of change in the sources and uses of income
(welfare) caused by the fact that relative user prices of final goods also change. Though
this was not a part of closed economy models as in Harberger (1962), since open
economy models mean that non-tradable commodities exist, changes in output prices also
impact welfare, since each country consumer consumes a different bundle of goods.
Following Randolph (2006) and Gravelle and Smetters (2001, 2006), we have to find a
way to compute this effect as well. We can use a Laspeyres‟ index defined as the change
in the cost of purchasing the base year‟s consumption bundle. Since G is an input into
production, it does not enter into the consumption bundle at all. For the OECD country,
the index is defined as:
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(Px + dPx)* Xo + (Py + dPy)* Yo + (Pz + dPz)*Zo
LASo =

-----------------------------------------------------------Px * Xo + Py * Yo + Pz *Zo

Similarly, for ROW we can estimate:
(Px + dPx)* Xr + (Pz + dPz)*Zr
LASr =

----------------------------------------Px * Xr + Pz *Zr

Next we know that dPz = 0 and initial prices are equal to 1, this gives:
dPx* Xo + dPy* Yo + Zo + Xo + Yo
LASo =

-------------------------------------------- =

dPx* Xo + dPy* Yo
1+

Xo + Yo + Zo

----------------------------Xo + Yo + Zo

Similarly, we have:
Xr + dPx* Xr + Zr
LASr =

----------------------------------------- = 1 +
Xr + Zr

dPx* Xr
-------------------Xr + Zr

We also have to find a way to combine the total welfare effect of the change in
income (GDP) and the change in the uses side or cost-of-living index. This can be done
in a number of ways; one very logical way is available in Randolph (2006). The method
proposed here is more basic. It starts with the assumption that the social welfare function
is a weighted function of proportionate change in income and the proportional change in
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the cost of living, with equal weights. This would imply that we could write OECD
welfare as:
Wo = 1 + dGDPo/GDPo - LASo and ROW welfare Wr = 1+ dGDPr/GDPr - LASr
This is a pure assumption, and we could have chosen any form for the welfare function,
such as Wo =

instead or more complicated forms.
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APPENDIX A

% Dissertation model chapter#2- lowering tax on capital- AMENDED ( dt 7/22/09) %
% 4 equations in 4 variables:- dKx_Kx, dLy_Ly, dPlo, dKy_Ky %
clear;
clear all;
eq1 = 'A11*dKx_Kx + A12*dKy_Ky + A13*dLy_Ly + A14*dPlo = B1';
eq2 = 'A21*dKx_Kx +A22*dKy_Ky

+ A23*dLy_Ly + A24*dPlo = B2' ;

eq3 = 'A31*dKx_Kx + A32*dKy_Ky + A33*dLy_Ly + A34*dPlo = B3' ;
eq4 = 'A41*dKx_Kx +A42*dKy_Ky

+ A43*dLy_Ly + A44*dPlo = B4' ;

s = solve (eq1, eq2, eq3, eq4, 'dKx_Kx', 'dKy_Ky', 'dLy_Ly', 'dPlo');
dKx_Kx= s.dKx_Kx
dKy_Ky = s.dKy_Ky
dLy_Ly = s.dLy_Ly
dPlo = s.dPlo

% RESULTS %
dKx_Kx =
-(A12*A23*A34*B4 - A12*A23*A44*B3 - A12*A24*A33*B4 + A12*A24*A43*B3 +
A12*A33*A44*B2 - A12*A34*A43*B2 - A13*A22*A34*B4 + A13*A22*A44*B3 +
A13*A24*A32*B4 - A13*A24*A42*B3 - A13*A32*A44*B2 + A13*A34*A42*B2 +
A14*A22*A33*B4 - A14*A22*A43*B3 - A14*A23*A32*B4 + A14*A23*A42*B3 +
A14*A32*A43*B2 - A14*A33*A42*B2 - A22*A33*A44*B1 + A22*A34*A43*B1 +
A23*A32*A44*B1 - A23*A34*A42*B1 - A24*A32*A43*B1 + A24*A33*A42*B1)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------(A11*A22*A33*A44 - A11*A22*A34*A43 - A11*A23*A32*A44 +
A11*A23*A34*A42 + A11*A24*A32*A43 - A11*A24*A33*A42 -

73

A12*A21*A33*A44 + A12*A21*A34*A43 + A12*A23*A31*A44 A12*A23*A34*A41 - A12*A24*A31*A43 + A12*A24*A33*A41 +
A13*A21*A32*A44 - A13*A21*A34*A42 - A13*A22*A31*A44 +
A13*A22*A34*A41 + A13*A24*A31*A42 - A13*A24*A32*A41 A14*A21*A32*A43 + A14*A21*A33*A42 + A14*A22*A31*A43 A14*A22*A33*A41 - A14*A23*A31*A42 + A14*A23*A32*A41)

dKy_Ky =

(A11*A23*A34*B4 - A11*A23*A44*B3 - A11*A24*A33*B4 + A11*A24*A43*B3 +
A11*A33*A44*B2 - A11*A34*A43*B2 - A13*A21*A34*B4 + A13*A21*A44*B3 +
A13*A24*A31*B4 - A13*A24*A41*B3 - A13*A31*A44*B2 + A13*A34*A41*B2 +
A14*A21*A33*B4 - A14*A21*A43*B3 - A14*A23*A31*B4 + A14*A23*A41*B3 +
A14*A31*A43*B2 - A14*A33*A41*B2 - A21*A33*A44*B1 + A21*A34*A43*B1 +
A23*A31*A44*B1 - A23*A34*A41*B1 - A24*A31*A43*B1 + A24*A33*A41*B1)
*DIVIDED BY*
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(A11*A22*A33*A44 - A11*A22*A34*A43 - A11*A23*A32*A44 +
A11*A23*A34*A42 + A11*A24*A32*A43 - A11*A24*A33*A42 A12*A21*A33*A44 + A12*A21*A34*A43 + A12*A23*A31*A44 A12*A23*A34*A41 - A12*A24*A31*A43 + A12*A24*A33*A41 +
A13*A21*A32*A44 - A13*A21*A34*A42 - A13*A22*A31*A44 +
A13*A22*A34*A41 + A13*A24*A31*A42 - A13*A24*A32*A41 A14*A21*A32*A43 + A14*A21*A33*A42 + A14*A22*A31*A43 A14*A22*A33*A41 - A14*A23*A31*A42 + A14*A23*A32*A41)

dLy_Ly =

-(A11*A22*A34*B4 - A11*A22*A44*B3 - A11*A24*A32*B4 + A11*A24*A42*B3 +
A11*A32*A44*B2 - A11*A34*A42*B2 - A12*A21*A34*B4 + A12*A21*A44*B3 +
A12*A24*A31*B4 - A12*A24*A41*B3 - A12*A31*A44*B2 + A12*A34*A41*B2 +
A14*A21*A32*B4 - A14*A21*A42*B3 - A14*A22*A31*B4 + A14*A22*A41*B3 +
A14*A31*A42*B2 - A14*A32*A41*B2 - A21*A32*A44*B1 + A21*A34*A42*B1 +
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A22*A31*A44*B1 - A22*A34*A41*B1 - A24*A31*A42*B1 +
A24*A32*A41*B1)*DIVIDED BY*
--------------------------------------------------------------(A11*A22*A33*A44 - A11*A22*A34*A43 - A11*A23*A32*A44 +
A11*A23*A34*A42 + A11*A24*A32*A43 - A11*A24*A33*A42 A12*A21*A33*A44 + A12*A21*A34*A43 + A12*A23*A31*A44 A12*A23*A34*A41 - A12*A24*A31*A43 + A12*A24*A33*A41 +
A13*A21*A32*A44 - A13*A21*A34*A42 - A13*A22*A31*A44 +
A13*A22*A34*A41 + A13*A24*A31*A42 - A13*A24*A32*A41 A14*A21*A32*A43 + A14*A21*A33*A42 + A14*A22*A31*A43 A14*A22*A33*A41 - A14*A23*A31*A42 + A14*A23*A32*A41)

dPlo =

(A11*A22*A33*B4 - A11*A22*A43*B3 - A11*A23*A32*B4 + A11*A23*A42*B3 +
A11*A32*A43*B2 - A11*A33*A42*B2 - A12*A21*A33*B4 + A12*A21*A43*B3 +
A12*A23*A31*B4 - A12*A23*A41*B3 - A12*A31*A43*B2 + A12*A33*A41*B2 +
A13*A21*A32*B4 - A13*A21*A42*B3 - A13*A22*A31*B4 + A13*A22*A41*B3 +
A13*A31*A42*B2 - A13*A32*A41*B2 - A21*A32*A43*B1 + A21*A33*A42*B1 +
A22*A31*A43*B1 - A22*A33*A41*B1 - A23*A31*A42*B1 + A23*A32*A41*B1)
*DVIDED BY*
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------(A11*A22*A33*A44 - A11*A22*A34*A43 - A11*A23*A32*A44 +
A11*A23*A34*A42 + A11*A24*A32*A43 - A11*A24*A33*A42 A12*A21*A33*A44 + A12*A21*A34*A43 + A12*A23*A31*A44 A12*A23*A34*A41 - A12*A24*A31*A43 + A12*A24*A33*A41 +
A13*A21*A32*A44 - A13*A21*A34*A42 - A13*A22*A31*A44 +
A13*A22*A34*A41 + A13*A24*A31*A42 - A13*A24*A32*A41 A14*A21*A32*A43 + A14*A21*A33*A42 + A14*A22*A31*A43 A14*A22*A33*A41 - A14*A23*A31*A42 + A14*A23*A32*A41)
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CHAPTER III

–

THE CONSUMPTION TAX

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a model of the consumption tax and
simulate tax competition in the OECD country, using a similar model set-up as in chapter
two. The major variation is that instead of a tax on all capital in the OECD country, there
is now a tax on consumption (not production) in the OECD. The tax initially drives a
wedge between the price paid by the OECD consumer and producers on the one hand and
between the prices paid by the ROW and OECD consumers on the other.
If total demand can be split as in chapter two in the following manner:
X = Xo + Xr , Y = Yo , and Z = Zo + Zr , then the tax applies to Xo , Yo and Zo only, not
to Xr and Zr. Further, the price paid by the consumer in OECD is Px*(1+TCo), Py*(1+TCo)
and Pz*(1+TCo), the prices paid by the consumer in the ROW are Px and Pz and the prices
received by producers in both countries are also Px , Py and Pz . As before, Px , Py and Pz
are still initially equal to 1, and Px*(1+TCo), Py*(1+TCo) and Pz*(1+TCo) are ≠ 1. We will
continue with all the previous assumptions, except where specified.
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION BEHAVIOR BY FIRMS (SECTORS)
The production functions for each sector can be written as a function of productive
resources:
X = f (Kx , Lx, G)

Y = g (Ky, Ly, G)

Z = h (Kz, Lz)

{Where the amount of G is common to both X and Y, G is a public good}
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The sector is synonymous with the firm. Since CRS industries imply that the size
of the firm is indeterminate, we speak of the sector and firm interchangeably, like each
sector were one giant firm. However, we have also assumed perfect competition, so each
firm (sector) acts like an atomistic price-taker in all markets. Specifically, we assume that
firms do not recognize the externality associated with paying taxes that support the public
good G. The main difference is that the tax is not imposed on capital. Since producers
receive only the supply price, and they take the tax rate as a given constant, they seek to
maximize the objective function based on the production functions:
X = f (Kx , Lx, )
Where

Y = g (Ky, Ly, )

Z = h (Kz, Lz)

is taken as fixed and given at the historical level which is assumed unchanged.

The profit maximization problem can then be set up as:
FIRM (SECTOR) X
Maximize Π (profit) = { Px* f (Kx , Lx,

) - Pk*Kx – Plo*Lx } with respect to Kx and Lx

First order conditions:
1.

Px*

- Pk = 0

2. Px*

- Plo = 0

And

Since Px = 1, this implies that

= Pk and

= Plo
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Each firm pays each factor its marginal product at the current level of provision of
the public good. The demand price includes the tax, but since the tax is assumed to go to
the government and the tax rate is independent of the firm‟s actions, it does not enter the
objective function. Revenue for a firm is independent of the tax, so even if we included
the demand price in our objective function we would have to subtract tax payable. As in
the previous chapter, the firm ignores the externality arising from changes in G.
FIRM (SECTOR) Y

Behaves in exactly the same way as X, and so we get

= Pk and

= Plo

FIRM (SECTOR) Z
Since there is no government good or tax in the ROW we have only the production
function
Z = h (Kz,

) and the problem for firm Z:

Maximize Π (profit) = { Pz* h (Kz ,

) - Pk*Kz - Plr*

} with respect to Kz {since we

assume full employment always in both countries, choosing Lz is not a decision variable}
and we get

= Pk

We have chosen to keep the total amount of labor fixed in ROW, and to maintain
a full employment restriction to keep the model simple and transparent. To equate labor
price in ROW to marginal products, and to allow labor to move between sectors in ROW,
all we have to do is introduce two sectors in ROW instead of one. We will then have a 4
sector open economy model. Alternatively, we could have modeled labor supply in the
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ROW on the lines of existing substantial under-employment in the informal and
agricultural sector, a la Arthur Lewis‟ famous model to give us an independent equation
for labor in ROW. It will need to account for the fact that in competitive conditions in
this model with full price and wage flexibility, unemployment should imply that Plr has to
be driven down to zero.
we leave this issue to a future extension of this model, and for the present, assume
that full employment exists for ROW, there is a positive labor price and that dLz = 0. We
do this for two reasons. The first is to keep the model as transparent and simple as
possible and incorporate only essential complications. This is in line with most of the
significant previous literature that also assumes full employment in the OECD and ROW,
albeit with more sectors. The second is that if we were to contemplate a fixed
compensation for labor in ROW, or allow Plr to fall to zero, we cannot capture the effect
noted in Harberger (1995): when the tax in the OECD is changed, capital flows into or
out of the ROW, changing the marginal productivity of labor, especially for constant
employment.
This has to mean that even if total labor supply in ROW is fixed, Plr is only fixed
for a given amount of capital. Thus, instead of assuming both in this chapter and in
chapter two that movement of capital into and out of ROW changes the unemployment
level with dPlr = 0 we prefer Lz =

, we treat Plr as a residual determined by the level of

Kz and instead take Pz as the numeraire. However, we could have proceeded in both
chapters by using Plr as the numeraire instead of Pz , or by allowing Lz to vary in terms of
some independent labor supply equation.
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SUBSTITUTION

The elasticity of substitution is (with CRS and competition) defined as: Sx =

This can be rewritten as:

= Sx *

Since the amount of G is taken as fixed and given by the firms, and once provided
the fixed amount of G is available to both firms, there is no substitution between G and
other factors of production. This is also especially true since the amount of G cannot be
varied by the firm, and no payment has to be made for G. Since the derivation follows
exactly the same steps as in Tresch (2002) it is not derived here, the results are stated:
SECTOR X

-

= Sx * (dPk - dPlo)

………………………………….(U1)
SECTOR Y

-

= Sy * (dPk - dPlo)

……………………………………(U2)
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SECTOR Z
There is no substitution equation in sector Z, since the total supply of labor in ROW is
fixed and full employment is assumed.
BALANCING
dKx + dKy + dKz =0
dLx + dLy = 0
dLz =0
dPz = 0 [Numeraire]
Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output supply prices) are all equal to 1 and
to each other to begin with
SUPPLY
The production functions for the three sectors are:
X = f (Kx , Lx, G)

Y = g (Ky, Ly, G)

Z = h (Kz, Lz)

{Where the amount of G is common to both X and Y, G is a public good}
SECTOR X
X = f (Kx , Lx, G)
The total change in supply (output) or the total differential can be split into:
dX =

* dKx +

* dLx +

* dG
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=

*

+

Writing θkx =

And

θlx =

S1…………………..

*

+

*

* dG

the tax-exclusive share of capital‟s product in sector X

the tax-exclusive share of labor‟s product in sector X, we get

= θkx *

+ θlx *

+

*

* dG

The last term in this equation works a little like a “Solow residual” in the sense
that like technology, the factor augmenting government good provides a third path for
output to grow, beyond what would have been captured by growth in capital and labor
(Solow 1957, Romer 2006). When production is CRS in K and L, and factor shares θkx +
θlx = 1, this term shows the growth in output that cannot be accounted for changes in K
and L.
Similarly, for SECTOR Y we have:
S2………...............

Where

And

θky =

θly =

= θky *

+ θly *

+

*

*dG

the tax-exclusive share of capital‟s product in sector Y

the share of labor‟s product in sector Y.

SECTOR Z
There is no tax and no government good in the ROW, so the relevant terms for this
sector:
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S3a………...............

= θkz *

But dLz = 0 by assumption (Lrow =
S3………...............

+

*

*

is fixed), so we can write the above as:

= θkz *

This gives us our three supply equations. The only difference between this case
and the previous chapter is in the shares of capital in the supply equations. Since the
producer does not receive or pay the tax, the shares are all tax-exclusive. We now turn to
price formation. The differences from chapter two are that (1) there is no tax on any
factor, and that supply price here means the prices received by producers. (2)The demand
price in each case is the producers‟ price inflated by the ad valorem consumption tax.
PRICE FORMATION
SECTOR X
Suppose we did not know what the production function for X looked like when
we included all factors K, L and G. If it is CRS for K and L alone, we can think of it as
IRS with all three being varied. From Euler‟s law we can write this as:

* Kx +

* Lx +

* G = A*X (where A > 1 and A is the degree of homogeneity)

Now we know that sector X does not have to pay a user fee for G, the consumer pays the
tax on consumption in the OECD. If K and L are paid their marginal products in the
presence of G, and if G had to be paid a user fee equal to its marginal product, then
payments to factors would equal A*X> X, total product would be more than exhausted.
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Since G is not paid for directly, we are interested in what the payment for capital and
payments to labor add up to. Let us say that:
* Kx +

* Lx = B*X

* Kx +

* Lx = B*Px*X

since Px =1

If we then continue with our assumption that firms pay marginal products:
B*Px*X = Pk* Kx + Plo* Lx
The assumption we make here, to maintain consistency between total factor incomes and
expenditure is that:
B = (1+TCo), so that implies: (1+TCo)*Px*X = Pk* Kx + Plo* Lx where X = f (K, L), or
Px*X = Pk* Kx + Plo* Lx when X = f (K, L, G).
What we are saying here is that without T, G, the total product would have been
exactly exhausted by factor incomes (CRS). When the tax was imposed in the first
instance, demand went down, quantity went down and there was a wedge between
payments by consumers and payments to factors. This wedge however, was used to
provide G which increased output, reduced costs and thus resulted in additional product.
We assume simply that this additional product, in the absence of savings will end up with
the single consumer in the economy and is exactly equal to tax revenue. It looks at first
instance that this extra product should go to the government as tax revenue but not to the
consumer.
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This is true if we were to assume that our model is dynamic in some sense, or if
we were to consider the next period. To maintain parity with the transfer case, we have to
assume that at some stage, the extra product from the input is also returned to the
economy. In the standard Harberger (1962) model and others, the transfer payment also
could not go back to the consumer as a transfer payment and flow back to the government
as tax revenue. If this happens, then we would not have been able to claim income
compensation in the demand curve, or to be able to isolate the excess burden from the
revenue itself.
In the transfer payments model, to have income compensated demand curves,
authors assume that the tax is collected in the first round and then returned to the
consumers, and focus only on the distortion caused by the change in relative prices.
Similarly in the input models we assume the exact analogue of these transfers: the extra
output due to the input also has to go to the consumers. The additional assumption is that
it holds in each sector separately, though this is not strictly necessary and is assumed only
to allow us to continue with CRS price formation equations as in the Harberger (1962)
model. The increase in taxes that resulted in extra G added back as much product in each
market as was lost due to the tax wedge.
d(B*Px*X) = d((1+TCo)*Px*X) = (1+TCo)*Px*dX + (1+TCo)*X*dPx + X*dTCo=
d[

* Kx +

* Lx]

This is possible when we remember that: Px*X (f (Kx , Lx, )) = (1+TCo)*Px*X (f
(Kx , Lx)) or that the government input paid for out of taxes adds back as much value to
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product as taken out by taxes. From the supply equations and assumptions Px = 1 we
know that Px*dX = dX and
dX =

⇨

* dKx +

* dLx +

* dG

Px*dX = Pk * dKx + Plo * dLx +

* dG

Substituting in our original equation:
(1+TCo)*Px*dX + (1+TCo)*X*dPx + X*dTCo =
[dPk* Kx + Pk* dKx + dPlo* Lx + Plo* dLx ]
⇨

(1+TCo)*X(K,L)*dPx = [dPk* Kx + Pk* dKx + dPlo* Lx + Plo* dLx ] -

(1+TCo)*Px*dX(K, L) - X(K,L)*dTCo
⇨

(1+TCo)*X*dPx = [dPk* Kx + dKx + dPlo* Lx + dLx ] - dKx - dLx - TCo *dKx TCo*dLx -

dPx = θkx *

* dG - X*dTCo

+ θlx *

*dPk

*dPlo -

*

*dG -

* θkx *

*θlx *

…………………(P1)

-

Similarly for SECTOR Y
dPy = θky *

*dPk

+ θly *

*dPlo -

*

*dG -

* θky *

-
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*θly *

-

………………… (P2)

SECTOR Z
There is no tax and no government good here. Suppose that total payments to
capital in Z are a constant proportion of the product (output). This is a small restriction
we have to place for analytical convenience since we have only one sector in Z, and full
employment is assumed. Even if we had assumed two ROW sectors, the standard
assumption in the literature is that full employment of labor exists to ROW as a whole.
Only the allocation of labor between ROW sectors would be governed by labor‟s
marginal product and we would have substitution equations between labor and capital in
ROW as well. In both the Harberger (1962) and Jones (1965) versions fixed factor shares
are used for labor and capital in the price formation and supply equations. What we have
given up for the convenience of one ROW sector is the payment of marginal product to
labor. Capital is still paid marginal product since it is mobile. We have no substitution
equation in Z since the amount of labor is fixed.
To introduce marginal product payments to labor in ROW, all we have to do is
introduce two ROW sectors. We would still use fixed proportions between labor and
capital for supply and price formation, and we would still use full employment of labor in
ROW as a whole. Thus, this is a trade-off between the convenience of a single ROW
sector, and the restricted behavior of labor in ROW. Since we are interested primarily in
movement of capital and income between the countries, and not between sectors in
ROW, or the relative distribution between capital and labor, we believe that we do not
lose much in terms of insights with this modification. The residual output in Z after
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capital is paid marginal product is paid to labor. If b represents the baseline payments
proportion to capital in Z, and if b is assumed to be a constant, then:
b* Pz* Z = Pk * Kz : b<1and b is constant
[ Pz*dZ + Z*dPz] = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ]

Now from the supply equation for Z we know that: Pz*dZ = dZ ( since Pz = 1) = Pk * dKz
⇨ Z*dPz = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ] - Pz*dZ

⇨ Z*dPz = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ] - Pk * dKz

⇨ dPz = ( )* [θkz *dPk + θkz *

] - θkz *

(Since Pk and Pz = 1, and θkz is tax-exclusive)
⇨ dPz = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

)* θkz *

Now since we have chosen Pz as our numeraire (dPz = 0), we get a relationship between
dPk and

and ultimately between dPk and

0 = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

= - ( )*

- ( )*

)* θkz *

dPk = (b - 1 ) *

…………………(P3)

From these expressions we can see that Plr and dPlr can be derived in terms of either total
product Pz*Z, a combination of Pz*Z and Pk*Kz or Pk*Kz alone:
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Plr = ( 1 – b )* Pz*Z
Or

Plr = Pz*Z - Pk*Kz

Or

Plr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Plr = (

)* [Pk* Kz ]* ( )

⇨ dPlr = (

)* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ]* ( )

Or

dPlr = (1 – b)* [Pz*dZ]* ( )

since dPz = 0

DEMAND
The major difference with the previous chapter is in this area.
SECTOR X
X = Xo(Px *(1+TCo), Py*(1+TCo), Pz *(1+TCo), Mo) + Xr(Px, Pz, Mr)
Xo represents OECD demand for X. it is a function of all three prices since the
OECD consumer consumes the products of all sectors. Mo is OECD consumer‟s
disposable income. This is a Marshallian demand curve. Here, the total factor income is
also equal to disposable income, since there are no direct taxes. Xr is the ROW demand
for X. it is a function of prices of only the two tradable goods since the ROW does not
consume Y. Mr is the disposable income of the ROW consumer. Since there are no taxes
in the ROW this is equal to GDP. This is also a Marshallian demand curve. Explicit
formulations for disposable income follow:

89

For both Mo and Mr there is no tax on incomes:
Mo = Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)
dMo = Pk*(dKx + dKy) + (Kx + Ky)*dPk + Plo*(dLx + dLy) + (Lx + Ly)*dPlo
But dLx + dLy = 0 by definition, so
dMo = Pk*(dKx + dKy) + (Kx + Ky)*dPk + (Lx + Ly)*dPlo
⇨ dMo = Pk*Kx*

+ Pk*Ky*

+ (Kx + Ky)*dPk + (Lx + Ly)*dPlo

Mr = Pk * Kz + Plr * Lz
But Plr * Lz =

Plr = Pz*Z - Pk*Kz = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Mr = Pk * Kz + ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Mr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]

dMr = ( )* [Kz*dPk + Pk*dKz]

…………………(P3)

But dPk = (b - 1 ) *

⇨ dMr = ( )* [Kz*(b - 1 ) *

+ Pk*dKz]

⇨ dMr = ( )* [(b - 1 )*dKz + dKz]
⇨ dMr = dKz
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⇨ dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

Taking the total differential of the demand for X we get:

dX =

* d[Px *(1+TCo)] +

* d[Py *(1+TCo)] +

* dMo +

* d[Pz *(1+TCo)] +

* dPx +

* dPz +

* dMr

Dividing by X we get:
⇨

=

*

*

* d[Pz *(1+TCo)] +

* dMo +

+ ( )*[

* d[Px *(1+TCo)] +

*

*

* dPx +

* d[Py *(1+TCo)] +
*

* dPz

* dMr ]

Remembering that all prices are = 1 to begin with and that d[Px *(1+TCo)]= [(1+TCo)* dPx
+ Px *dTCo ] and that dPz =0 due to the numeraire assumption we can write the above as:
⇨

=[

+

*

*

+

*

] * dPx + [

+

*

*

]* dPy +

+

( )*[

*

* dMo +

* dMr ]

…………………………..(D1)
All elasticities for OECD are defined with respect to demand prices here,
inclusive of the consumption tax. In the ROW there is no tax, and producer and consumer
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prices are the same, so there is no difference. Also, Y is not consumed in the ROW. We
have not assumed that demand curves are HOD zero in all prices and income.
SECTOR Y
Since Y is non-tradable, the demand curve consists of demand only from the OECD
country.
Y = Yo(Px *(1+TCo), Py*(1+TCo), Pz *(1+TCo), Mo), and Yo = Y
* dMo] + Eyx *

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + Eyz *dPz + ( )*[

+ Eyy*

+

……………………………………(D2)

Eyz *

SECTOR Z

=[

*

+

+

*

*

] * dPx + [

+

*

*

]* dPy +

+

( )*[

*

* dMo +

* dMr ]

…………………………..(D3)
GOVERNMENT
We have assumed that the government good G does not suffer from loss in value
due to inflation, and that the dollar value of expenditure on G equals the amount of G
available. We could have had a price for G that would have been a weighted sum of labor
and capital prices in OECD. However, since we have simplified away from this more
complete model of the government good production to keep the model simple, we simply
assume that tax revenue gets transformed into the input without complications raised by
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the changing prices of labor and capital. As explained in the previous chapter, this is
relatively simple to do following McLure (1969) and can be left to future models. Thus,
in the initial case G = tax revenue received. Since the tax is on consumption in OECD
and there is no tax on exports from OECD while imports are taxed,
G = TCo* Px * Xo + TCo* Py * Yo + TCo* Pz * Zo
Since there are no savings and capital accumulation in this model, Total consumption =
Total GDP in OECD and ROW separately. Total OECD expenditure =
Px *(1+TCo)* Xo + Py*(1+TCo) * Yo + Pz *(1+TCo) * Zo
= Px * Xo + Py * Yo + Pz * Zo + G
From the income side, we have: OECD GDP = Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly) = Px * Xo
+ Py * Yo + Pz * Zo + TCo* Px * Xo + TCo* Py * Yo + TCo* Pz * Zo
⇨ G = Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly) - Px * Xo - Py * Yo - Pz * Zo
Now we want to convert this into a function of GDP alone, so we choose the rate Tc such
that the following is true:
(1 - Tc )*[Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)] = Px * Xo + Py * Yo + Pz * Zo
In the price formation equations we had assumed that (1+TCo)*Px*X = Pk* Kx + Plo* Lx
and (1+TCo)*Py*Y = Pk* Ky + Plo* Ly, so it is easy to check that
Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly) = (1+TCo)*Px*X + (1+TCo)*Py*Y ; and since we have
budget balance internationally, Xr = Zo with all prices equal to one, so the relation
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Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly) = Px *(1+TCo)* Xo + Py*(1+TCo) * Yo + Pz *(1+TCo) * Zo
holds.
Following McLure (1975) and Musgrave (1959), it could very well be proved
with certain restrictions that TCo and Tc are directly related in a constant manner. This is
conveniently illustrated by the tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive rate analogy. If TCo is the
“tax-exclusive” rate that inflates consumption (Px * Xo + Py * Yo + Pz * Zo ) to income
(Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly) ), then Tc is the “tax-inclusive” rate that deflates income
to consumption. The relationship between changes in the two rates is also similarly
derived.
We note that (1 - Tc ) is the fraction of OECD GDP that goes to the producer in
the first instance before the tax revenue is used to provide the input, the rest being spent
on the government good. If such a Tc exists, is positive and < 1, we discuss in the chapter
on data issues how it may be calculated.
Now:
G = Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly) - Px * Xo - Py * Yo - Pz * Zo
And:
(1 - Tc )*[Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)] = Px * Xo + Py * Yo + Pz * Zo
Therefore:
G = { 1- (1 - Tc )}*[Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
= Tc *[Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
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Thus:
dG = [dPk*(Kx + Ky) + Pk*d(Kx + Ky)+ dPlo*(Lx + Ly) ]* Tc +
[Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]* dTc

since d(Lx + Ly) = 0

We have assumed again that such an appropriate dTc exists, and has all the required
attributes. Tc and dTc are chosen such that the following is true:
(1 - Tc )*d[Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)] - [Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]* dTc
= d[Px * Xo + Py * Yo + Pz * Zo]

since

(1 - Tc )*[Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)] = Px * Xo + Py * Yo + Pz * Zo
SUMMARY OF EQUATIONS FOR THE MODEL SO FAR
Supply
= θkx *

+ θlx *

+

*

* dG

.... (S1)

= θky *

+ θly *

+

*

*dG

… (S2)

= θkz *

… (S3)

Substitution
-

= Sx * (dPk - dPlo)

… (U1)

-

= Sy * (dPk - dPlo)

… (U2)
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Price Formation
dPx = θkx *

+ θlx *

*dPk

* θkx *

*dPlo -

*θlx *

-

*

*dG -

……………(P1)

-

(Where θkx and θlx are tax exclusive)
dPy = θky *

+ θly *

*dPk

* θky *

*dPlo -

*θly *

-

*

*dG -

………………… (P2)

-

(Where θky and θly are tax exclusive)
dPz = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

)* θkz *

……………….. (P3)

Demand
=[

*

+

*

*

+

*

* dMo +

( )*[

] * dPx + [

+

=[

+ Eyy*

*

+

]* dPy +

*

+

* dMr]

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + ( )*[

Eyx *

*

………………………..(D1)

* dMo] +

……………………………(D2)

+ Eyz *

*

] * dPx + [

*

]* dPy +
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*

( )*[

+

*

* dMo +

+

*

* dMr ]

+

………………..(D3)

Where elasticities are Marshallian and income effects Mo and Mr is disposable income.
Adding up
dKx + dKy + dKz =0

………….(A1)

dLx + dLy = 0

………….(A2)

dLz =0

………….(A3)

dPz = 0 [Numeraire]
Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output prices) are all equal to 1 and to
each other to begin with
Other relationships
G = TCo* Px * Xo + TCo* Py * Yo + TCo* Pz * Zo
G = Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly) - Px * Xo - Py * Yo - Pz * Zo
G = Tc *[Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
dG = [dPk*(Kx + Ky) + Pk*d(Kx + Ky)+ dPlo*(Lx + Ly) ]* Tc +
[Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]* dTc
dMo = Kx*

+ Ky*

+ (Kx + Ky)*dPk + (Lx + Ly)*dPlo
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dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

SOLUTION PROCEDURES
………….(A1) we can write:

Using dKx + dKy + dKz =0

= - ( )*

- ( )*

………….(A2) we can write:

And using dLx + dLy = 0

= - ( )*

We equate the demand and supply equations for sector X and Y, remembering
that due to Walras‟ Law, the market for Z is in equilibrium when the first two are
balanced. We substitute dPz = 0 from the numeraire equation in the demand functions and
dLz = 0 wherever it appears. We use dPk = (b - 1 ) *

dPk = (b - 1 )*[- ( )*

- ( )*

or

]when required.

Now the substitution equations are rewritten as:
-

⇨

+ ( )*

-

… (U1)

= Sx * (dPk - dPlo)

= Sx *(b - 1 )*[- ( )*

= Sy * (dPk - dPlo)

- ( )*

] - Sx *dPlo

… (U2)
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⇨

-

= Sy *(b - 1 )*[- ( )*

- ( )*

] - Sy*dPlo

Next we equate the supply and demand for X, and remembering that dPz = 0 and

= - ( )*

θkx *

- θlx * ( )*

]* dPy +
+

:

*

+

*

+

*

* dG = [

*

+

+

*

*

] * dPx + [

*
* dMo

+( )*[

* dMr ]

Equating demand and supply for Y:
θky *
*

+ θly *

+

+ Eyy*

*

*dG = Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + ( )*[

* dMo] + Eyx

+ Eyz *

, dG , dPx , dPy , dMo,

Then we have 4 equations in the following unknowns:

, dMr, dPlo and dPk . We can substitute for some variables using:
dPx = θkx * (b - 1 )*
-

*[- ( )*

* θkx *

-

dPy = θky * (b - 1 )*
-

* θky *

*θlx *

* [- ( )*

-

- ( )*

*θly *

-

- ( )*

-

] + θlx *

* dPlo -

*

* dG

(Where θkx is tax exclusive)

] + θly *

*dPlo -

*

* dG

(Where θky is tax exclusive)
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dMo = Kx*

+ Ky*

dMr = - Kx*(

+ (Kx + Ky)* (b - 1 )*[- ( )*

) - Ky*(

dG = {(b - 1 )*[- ( )*

- ( )*

] + (Lx + Ly)*dPlo

)

- ( )*

]*(Kx + Ky) + Kx*(

) + Ky*(

)+

dPlo*(Lx + Ly) }* Tc + [(Kx + Ky) + (Lx + Ly)]* dTc

And we are left with 4 equations in 4 variables, namely:

,

and dPlo

Next we use symbolic notation for some of the parameters involved:
Єxx = [

*

+

*

Єxy = [

]

*

]

These weighted elasticities are Marshallian and are derived assuming the demand curves
are separate for OECD and ROW.
We can write for symmetry since Yo = Y: Єyx = Eyx

and

Єyy = Eyy

REDUCED FORM VERSION OF THE MODEL
[1+Sx *(b - 1 )*( )]*

+ ( )*

+ Sx *(b - 1 )*( )*

…………

Sy *(b - 1 )*( )*

-

(1)

+ [1+Sy *(b - 1 )*( )]*

…………

+ Sx *dPlo = 0

(2)

+ Sy *dPlo = 0
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{θkx + [ Tc* θkx*(1+β)*

]*(1+ Єxx) +

*( Єxx *θkx + Єxy *

*

θkx*(

– (1-

β)*

{ [ Tc*

*(1+β)*

]*(1+ Єxx) +

*

– (1-

β)*

*[(1+β)*

*(

) + Єxy *(1+β)*

) + Єxy *

+ Єxx *θkx *(

*( Єxx *θkx + Єxy *

+

-

+

]*

+ Єxy * Tc*[ θly +

–

*

[ θlx +

{

}*

}*

*( Єxx* θlx + Єxy* θly )+ ( 1 + Єxx)* Tc*[ θlx +

}*

)+

+(

{ [θlx * ( )*(1 ∓

{-

)+

*

}* dPlo =

* (1+ Єxx)*[ θkx +

{

*

+ θlx +

+

] +

*

+

- [Єxx + Єxy ]}*

*

* Єxy*[ θky +

+ θly +

]}* dTc

…………

{[ Tc*

*(1+β)*

Єyx *θkx *[(

{θky + [ Tc*
β)*

]*(1+ Єyy) +

+ (1+β)*Tc*

*(1+β)*

+ Єyy *θky *[(

*( Єyx * θkx + Єyy *

}*

) –

(3)

*(1-β)*

+

]*(1+ Єyy) +
+ Єyx *(1+β)*

*( Єyx * θkx + Єyy *
}*

+

)–

*(1-

+
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{[θly*(1 ∓

}*

{ ( 1 + Єyy)* Tc*[ θly +

]*

+ Єyx * Tc*[ θlx +

*( Єyx* θlx + Єyy* θly ) }* dPlo = {
- {

* (1+ Єyy)*[ θky +

+ θly +

] +

+

*

– [ θly +

+

+

*

- [Єyx + Єyy ] }*

* Єyx*[ θkx +

+ θlx +

]}*

dTc
…………
Where β = [–

(4)

]

These, as before are 4 equations in 4 variables. If variables are denoted in the
following order by subscript j = 1, ..., 4;

,

,

, dPlo and subscript i = 1, ..., 4

represents the equation, the 4 equations above can be written in symbolic form with aij
representing coefficients attached to the left hand side variables and bi the constants on
the right hand side.

A11*

+ A12*

+ A13 *

+ A14*dPlo = B1

…………

(1)

A21*

+ A22*

+ A23 *

+ A24* dPlo = B2

…………

(2)

A31*

+A32*

+ A33 *

+ A34* dPlo = B3

………….

(3)

A41*

+ A42*

…………

(4)

+ A43 *

+ A44*dPlo = B4
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Where

A11= 1+Sx *(b - 1 )*( ) A12 = Sx *(b - 1 )*( )

A21 = Sy *(b - 1 )*( )

A22 = 1+Sy *(b - 1 )*( ) A23 = -1

A31 = {θkx + [ Tc* θkx*(1+β)*

θkx*(

– (1-

β)*

– (1-

*(

]*(1+ Єxx) +

]*(1+ Єxx) +

β)*

) + Єxy *

B3 = {

{

*

+

– [ θlx +

*

+

*(1+β)*

B2 = 0

*[(1+β)*

)+

}

+(

)+

}

}

* (1+ Єxx)*[ θkx +

A41= {[ Tc*
β)*

*

A24 = Sy

*( Єxx *θkx + Єxy *

*

*( Єxx* θlx + Єxy* θly )+ ( 1 + Єxx)* Tc*[ θlx +

Єxy * Tc*[ θly +

B1 = 0

+ Єxx *θkx *(

A33 = - {[θlx * ( )*(1 ∓

A34 = {-

A14 = Sx

*( Єxx *θkx + Єxy *

*

) + Єxy *(1+β)*

*(1+β)*

A32 = {[ Tc*

A13 = ( )

+

*

+ θlx +

*

]*(1+ Єyy) +

+

}

- [Єxx + Єxy ] }*

] +

]*

* Єxy*[ θky +

-

+ θly +

*( Єyx * θkx + Єyy *

]}* dTc

) –

*(1-
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Єyx *θkx *[(

+ (1+β)*Tc*

A42 = {θky + [ Tc*

–

*(1+β)*

}

]*(1+ Єyy) +

+ Єyy *θky *[(

*(1-β)*

*( Єyx * θkx + Єyy *

+ Єyx *(1+β)*

)

}

A43 = {[θly*(1 ∓

}

A44 = {( 1 + Єyy)* Tc*[ θly +

+ Єyx * Tc*[ θlx +

]*

*

– [ θly +

*

*( Єyx* θlx + Єyy* θly ) }

B4 = {

{

+

+

- [Єyx + Єyy ] }*

* (1+ Єyy)*[ θky +

+ θly +

] +

-

* Єyx*[ θkx +

+ θlx +

]}* dTc

This can be solved using MATLAB or any other procedure as discussed in chapter two.
CHANGES IN GDP AND USES SIDE
Here GDP from the income side equals disposable income since there are no
direct taxes.
dMo = dGDPo = Pk*Kx*

dMr = dGDPr = - Kx*

+ Pk*Ky*

- Ky*

+ (Kx + Ky)*dPk + (Lx + Ly)*dPlo
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Now, as in chapter two we construct Laspeyres index for both countries to get an
estimate of the change in the cost of living. Since the consumption tax does not apply to
the ROW, the index for ROW is the same as in chapter two.
(Px + dPx)* Xr + (Pz + dPz)*Zr
LASr =

----------------------------------------Px * Xr + Pz *Zr

Next we know that dPz = 0 and initial prices are equal to 1, this gives:
Xr + dPx* Xr + Zr
LASr =

----------------------------------------- = 1 +
Xr + Zr

dPx* Xr
-------------------Xr + Zr

The major difference is in the index in the OECD country since the tax is imposed on
consumption here:
LASo =
d[Px*(1+TCo)]* Xo + d[Py*(1+TCo)]* Yo + d[Pz*(1+TCo)]* Zo + [Px*(1+TCo)]* Xo +
[Py*(1+TCo)]* Yo + [Pz*(1+TCo)]* Zo
------------------------------------------------------------[Px*(1+TCo)]* Xo + [Py*(1+TCo)]* Yo + [Pz*(1+TCo)]* Zo

d[Px*(1+TCo)]* Xo + d[Py*(1+TCo)]* Yo + d[Pz*(1+TCo)]* Zo
=

1+

---------------------------------------------------------------------------[Px*(1+TCo)]* Xo + [Py*(1+TCo)]* Yo + [Pz*(1+TCo)]* Zo
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=

dTCo*[ Xo + Yo + Zo] + (1+TCo)[ dPx*Xo + dPy* Yo]

1+

--------------------------------------------------------------------(1+TCo)* [Xo + Yo + Zo]
LASo

=

1+

+

As in chapter two, to measure total welfare, we can either take a linear combination of the
changes in the sources and uses side, or deflate the change in GDP by the change in
prices.
OECD welfare:
Wo =1 + dGDPo/GDPo - LASo and
ROW welfare Wr = 1+ dGDPr/GDPr - LASr
This is a pure assumption, and we could have chosen any form for the welfare function,
such as Wo =

instead or more complicated forms.

In the next chapter, we examine the models of the CIT and the consumption tax
with different expenditure assumptions. We assume in chapter 4 that government does
not provide an active input, but instead returns the tax revenue to the consumer in the
OECD through a transfer payment. We compare these models of the transfer payment
with the ones developed in chapters two and three to examine the impact of the
expenditure assumption made.
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CHAPTER IV – THE TRANSFER MODELS

The purpose of this chapter is to develop models of the tax competition case with
largely the same set-up as in chapters two and three; the main difference will be that there
is no government provided input. In line with Randolph (2006), Harberger (1962, 1995
and 2008) and others, tax revenue will be returned lump-sum to the single consumer in
the OECD. This may be thought of as a tax and transfer program, but since there is only
one consumer in the OECD, the net effect is that what is taken in tax revenue is returned
without administrative costs. However, taxation creates an excess burden when relative
prices change, and so a change in the tax implies a change in this burden.
In the Harberger (1962) model, taxes are returned to the single consumer. The
model seeks to quantify only the change in the sources side of income caused by
imposing the tax even after the tax revenue itself is returned. Although Harberger (1962)
concentrates on small tax rate changes, the effects of such a tax in terms of excess burden
are not negligible.
In the case where the tax is imposed on one factor of production, the tax changes
the relative price of this factor. If the producer equates this distorted factor price to
marginal product, the higher tax inclusive price means that relatively less capital is
employed relative to the no-tax situation. This inefficiency or “excess burden” implies
that total production and therefore GDP is lower in the situation with taxes than in the notax case.
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Even if the tax revenue raised is returned lump-sum to the consumer, the wedge
between factor prices remains, and the welfare cost does too. This burden arises purely on
the tax side since there is no government good here, and all tax revenues are raised and
returned without administrative cost. Since the GDP equals the single consumers‟
income, a change in GDP implies an income effect. Thus, a reduction in this distorting
tax should imply a reduction in the excess burden or an increase in GDP.
In the case of a consumption tax, one country is able to tax only the goods
consumed within that country‟s borders. This imposes a wedge between the prices of the
import and export goods prevailing in the ROW and OECD countries. Reducing taxes
removes this wedge and affects demand only in the OECD country since the demand
curves include income effects.
Once two models for the transfer case are developed (one for the capital income
tax and the other for the consumption tax), we can answer one of the research questions
set out in chapter one: Does the use to which taxes are put have an effect on the quantum
and nature of burdens on the sources and uses of income even if no extra assumptions are
made about the non-neutrality of expenditure? In case the differential effects on income
as measured are different in the two cases (for each tax) we can say that the use to which
the tax is put implies that there is an expenditure effect in addition to the tax effect, and it
could very well happen that the government ends up imposing a higher or lower excess
burden on the ROW due to the expenditure choice, even with the same tax revenue.
The models in this chapter differ from the Harberger (1962, 1995 and 2008)
models in the following ways: (1) We still have taxes on all capital income and on
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consumption, not on corporate income (2) There is no separate corporate sector-we focus
on international burdens only (3) There is an existing tax that is lowered (4) The OECD
country is a large open economy and burdens are measured on the sources and uses sides.
Though this version is not solved explicitly in Harberger (1995 and 2008), it is closer in
spirit to the models discussed in Gravelle and Smetters(2006) and Randolph (2006) with
the introduction of the capital income tax and consumption tax being new features.

THE CAPITAL INCOME TAX CASE WITH TRANSFERS
Profit maximization behavior by firms (sectors)
We remind ourselves that Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output
prices) are all equal to 1 and to each other to begin with. Since our existing tax is ≠ 0, this
implies that Pk*(1+Tko) ≠ 1.
The production functions for each sector can be written as a function of productive
resources:
X = f (Kx , Lx)

Y = g (Ky, Ly)

Z = h (Kz, Lz)

Since there is no government provided input, the production functions in sectors
X and Y are functions of capital and labor alone. For sector Z, since we have assumed
full employment, the only variable is Kz since Lz is a constant. We can write the
production function for Z as: Z = h (Kz,
be set up as:

). The profit maximization problem can then
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FIRM (SECTOR) X
Maximize Π (profit) = { Px* f (Kx , Lx) - Pk*(1+Tko)*Kx – Plo*Lx } with respect to Kx and
Lx
First order conditions:

3.

Px*

- Pk*(1+Tko) = 0

And

4. Px*

- Plo = 0

Since Px = 1, this implies that

= Pk*(1+Tko) and

= Plo

Each firm pays each factor its marginal product at the current level of provision of the
public good. In the case of capital in OECD, this is the gross of tax rate of return.
FIRM (SECTOR) Y

Behaves in exactly the same way as X, and so we get

= Pk*(1+Tko) and

= Plo

FIRM (SECTOR) Z
In relative terms, we can behave as if there is no government good or tax in the
ROW. We can assume that the amount of taxation is fixed, and does not vary in the sense
that we are only modeling the excess tax in the OECD country (over and above the level
of taxes and public services provided in the ROW). Furthermore, the tax and level of G in
the ROW does not change at all, so it is built into prices and output. We can thus proceed
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as if there is no tax or G in ROW, although this may be true only in relative terms. Since
no changes are being made to T and G in ROW, we assume that there are no marginal
effects. However, this is an approximation, as in previous chapters. If there is an ad
valorem tax in the ROW either on capital or on consumption, changing factor and
commodity prices will affect revenues even without rate changes. As in previous
chapters, we have ignored such effects. We therefore have only the production function:
Z = h (Kz,

) and the problem for firm Z:

Maximize Π (profit) = { Pz* h (Kz ,

) - Pk*Kz – Plr*

} with respect to Kz { since we

assume full employment always in both countries, choosing Lz is not a decision variable
} and we get

= Pk

CHANGES IN THE AD VALOREM TAX RATE
We use

d(Pk*(1+Tko)) = d(Pk + Pk*Tko) = dPk + Tko*dPk + dTko = dTko +

(1 + Tko)*dPk
SUPPLY
The production functions for the three sectors are:
X = f (Kx , Lx)

Y = g (Ky, Ly)

Z = h (Kz, Lz)

Since there is no government input here, G does not enter any supply function.
SECTOR X
X = f (Kx , Lx)
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The total change in supply (output) or the total differential can be split into:

dX =

* dKx +

* dLx

Remembering that firms in sector X equate

and

= Plo and that Px = 1:

=

*

Writing θkx =

And

= Pk*(1+Tko)

θlx =

S1…………………..

+

*

the tax-inclusive share of capital‟s product in sector X

the share of labor‟s product in sector X, we get

= θkx *

+ θlx *

Similarly, for SECTOR Y we have:
S2………...............

Where

θky =

And

θly =

= θky *

+ θly *

the tax-inclusive share of capital‟s product in sector Y

the share of labor‟s product in sector Y.

SECTOR Z
There is no tax in the ROW, so the relevant terms for this sector:
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S3a………...............

= θkz *

But dLz = 0 by assumption (Lrow =

+

*

*

is fixed), and θkz is tax-exclusive, so we can write

the above as:
S3………...............

= θkz *

This gives us our three supply equations.
PRICE FORMATION
Sectors X and Y, as in the traditional case are assumed to be CRS. Since there is
no government input, they continue to be so. For sector Z, however, since we assume full
employment, the production function has only one argument, that is Kz. We can no longer
say that the production function is CRS in K alone since Lrow =
is combined with the fixed

and any amount of Kz

which is not variable. The production function has to show

diminishing returns to the single variable factor Kz. Payments to labor in Z are a residual.
Since the amount of Kz depends on Pk which is determined jointly with other sectors,
whatever is left over of the product is paid to labor. Given the fixed amount of labor, we
get Plr and dPlr as a residual.
SECTOR X
We know that production is HOD One, and that there are only two arguments in the
production function, capital and labor.
From Euler‟s law:
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* Kx +

* Lx = X

* Kx +

* Lx = Px*X

since Px =1

d(Px*X) = [ Px*dX + X*dPx] = d[

* Kx +

* Lx]

If we then continue with our assumption that firms pay marginal products:
[ Px*dX + X*dPx] = d[Pk*(1+Tko)* Kx + Plo* Lx]
⇨

[ Px*dX + X*dPx] = d[(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + Plo* Lx]

⇨

Px*dX + X*dPx = [d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + (Pk+Pk*Tko)* dKx + dPlo* Lx + Plo* dLx ]

From the supply equations and assumptions Px = 1 we know that Px*dX = dX and
dX =

⇨

* dKx +

* dLx

Px*dX = Pk*(1+Tko)* dKx + Plo * dLx

Substituting in our original equation:
Px*dX + X*dPx = [d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + (Pk+Pk*Tko)* dKx + dPlo* Lx + Plo* dLx ]
X*dPx = [d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + (Pk+Pk*Tko)* dKx + dPlo* Lx + Plo* dLx ] - Px*dX
⇨

X*dPx = [d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + (Pk+Pk*Tko)* dKx + dPlo* Lx + Plo* dLx ] –
Pk*(1+Tko)* dKx - Plo * dLx

⇨

X*dPx = d(Pk+Pk*Tko)* Kx + dPlo* Lx
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⇨

X*dPx = Kx*dPk+ Kx*( dPk*Tko + Pk*dTko) + dPlo* Lx

⇨

X*dPx = Kx*{(1 + Tko)* dPk + Pk*dTko} + dPlo* Lx

Using Pk = 1, Plo = 1 and Px =1:
dPx =

⇨

*dPk +

dPx = θkx * dPk + θkx *

*

+

*dPlo

+ θlx * dPlo

…………………(P1)
Similarly for SECTOR Y
⇨

dPy = θky * dPk + θky *

+ θly * dPlo

…………………(P2)
SECTOR Z
There is no tax here. Suppose that total payments to capital in Z are a constant
proportion of the product. The residual is paid to labor. As discussed in previous
chapters, we impose this restriction for the analytical convenience of collapsing ROW to
one sector. This is not so damaging, however, when we consider that constant factor
proportions are an implication of several well-known functional forms such as CobbDouglas. Harberger (1962) assumes CRS production functions, as do many other models
based on his paper and Jones (1965). Further, constant proportions are assumed in the
price formation and supply equations in Harberger (1962) even without assuming
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functional forms. If b represents the baseline payments proportion to capital in Z, and if b
is assumed to be a constant, then:
b* Pz* Z = Pk * Kz : b<1and b is constant
[ Pz*dZ + Z*dPz] = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ]

Now from the supply equation for Z we know that: Pz*dZ = dZ ( since Pz = 1) = Pk * dKz
⇨ Z*dPz = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ] - Pz*dZ

⇨ Z*dPz = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ] - Pk * dKz

⇨ dPz = ( )* [θkz *dPk + θkz *

] - θkz *

(Since Pk and Pz = 1, and θkz is tax-exclusive)
⇨ dPz = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

)* θkz *

Now since we have chosen Pz as our numeraire (dPz = 0), we get a relationship between
dPk and

and ultimately between dPk and

0 = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

dPk = (b - 1 ) *

= - ( )*

- ( )*

)* θkz *

…………………(P3)

Though we have assumed that the proportion of product that goes to capital in
sector Z is a constant (b), this is not a necessary assumption. We could have proceeded as
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if b was a variable. However, to be able to derive an exact expression for the change in b,
we need to know the functional form, and to maintain generality, we assume b is
constant. This is not a departure from the various versions of the Harberger model or the
Jones version, since b is replaceable by θkz , which is usually assumed fixed. From these
expressions, we can see that Plr and dPlr can be derived in terms of either total product
Pz*Z, a combination of Pz*Z and Pk*Kz or Pk*Kz alone:
Plr = ( 1 – b )* Pz*Z
Or

Plr = Pz*Z - Pk*Kz

Or

Plr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Plr = (

)* [Pk* Kz ]* ( )

⇨ dPlr = (

)* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ]* ( )

Or

dPlr = (1 – b)* [Pz*dZ]* ( )

since dPz = 0

SUBSTITUTION

The elasticity of substitution is (with competition) defined as: Sx =

This can be rewritten as:
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= Sx *

Since the derivation follows exactly the same steps as in Tresch (2002) it is not derived
here, the results are stated:
SECTOR X

-

= Sx * (dPk +

- dPlo)

………………………………….(U1)

- dPlo)

……………………………………(U2)

SECTOR Y

-

= Sy * (dPk +

SECTOR Z
In the ROW dLz = 0 by assumption, so any amount of capital is combined with
the fixed amount of labor, which is not varied at all. Therefore, there is no substitution
elasticity or equation for this sector.

DEMAND
SECTOR X
X = Xo(Px, Py, Pz, Mo) + Xr(Px, Pz, Mr)
Xo represents OECD demand for X. it is a function of all three prices since the
OECD consumer consumes the products of all sectors. Mo is OECD consumer‟s
disposable income. This is a Marshallian demand curve. Even though, following
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Harberger (1962), all tax revenue is returned as a lump-sum transfer to the OECD
consumer; the change in the tax changes the excess burden, and creates an income effect.
If income or utility is not held constant, the demand curve is not Hicksian, but
Marshallian.
There is another difference with chapter two. Since all tax revenue is returned to
the consumer, disposable income is equal to GDP in the OECD in this model by virtue of
the transfer and not the increase in product caused by the government input. This
formulation follows Ballentine and Eris (1975), and the Marshallian elasticities could
have been represented as compensated elasticities as well, using the Slutsky substitution.
Xr is the ROW demand for X. It is a function of prices of only the two tradable
goods since the ROW does not consume Y. Mr is the disposable income of the ROW
consumer. Since there are no taxes in the ROW this is equal to GDP. This is also a
Marshallian demand curve. Explicit formulations for disposable income follow:
Mo = Pk*(1 + Tko)*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)
dMo = Pk*(1 + Tko)*(dKx + dKy) + (Kx + Ky)*d[Pk*(1 + Tko)] + Plo*(dLx + dLy) +
(Lx + Ly)*dPlo
But dLx + dLy = 0 by definition, so
dMo = Pk*(1 + Tko)*(dKx + dKy) + (Kx + Ky)* dPk*(1 + Tko) +(Kx + Ky)* dTko +
(Lx + Ly)*dPlo
⇨ dMo = Pk*(1 + Tko)*Kx*

+ Pk*(1 + Tko)*Ky*

+ (Kx + Ky)*dPk *(1 + Tko) +
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(Kx + Ky)* dTko + (Lx + Ly)*dPlo
For Mr there is no tax, so GDP is the same as disposable income:
Mr = Pk * Kz + Plr * Lz
But Plr * Lz =

Plr = Pz*Z - Pk*Kz = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Mr = Pk * Kz + ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Mr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]

dMr = ( )* [Kz*dPk + Pk*dKz]

…………………(P3)

But dPk = (b - 1 ) *

⇨ dMr = ( )* [Kz*(b - 1 ) *

+ Pk*dKz]

⇨ dMr = ( )* [(b - 1 )*dKz + dKz]
⇨ dMr = dKz
⇨ dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

Taking the total differential of the demand for X we get:

dX =

* dPx +

* dMr

* dPy +

* dPz +

* dMo +

* dPx +

* dPz +
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Dividing by X we get:
⇨

=

*

+

* dPx +

*

*

* dPy +

*

* dMo +

* dPz + ( )*[

* dPz +

*

* dPx

* dMr ]

Remembering that all prices are = 1 to begin with, and that dPz = 0 we can write the
above as:
⇨

=[

*

+

*

( )*[

] * dPx + [

* dMo +

*

]* dPy +

* dMr ]

………………………..(D1)

SECTOR Y
Since Y is non-tradable, the demand curve consists of demand only from the OECD
country.
Y = Yo(Px, Py, Pz, Mo)

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + ( )*[

* dMo]

………………………………(D2)

SECTOR Z

=[

*

+

*

] * dPx + [

( )*[

* dMo +

*

]* dPy +

* dMr ]

……………………..(D3)
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SUMMARY OF EQUATIONS FOR THE MODEL SO FAR
Supply
= θkx *

+ θlx *

.... (S1)

(Where θkx is tax inclusive)
= θky *

+ θly *

… (S2)

(Where θkyis tax inclusive)
= θkz *

… (S3)

Price Formation
dPx = θkx * dPk + θkx *

+ θlx * dPlo

…. (P1)

+ θly * dPlo

… (P2)

(Where θkx is tax inclusive)
dPy = θky * dPk + θky *

(Where θkyis tax inclusive)
dPz = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

)* θkz *

… (P3)

Substitution
-

= Sx * (dPk +

- dPlo)

… (U1)

-

= Sy * (dPk +

- dPlo)

… (U2)
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Demand
=[

*

+

*

* dMo +

+ ( )*[

] * dPx + [

* dMr ]

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + ( )*[

=[

*

+ ( )*[

+

*

*

* dMo +

] * dPx + [

]* dPy

………… (D1)

* dMo ]

*

* dMr ]

…………(D2)

]* dPy

………… (D3)

Where elasticities are Marshallian and income effects Mo and Mr is disposable income.
Adding up
dKx + dKy + dKz =0

………….(A1)

dLx + dLy = 0

………….(A2)

dLz =0

………….(A3)

dPz = 0 [Numeraire]
Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output prices) are all equal to 1 and to
each other to begin with
Other relationships
d(Pk*(1+Tko)) = dPk + Tko*dPk + Pk*dTko = dPk + Tko*dPk + dTko
dMo = Pk*(1 + Tko)*Kx*

+ Pk*(1 + Tko)*Ky*

+

…..(O1)
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(Kx + Ky)*dPk *(1 + Tko) + (Kx + Ky)* dTko + (Lx + Ly)*dPlo
dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

Plr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

Plr = (

)* [Pk* Kz ]* ( )

dPlr = (

Or

)* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ]* ( )

dPlr = (1 – b)* [Pz*dZ]* ( )

( )* θkz *dPk + (

)* θkz *

since dPz = 0

=0

dPk = (b - 1 ) *

SOLUTION PROCEDURES
Using dKx + dKy + dKz =0

= - ( )*

- ( )*

And using dLx + dLy = 0

= - ( )*

………….(A1) we can write:

………….(A2) we can write:
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Then we equate the demand and supply equations for sector X and Y,
remembering that due to Walras‟ Law, the market for Z is in equilibrium when the first
two are balanced. Now the substitution equations are rewritten as:
-

= Sx * (dPk +

… (U1)

- dPlo)

⇨

+ ( )*

= Sx *(b - 1 ) *

⇨

+ ( )*

= Sx *(b - 1 )*{ - ( )*

-

⇨

= Sy * (dPk +

-

+ Sx *

- Sx *dPlo

- ( )*

- Sx *dPlo

… (U2)

- dPlo)

= Sy *(b - 1 )*{ - ( )*

}+ Sx *

- ( )*

} + Sy*

- Sy*dPlo

Next we equate the supply and demand for X, and remembering that dPz = 0 and

= - ( )*

θkx *

( )*[

:

- θlx * ( )*

* dMo +

=[

*

+

*

] * dPx + [

*

* dMr ]

Equating demand and supply for Y:
θky *

+ θly *

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + ( )*[

* dMo ]

]* dPy +
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,dPx , dPy , dMo,

We now have 4 equations in the following unknowns:
, dMr, and dPlo . We can substitute for some variables using:

dPx = θkx *(b - 1 )*{ - ( )*

- ( )*

}+ θkx *

- ( )*

} + θky *

+ θlx * dPlo

(Where θkx is tax inclusive)
dPy = θky *(b - 1 )*{ - ( )*

+ θly * dPlo

(Where θkyis tax inclusive)
dMo = Pk*(1 + Tko)*Kx*

+ Pk*(1 + Tko)*Ky*

(Kx + Ky) *(b - 1 )*{ - ( )*

- ( )*

+

}*(1 + Tko) + (Kx + Ky)* dTko +

(Lx + Ly)*dPlo
dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

And we are left with 4 equations in 4 variables, namely:

,

Next we use symbolic notation for some of the parameters involved:
Єxx = [

*

+

*

]

We can write for symmetry since Yo = Y:
Єyx = Eyx

and

Єyy = Eyy

Єxy = [

*

]

and dPlo
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REDUCED FORM VERSION OF THE MODEL
[1+ Sx*(b - 1 )*( )]*

+ Sx *(b - 1 )*( )*

+ ( )*

+ Sx*dPlo = Sx *

…..(1)

Sy *(b - 1 )*( )*

+ [1+ Sy*(b - 1 )*( )]*

-

+ Sy*dPlo = Sy*

…..(2)
{θkx + [θkx* Єxx + θky* Єxy]*(b-1)*

[θkx +

*(1 + Tko)]*(b-1)*( )*

}*

{[θkx*Єxx + θky*Єxy]*(b-1)*

[θkx +

-

*(1 + Tko)]*(b-1)*( )*

- θlx * ( )*

+

*

+

+

*(1 + Tko)*

+

*

+

}*

- { Єxx* θlx + Єxy* θly +

{ θkx*Єxx + θky*Єxy + [θkx+

*

*(1 + Tko)]*

{ [θkx*Єyx + θky*Єyy ]*(b-1)*

[θky +

- θkx*

*(1 + Tko)]*(b-1)*( )*

{ θky + [θkx*Єyx + θky*Єyy]*(b-1)*

-

…………

}*

*(1 + Tko)*

}*

}* dPlo =

+

- θky*

+

+

(3)

127

[θky +

*(1 + Tko)]*(b-1)*( )*

+ θly*

}*

- { Єyx* θlx + Єyy* θly +

{ θkx*Єyx + θky*Єyy + [θky +

*

*(1 + Tko)]*

}* dPlo =

…………

}*

(4)

These, as before are 4 equations in 4 variables. If variables are denoted in the
following order by subscript j = 1, ..., 4;

,

,

, dPlo and subscript i = 1, ..., 4

represents the equation, the 4 equations above can be written in symbolic form with aij
representing coefficients attached to the left hand side variables and bi the constants on
the right hand side.

A11*

+ A12*

+ A13 *

+ A14*dPlo = B1

…………

(1)

A21*

+ A22*

+ A23 *

+ A24* dPlo = B2

…………

(2)

A31*

+A32*

+ A33*

+ A34* dPlo = B3

………….

(3)

A41*

+ A42*

+ A43*

+ A44*dPlo = B4

…………

(4)

Where

A11= [1+ Sx*(b - 1 )*( )]

B1 = Sx *

A12 = Sx *(b - 1 )*( )

A13 = ( )

A14 = Sx
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A21 = Sy *(b - 1 )*( )

A22 = [1+ Sy*(b - 1 )*( )]

A23 = -1

A24 = Sy

B2 = Sy*

A31 = {θkx + [θkx* Єxx + θky* Єxy]*(b-1)*

[θkx +

*(1 + Tko)]*(b-1)*( )*

*(1 + Tko)]*(b-1)*( )*

+

*

+

}

A32 = {[θkx*Єxx + θky*Єxy]*(b-1)*

[θkx +

- θkx*

-

*(1 + Tko)*

+

*

}

A33 = - θlx * ( )

A34 = - { Єxx* θlx + Єxy* θly +

B3 = { θkx*Єxx + θky*Єxy + [θkx+

*(1 + Tko)]*

A41 = { [θkx*Єyx + θky*Єyy ]*(b-1)*

[θky +

*(1 + Tko)]*(b-1)*( )*

-

A43 = θly

*(1 + Tko)]*(b-1)*( )*

*

}*

*(1 + Tko)*

+

}

A42 = { θky + [θkx*Єyx + θky*Єyy]*(b-1)*

[θky +

+

- θky*

+

}

A44 = - { Єyx* θlx + Єyy* θly +

*

}

}
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B4 = { θkx*Єyx + θky*Єyy + [θky +

*(1 + Tko)]*

}*

CHANGES IN GDP: SOURCES AND USES SIDES
Sources side:
GDPo (OECD) = Pk*(1 + Tko)*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)
⇨ GDPo = Pk* Kx + Pk*Tko*Kx + Pk*Ky + Pk*Tko*Ky + Plo*(Lx + Ly)
dGDPo = Pk* dKx + dPk* Kx + Pk*Tko*dKx + Pk*dTko*Kx + dPk*Tko*Kx + Pk*dKy +
dPk*Ky + Pk*Tko*dKy + Pk*dTko*Ky + dPk*Tko*Ky + dPlo*(Lx + Ly) + Plo*d(Lx + Ly)
But d(Lx + Ly)= 0, so we ignore the last term:
dGDPo = Pk* dKx + dPk* Kx + Pk*Tko*dKx + Pk*dTko*Kx + dPk*Tko*Kx + Pk*dKy +
dPk*Ky + Pk*Tko*dKy + Pk*dTko*Ky + dPk*Tko*Ky + dPlo*(Lx + Ly)
dGDPo = Pk* Kx*
Pk*Ky*

+ dPk* Kx + Pk*Tko*Kx*

+ dPk*Ky + Pk*Tko*Ky*

dGDPo = dMo = Pk*(1 + Tko)*Kx*

(Kx + Ky) *(b - 1 )*{ - ( )*

(Lx + Ly)*dPlo
GDPr = Mr = Pk * Kz + Plr * Lz

+ Pk*dTko*Kx + dPk*Tko*Kx +

+ Pk*dTko*Ky + dPk*Tko*Ky + dPlo*(Lx + Ly)

+ Pk*(1 + Tko)*Ky*

- ( )*

+

}*(1 + Tko) + (Kx + Ky)* dTko +
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GDPr =Mr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]

dMr = ( )* [Kz*dPk + Pk*dKz]

But dPk = (b - 1 ) *

⇨ dMr = ( )* [Kz*(b - 1 ) *

+ Pk*dKz]

⇨ dMr = ( )* [(b - 1 )*dKz + dKz]
⇨ dMr = dKz
⇨ dGDPr = dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

USES SIDE:
We can use a Laspeyres‟ index defined as the change in the cost of purchasing the base
year‟s consumption bundle. For the OECD country, the index is defined as:
(Px + dPx)* Xo + (Py + dPy)* Yo + (Pz + dPz)*Zo
LASo =

-----------------------------------------------------------Px * Xo + Py * Yo + Pz *Zo

Similarly, for ROW we can estimate:
(Px + dPx)* Xr + (Pz + dPz)*Zr
LASr =

----------------------------------------Px * Xr + Pz *Zr

Next we know that dPz = 0 and initial prices are equal to 1, this gives:
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dPx* Xo + dPy* Yo + Zo + Xo + Yo
LASo =

-------------------------------------------- =

dPx* Xo + dPy* Yo
1+

Xo + Yo + Zo

----------------------------Xo + Yo + Zo

Similarly, we have:
Xr + dPx* Xr + Zr
LASr =

----------------------------------------- = 1 +
Xr + Zr

dPx* Xr
----------------Xr + Zr

We also have to find a way to combine the total welfare effect of the change in
income (GDP) and the change in the uses side or cost-of-living index. This can be done
in a number of ways; one very logical way is available in Randolph (2006). The method
proposed here is more basic. It starts with the assumption that the social welfare function
is a weighted function of proportionate change in income and the proportional change in
the cost of living, with equal weights. This would imply that we could write OECD
welfare as:
Wo = 1 + dGDPo/GDPo - LASo and ROW welfare Wr = 1 + dGDPr/GDPr - LASr
This is a pure assumption, and we could have chosen any form for the welfare function,
such as Wo =

instead or more complicated forms.
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THE CONSUMPTION TAX CASE WITH TRANSFERS
GOVERNMENT
Since there are no savings and capital accumulation in this model, Total consumption =
Total GDP in OECD and ROW separately. Total OECD expenditure /consumption =
Px *(1+TCo)* Xo + Py*(1+TCo) * Yo + Pz *(1+TCo) * Zo
From the income side, we have: OECD GDP = (1+TCo)* [Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
and this = Px *(1+TCo)* Xo + Py*(1+TCo) * Yo + Pz *(1+TCo) * Zo
In this case we have assumed that all revenue collected is returned lump-sum to
the single OECD consumer. Thus, whatever is paid as tax is returned, and no government
good exists, so the production and price formation equations are functions of capital, tax
and labor alone. However, since the tax is returned to the consumer and not spent on G,
the effect has to be as if the income of the consumer in OECD went up by the amount of
the tax. This is not clearly reflected when we consider GDP in terms of Pk*(Kx + Ky) +
Plo*(Lx + Ly), since GDP has to equal factor payments in either case to maintain parity
between aggregate production and demand.
To keep this case comparable with chapter three, we now can assume that even if
total product was returned as factor payments to the extent of Px * Xo + Py* Yo + Pz * Zo
since Xr = Zo due to balanced trade; all the tax revenue collected is returned as well and
is available for spending. Since we have a proportionate ad valorem tax on all
consumption in the OECD, prices of all goods changed proportionately and there was no
change in relative prices. There are no savings and the tax was returned, so the only effect
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could be the change in GDP through the change in excess burden. The only price
differences were the wedge between consumer and producer prices, and the differences in
prices faced by the OECD and ROW consumer.
When all tax revenue collected from the OECD consumer is returned to him, it is
as if the OECD consumer spends Px *(1+TCo)* Xo + Py*(1+TCo) * Yo + Pz *(1+TCo) * Zo
and then gets back G = TCo* Px * Xo + TCo* Py * Yo + TCo* Pz * Zo which would have
gone to finance the government good. Thus, his total expenditure on the same quantities
purchased as in chapter three is Px * Xo + Py * Yo + Pz * Zo but he has unspent income
equal to tax revenue returned. There are no savings and no leisure, and no untaxed
consumption. He has to spend the returned income on the same goods. When demand
curves are HOD Zero in prices and income, the effect on quantities purchased in the limit
is the same as if he were facing the lower prices Px , Py and Pz instead of Px *(1+TCo),
Py*(1+TCo) and Pz *(1+TCo) .
When the amount of the tax is returned to the same consumer, he spends it as is he
had received income equal to TCo* Px * Xo + TCo* Py * Yo + TCo* Pz * Zo . Tax revenue
out of this income is TCo * [TCo* Px * Xo + TCo* Py * Yo + TCo* Pz * Zo ]. Since TCo < 1,
the amount of tax revenue in successive rounds keeps decreasing until it converges to
zero. Then the entire spending is on goods, and the effect is the same as the consumer
facing prices of Px , Py and Pz . Since there is no change in relative prices in either case
and there are no savings, (i.e.

=

), the effect of returning the tax lump-sum

is the same as reducing the prices faced by the same proportion.
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However, as before we have note that we have avoided placing the perfectly
reasonable restrictions on utility functions that guarantee that demands are HOD Zero in
prices and income. This simply means that we do not rule out beforehand that demand
curves do not incorporate “money illusion,” or other effects (Veblen, “Bandwagon” or
“Snob” effects). Since the demand curves are not demand curves for single goods but
consolidated ones, we minimize the set of restrictions in our model in the Harberger spirit
by not placing this restriction in the first instance although the curves do have to satisfy
the Walrasian consistency conditions for a system of general equilibrium. This also
allows for the empirical possibility that the consolidated demand curves may have a set of
elasticities that are not consistent with HOD Zero.
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION BEHAVIOR BY FIRMS (SECTORS)
The production functions for each sector can be written as a function of productive
resources:
X = f (Kx , Lx)

Y = g (Ky, Ly)

Z = h (Kz,

)

The profit maximization problem can then be set up as:
FIRM (SECTOR) X
Maximize Π (profit) = { Px* f (Kx , Lx) - Pk*Kx – Plo*Lx } with respect to Kx and Lx
First order conditions:
1.

And

Px*

- Pk = 0
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2. Px*

- Plo = 0

Since Px = 1, this implies that

= Pk and

= Plo

Each firm pays each factor its marginal product. The demand price includes the
tax, but since the tax is assumed to go to the government and is then refunded to the
single consumer, it does not go to the firm. The tax rate is independent of the firm‟s
actions, so it does not enter the objective function as it is not a part of the firm‟s revenue.
FIRM (SECTOR) Y

Behaves in exactly the same way as X, and so we get

= Pk and

= Plo

FIRM (SECTOR) Z
Since there is no tax in the ROW we have only the production function
Z = h (Kz,

) and the problem for firm Z:

Maximize Π (profit) = { Pz* h (Kz ,

) - Pk*Kz – Plr*

} with respect to Kz { since we

assume full employment always in both countries, choosing Lz is not a decision variable
} and we get

= Pk

SUBSTITUTION

The elasticity of substitution is (with CRS and competition) defined as: Sx =
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This can be rewritten as:

= Sx *

SECTOR X

-

= Sx * (dPk - dPlo)

………………………………….(U1)

SECTOR Y

-

= Sy * (dPk - dPlo)

…………………………………(U2)

SECTOR Z
There is no substitution equation in sector Z.
BALANCING
dKx + dKy + dKz =0
dLx + dLy = 0
dLz =0
dPz = 0 [Numeraire]
Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output supply prices) are all equal to 1 and
to each other to begin with
SUPPLY
The production functions for the three sectors are:
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X = f (Kx , Lx)

Y = g (Ky, Ly)

Z = h (Kz, Lz)

SECTOR X
X = f (Kx , Lx)
The total change in supply (output) or the total differential can be split into:

dX =

=

* dKx +

*

+

Writing θkx =

And

θlx =

S1…………………..

* dLx

*

the tax-exclusive share of capital‟s product in sector X

the tax-exclusive share of labor‟s product in sector X, we get

= θkx *

+ θlx *

Similarly, for SECTOR Y we have:
S2………...............

Where

θky =

And

θly =

= θky *

+ θly *

the tax-exclusive share of capital‟s product in sector Y

the share of labor‟s product in sector Y.

SECTOR Z
There is no tax in the ROW, so the relevant terms for this sector:
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S3a………...............

= θkz *

But dLz = 0 by assumption (Lrow =
S3………...............

+

*

*

is fixed), so we can write the above as:

= θkz *

This gives us our three supply equations. The only difference between this case
and the capital income tax is in the shares of capital and labor in the supply equations.
Since the producer does not receive or pay the tax, the shares are all tax-exclusive. Since
there are no compliance and administrative (collection) costs, we have the full payment to
owners of capital and labor being retained by them, and the impact of the tax being
confined, if at all to the difference between the price paid by the consumer, and that
received by the producer for sales in the OECD alone.
We now turn to price formation. The differences from chapter two are that (1)
there is no tax on any factor, and that supply price here means the prices received by
producers. (2)The demand price in each case is the producers‟ price inflated by the ad
valorem consumption tax.
PRICE FORMATION
SECTOR X
If the production function is CRS and we use Euler‟s law:

* Kx +

(1+TCo)* [

* Lx = X

* Kx +

* Lx] = Px*(1+TCo)* X

since Px =1
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d(Px*(1+TCo)* X) = [(1+TCo)* dX + dTCo*X +(1+TCo)* X*dPx] =
d{(1+TCo)* [

* Kx +

* Lx]}

If we then continue with our assumption that firms pay marginal products:
[(1+TCo)* dX + dTCo*X +(1+TCo)* X*dPx] = d{(1+TCo)* [Pk* Kx + Plo* Lx]}
⇨

[(1+TCo)* dX + dTCo*X +(1+TCo)* X*dPx] = [dPk* Kx *(1+TCo)* + Pk* dKx

*(1+TCo) + dPlo* Lx *(1+TCo) + Plo* dLx *(1+TCo) + dTCo* [Pk* Kx + Plo* Lx] ]
From the supply equations and assumptions Px = 1 we know that Px*dX = dX and
dX =

⇨

* dKx +

* dLx

Px*dX = Pk * dKx + Plo * dLx

Substituting in our original equation:
[(1+TCo)* dX + dTCo*X +(1+TCo)* X*dPx] = [dPk* Kx *(1+TCo)* + Pk* dKx *(1+TCo) +
dPlo* Lx *(1+TCo) + Plo* dLx *(1+TCo) + dTCo* [Pk* Kx + Plo* Lx] ]
(1+TCo)* X*dPx = [dPk* Kx *(1+TCo)* + Pk* dKx *(1+TCo) + dPlo* Lx *(1+TCo) +
Plo* dLx *(1+TCo) + dTCo* [Pk* Kx + Plo* Lx] ]- (1+TCo)* dX - dTCo*X
⇨

(1+TCo)* X*dPx = dPk* Kx *(1+TCo)* + Pk* dKx *(1+TCo) + dPlo* Lx *(1+TCo) +

Plo* dLx *(1+TCo) + dTCo* [Pk* Kx + Plo* Lx] - (1+TCo)* [Pk * dKx + Plo * dLx] dTCo*X
⇨

X*dPx = dPk* Kx + dPlo* Lx as long as [Pk* Kx + Plo* Lx]= X

Using Pk = 1, Plo = 1 and Px =1:
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dPx =

⇨

*dPk

+

dPx = θkx * dPk

*dPlo

+ θlx * dPlo …………………(P1)

Similarly for SECTOR Y
⇨

dPy = θky * dPk

+ θly * dPlo …………………(P2)

SECTOR Z
There is no tax here. Suppose that total payments to capital in Z are a constant
proportion of the product. The residual is paid to labor. If b represents the baseline
payments proportion to capital in Z, and if b is assumed to be a constant, then:
b* Pz* Z = Pk * Kz : b<1and b is constant
[ Pz*dZ + Z*dPz] = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ]

Now from the supply equation for Z we know that: Pz*dZ = dZ ( since Pz = 1) = Pk * dKz
⇨ Z*dPz = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ] - Pz*dZ

⇨ Z*dPz = ( )* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ] - Pk * dKz

⇨ dPz = ( )* [θkz *dPk + θkz *

] - θkz *

(Since Pk and Pz = 1, and θkz is tax-exclusive)
⇨ dPz = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

)* θkz *
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Now since we have chosen Pz as our numeraire ( dPz = 0), we get a relationship between
dPk and

and ultimately between dPk and

0 = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

= - ( )*

- ( )*

)* θkz *

…………………(P3)

dPk = (b - 1 ) *

From these expressions we can see that Plr and dPlr can be derived in terms of either total
product Pz*Z, a combination of Pz*Z and Pk*Kz or Pk*Kz alone:
Plr = ( 1 – b )* Pz*Z
Or

Plr = Pz*Z - Pk*Kz

Or

Plr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Plr = (

)* [Pk* Kz ]* ( )

⇨ dPlr = (

)* [dPk* Kz + Pk* dKz ]* ( )

Or

dPlr = (1 – b)* [Pz*dZ]* ( )

since dPz = 0

DEMAND
SECTOR X
X = Xo((1+TCo)* Px , (1+TCo)* Py, (1+TCo)* Pz , Mo) + Xr(Px, Pz, Mr)
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Xo represents OECD demand for X. it is a function of all three prices since the
OECD consumer consumes the products of all sectors. Mo is OECD consumer‟s
disposable income. This is a Marshallian demand curve. Here, the total factor income is
also equal to disposable income, since there are no direct taxes and the transfer equals the
tax revenue taken out of total expenditure and not paid to the factors of production. Xr is
the ROW demand for X. It is a function of prices of only the two tradable goods since the
ROW does not consume Y. Mr is the disposable income of the ROW consumer. Since
there are no taxes in the ROW this is equal to GDP. This is also a Marshallian demand
curve. Explicit formulations for disposable income follow:
For both Mo and Mr there is no tax on incomes:
Mo = (1+TCo)* [Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
dMo = (1+TCo)* Pk*(dKx + dKy) + (1+TCo)* (Kx + Ky)*dPk + (1+TCo)* Plo*(dLx + dLy) +
(1+TCo)* (Lx + Ly)*dPlo + dTCo* [Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
But dLx + dLy = 0 by definition, so
dMo = (1+TCo)* Pk*(dKx + dKy) + (1+TCo)* (Kx + Ky)*dPk + (1+TCo)* (Lx + Ly)*dPlo +
dTCo* [Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
⇨ dMo = (1+TCo)* Pk*Kx*

+ (1+TCo)* Pk*Ky*

+ (1+TCo)* (Kx + Ky)*dPk +

(1+TCo)* (Lx + Ly)*dPlo + dTCo* [Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
For Mr there is no tax, so GDP is the same as disposable income:
Mr = Pk * Kz + Plr * Lz
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But Plr * Lz =

Plr = Pz*Z - Pk*Kz = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Mr = Pk * Kz + ( )* [Pk* Kz ]- Pk*Kz

⇨ Mr = ( )* [Pk* Kz ]

dMr = ( )* [Kz*dPk + Pk*dKz]

…………………(P3)

But dPk = (b - 1 ) *

⇨ dMr = ( )* [Kz*(b - 1 ) *

+ Pk*dKz]

⇨ dMr = ( )* [(b - 1 )*dKz + dKz]
⇨ dMr = dKz
⇨ dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

Taking the total differential of the demand for X we get:

dX =

* d[Px *(1+TCo)] +

* d[Pz *(1+TCo)] +

Dividing by X we get:

* d[Py *(1+TCo)] +

* dMo +

* dPx +

* dPz +

* dMr
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⇨

=

*

*

* d[Pz *(1+TCo)] +

* dMo +

+ ( )*[

* d[Px *(1+TCo)] +

*

*

* dPx +

* d[Py *(1+TCo)] +
*

* dPz

* dMr ]

Remembering that all prices are = 1 to begin with and that d[Px *(1+TCo)]=
[(1+TCo)* dPx + Px *dTCo ] and that dPz =0 due to the numeraire assumption we can write
the above as:
⇨

=[

+

*

*

+

*

] * dPx + [

+

*

*

]* dPy +

+

( )*[

*

* dMo +

* dMr ]

…………………………..(D1)
All elasticities for OECD are defined with respect to demand prices as in chapter
three, inclusive of the consumption tax. In this case, the elasticities can be the same or
equivalent to tax free ones since the rate is very low compared to the price, and the effect
of returning tax revenue to the single consumer is the same as him facing tax-free prices.
In the ROW there is no tax, and producer and consumer prices are the same, so there is
no difference. Also, Y is not consumed in the ROW.
SECTOR Y
Since Y is non-tradable, the demand curve consists of demand only from the OECD
country.
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Y = Yo(Px *(1+TCo), Py*(1+TCo), Pz *(1+TCo), Mo), and Yo = Y

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + Eyz *dPz + ( )*[

* dMo] + Eyx *

+ Eyy*

+

……………………………………(D2)

Eyz *

SECTOR Z

=[

*

+

+

*

] * dPx + [

*

+

*

*

]* dPy +

+

*

( )*[

* dMo +

* dMr ]

…………………………..(D3)
SUMMARY OF EQUATIONS FOR THE MODEL SO FAR
Supply
= θkx *

+ θlx *

.... (S1)

= θky *

+ θly *

… (S2)

= θkz *

… (S3)

Substitution
-

= Sx * (dPk - dPlo)

… (U1)

-

= Sy * (dPk - dPlo)

… (U2)
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Price Formation
dPx = θkx * dPk

+ θlx * dPlo

…. (P1)

(Where θkx and θlx are tax exclusive)
dPy = θky * dPk

+ θly * dPlo

… (P2)

(Where θky and θly are tax exclusive)
dPz = ( )* θkz *dPk + (

)* θkz *

… (P3)

Demand

=[

*

+

*

] * dPx + [

*

*

+

]* dPy +

*

* dMo +

( )*[

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + ( )*[

*

+

* dMr ] …………………………..(D1)

* dMo] + Eyx *

+ Eyy*

+

……………………………………(D2)

Eyz *

=[

+

*

*

+

*

] * dPx + [

+

*

*

]* dPy +

+

*

+
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( )*[

* dMo +

* dMr ]

…………………………..(D3)

Where elasticities are Marshallian and income effects Mo and Mr is disposable income.
Adding up
dKx + dKy + dKz =0

………….(A1)

dLx + dLy = 0

………….(A2)

dLz =0

………….(A3)

dPz = 0 [Numeraire]
Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output prices) are all equal to 1 and to
each other to begin with
Other relationships
dMo = (1+TCo)* Pk*Kx*

+ (1+TCo)* Pk*Ky*

+

(1+TCo)* (Kx + Ky)*dPk + (1+TCo)* (Lx + Ly)*dPlo +
dTCo* [Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
dMr = - Kx*

- Ky*

SOLUTION PROCEDURES
As can be seen, only the demand functions remain a function of the tax rate.
When a tax was imposed on all consumption at a uniform rate, with no savings or leisure
or untaxed goods, no relative prices changed. When the tax was returned to the single
consumer, his income is also inflated by the same amount. The only effects of the tax

148

wedge are the difference between the prices faced by the OECD and ROW consumer
with respect to the prices of X and Z. This is similar to the tax wedge on the price of
capital faced by the corporate and non-corporate sector in the Harbereger (1962) model.
One the income side, the impact of this tax and transfer program in the OECD should be
neutral. However, once we take the uses side price indices into account, we may not have
uniform effects. Also, if we had been willing to assume that demand was HOD Zero in
income and prices, inflating all prices and income by the same factor of (1+TCo)would
have left all demand unchanged. Since we are not making such an assumption, our
demand curves include the tax rate.
Using dKx + dKy + dKz =0

= - ( )*

………….(A1) we can write:

- ( )*

………….(A2) we can write:

And using dLx + dLy = 0

= - ( )*

Then we equate the demand and supply equations for sector X and Y,
remembering that due to Walras‟ Law, the market for Z is in equilibrium when the first
two are balanced. We substitute dPz = 0 from the numeraire equation in the demand
functions and dLz = 0 wherever it appears. We use dPk = (b - 1 ) *

dPk = (b - 1 )*[- ( )*

- ( )*

]when required.

Now the substitution equations are rewritten as:

or
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-

⇨

+ ( )*

-

⇨

… (U1)

= Sx * (dPk - dPlo)

= Sx *(b - 1 )*[- ( )*

- ( )*

… (U2)

= Sy * (dPk - dPlo)

-

] - Sx *dPlo

= Sy *(b - 1 )*[- ( )*

- ( )*

] - Sy*dPlo

Next we equate the supply and demand for X, and remembering that dPz = 0 and

= - ( )*

θkx *

+

:

- θlx * ( )*

*

( )*[

+

* dMo +

=[

*

*

+

+

*

] * dPx + [

*

*

]* dPy

+

* dMr ]

Equating demand and supply for Y:
θky *
Eyy*

+ θly *

= Eyx *dPx + Eyy *dPy + ( )*[

* dMo] + Eyx *

+

+ Eyz *

We now have 4 equations in the following unknowns:

, dG , dPx , dPy , dMo,

dMr, dPlo and dPk . We can substitute for some variables using:

,
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dPx = θkx * (b - 1 )*[- ( )*

- ( )*

]

+ θlx * dPlo

…. (P1)

]

+ θly * dPlo

… (P2)

(Where θkx and θlx are tax exclusive)
dPy = θky * (b - 1 )*[- ( )*

- ( )*

(Where θky and θly are tax exclusive)
dMo = (1+TCo)* Pk*Kx*

+ (1+TCo)* Pk*Ky*

+ (1+TCo)* (Kx + Ky)*dPk + (1+TCo)*

(Lx + Ly)*dPlo + dTCo* [Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
dMr = - Kx*(

) - Ky*(

)

And we are left with 4 equations in 4 variables, namely:

,

and dPlo

Next we use symbolic notation for some of the parameters involved:
Єxx = [

*

+

*

Єxy = [

]

*

]

These weighted elasticities are Marshallian and are derived assuming the demand curves
are separate for OECD and ROW.
We can write for symmetry since Yo = Y: Єyx = Eyx

and

Єyy = Eyy

REDUCED FORM VERSION OF THE MODEL
[1+Sx *(b - 1 )*( )]*

+ ( )*

…………

+ Sx *(b - 1 )*( )*

(1)

+ Sx *dPlo = 0
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Sy *(b - 1 )*( )*

(1+ TCo)*

*

*

*(Єxx *θkx + Єxy *

{

(1+ TCo)*

*

*

) + θkx*(

}*

+

)+

*(

– (1+ TCo)*

– (1+ TCo)*

}*

*

+

*

+

*

-

+

*( Єyx * θkx + Єyy *

(1+ TCo)*

*

{θky +

(1+ TCo)*

{[ θly +

*

*(1+ TCo)*

}*

+

*( Єyx * θkx + Єyy *

)–

*

*

) –

*

}*

*

* ЄMX*(1+ TCo)}*

…………

{

)+

)+

- { Єxx* θlx + Єxy* θly +( 1 + TCo)*[ θlx +

{ [θlx * ( ) }*

{

+ Sy *dPlo = 0 ………… (2)

+ [1+Sy *(b - 1 )*( )]*

*( Єxx *θkx + Єxy *

{θkx +

=

-

+

(1+ TCo)*

+

*

Єyx* θlx + Єyy* θly }* dPlo =

(3)

-

+

}* dPlo
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{

+

+ ЄMY*(1+ TCo)}*

+

…………

(4)

Considering the two terms in equations 3 and 4 after the = that are constants:

{

{

*

+

+

*

+

+

*

+

* ЄMX*(1+ TCo)}*

+ ЄMY*(1+ TCo)}*

And

. Had we been willing to assume that the

demand curves were HOD Zero in tax inclusive prices and tax inclusive income, they
would sum to zero in each case due to the homogeneity identity and Euler‟s law: The sum
of all own price, cross price and income elasticities in a HOD Zero demand curve are
equal to zero (Mas-Colell et al 1999). Since we have not made the assumption we have
these terms in both equations. Had the terms dropped out instead, each equation would
have been free of the dTCo term, implying that the change in the tax rate had no impact on
the solution.
These, as before are 4 equations in 4 variables. If variables are denoted in the
following order by subscript j = 1, ..., 4;

,

,

, dPlo and subscript i = 1, ..., 4

represents the equation, the 4 equations above can be written in symbolic form with aij
representing coefficients attached to the left hand side variables and bi the constants on
the right hand side.

A11*

+ A12*

+ A13 *

+ A14*dPlo = B1

…………

(1)

A21*

+ A22*

+ A23 *

+ A24* dPlo = B2

…………

(2)
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A31*

+A32*

A41*

+ A42*

………….

(3)

…………

(4)

A12 = Sx *(b - 1 )*( )

A13 = ( )

A14 = Sx

A22 = 1+Sy *(b - 1 )*( )

A23 = -1

A24 = Sy

+ A33 *

+ A34* dPlo = B3

+ A43 *

+ A44*dPlo = B4

Where

A11= 1+Sx *(b - 1 )*( )
B1 = 0

A21 = Sy *(b - 1 )*( )
B2 = 0

*( Єxx *θkx + Єxy *

A31 = {θkx +

(1+ TCo)*

*

*

(1+ TCo)*

*

*

A41= {

*

+

)+

*(

– (1+ TCo)*

*

+

)+

)+

}

A34 = - { Єxx* θlx + Єxy* θly +( 1 + TCo)*[ θlx +

A33 = - {θlx * ( )}

B3 = {

– (1+ TCo)*

}

*(Єxx *θkx + Єxy *

A32 = {

) + θkx*(

*

*( Єyx * θkx + Єyy *

+

* ЄMX*(1+ TCo)}*

) –

*(1+ TCo)*

+

*

}
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(1+ TCo)*

*

*

*( Єyx * θkx + Єyy *

A42 = {θky +

(1+ TCo)*

*

*

+

+

)–

(1+ TCo)*

+

}

A44 = - {[ θly +

A43 =

B4 = {

}

*

Єyx* θlx + Єyy* θly }

+ ЄMY*(1+ TCo)}*

This can be solved using MATLAB or any other procedure as discussed in chapter two.
CHANGES IN GDP AND USES SIDE
Here GDP from the income side equals disposable income since there are no direct taxes.
dMo = dGDPo = (1+TCo)* Pk*Kx*

+ (1+TCo)* Pk*Ky*

+ (1+TCo)* (Kx + Ky)*dPk +

(1+TCo)* (Lx + Ly)*dPlo + dTCo* [Pk*(Kx + Ky) + Plo*(Lx + Ly)]
We get dGDPr = Pk*Kz*

= - Kx*

- Ky*

Now, as in chapter two we construct Laspeyres index for both countries to get an
estimate of the change in the cost of living. Since the consumption tax does not apply to
the ROW, the index for ROW is the same as in chapter two.
(Px + dPx)* Xr + (Pz + dPz)*Zr
LASr =

----------------------------------------Px * Xr + Pz *Zr
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Next we know that dPz = 0 and initial prices are equal to 1, this gives:
Xr + dPx* Xr + Zr
LASr =

----------------------------------------- = 1 +
Xr + Zr

dPx* Xr
-------------------Xr + Zr

The major difference is in the index the OECD country since the tax is imposed on
consumption here. Therefore LASo =
d[Px*(1+TCo)]* Xo + d[Py*(1+TCo)]* Yo + d[Pz*(1+TCo)]* Zo +
[Px*(1+TCo)]* Xo + [Py*(1+TCo)]* Yo + [Pz*(1+TCo)]* Zo
------------------------------------------------------------[Px*(1+TCo)]* Xo + [Py*(1+TCo)]* Yo + [Pz*(1+TCo)]* Zo

d[Px*(1+TCo)]* Xo + d[Py*(1+TCo)]* Yo + d[Pz*(1+TCo)]* Zo
=

1+

---------------------------------------------------------------------------[Px*(1+TCo)]* Xo + [Py*(1+TCo)]* Yo + [Pz*(1+TCo)]* Zo

dTCo*[ Xo + Yo + Zo] + (1+TCo)[ dPx*Xo + dPy* Yo]

=
1+

--------------------------------------------------------------------(1+TCo)* [Xo + Yo + Zo]

LASo

=

1 +

+
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As in chapter two, to measure total welfare, we can either take a linear combination of the
changes in the sources and uses side, or deflate the change in GDP by the change in
prices.
OECD welfare: Wo = 1 + dGDPo/GDPo - LASo

and

ROW welfare Wr = 1 + dGDPr/GDPr - LASr
This is a pure assumption, and we could have chosen any form for the welfare function,
such as Wo =

instead or more complicated forms.

To compare the models of chapter two and three with those in chapter four, we
simply note that for each tax, the tax rate change enters the expressions for GDP and uses
through the solutions for individual terms. Therefore the differential impact for each
input model is the difference between welfare index terms in chapter two and chapter
three and the corresponding transfer model in chapter four. The results for the sources
(GDP) and uses (LAS) are also presented separately for each model. A sample table from
chapter six is presented below for ease of comparison.
Table 4 Results: Sources, Uses & Total Welfare Changes with Baseline Data
OECD
CIT and
INPUT
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

ROW

SOURCES

USES

WELFARE

SOURCES

USES

WELFARE

1.3793

1.3535

0.02583

0.96805

1.0207

-0.052605

0.97619

0.97905

-0.00286

1.0

0.998776

0.001225

1.3939

1.3193

0.07457

0.96792

1.01899

-0.05107

0.99067

0.99100

-0.0003

1.0001

0.99995

0.00013

157

We will derive values for all parameters used in the four models (elasticities,
shares, tax rates etc.) from the existing literature. We will then substitute these in the
model equations. For the tax change, we take the base case to be a 50% reduction in the
differential tax. MATLAB models are built for all 4 cases in chapters two, three and four.
There models are solved to yield numerical values for the variables that enter the sources
and uses side calculations. As an illustration, the baseline MATLAB model and results
from it used to calculate burdens for the CIT with transfer case is appended below. A set
of four such distinct models in MATLAB (for CIT with input, consumption with input,
CIT with transfer and consumption with transfer) with appropriate parameter values
yields each results table in chapter six.
% Dissertation model chapter 4 dec- lowering tax on capital- %
% Reduced for is 4 equations in 4 variables:- dKx_Kx, dLy_Ly, dPlo, dKy_Ky %
clear;
clear all;
clc;
eq5='(1/3)*dKx_Kx + (2/3)*dLx_Lx = dX_X';
eq6='(1/3)*dKy_Ky + (2/3)*dLy_Ly = dY_Y';
eq7='(1/3)*dPk - (1/3)*(0.025/1.05) + (2/3)*dPlo = dPx';
eq4='(1/3)*dPk - (1/3)*(0.025/1.05) + (2/3)*dPlo = dPy';
eq1='dPk = - (2/3)*dKz_Kz';
eq2='dKz_Kz = - (3/36.75)*dKx_Kx - (12/36.75)*dKy_Ky';
eq3='dLx_Lx = -4*dLy_Ly';
eq8='dKx_Kx - dLx_Lx = -0.6*dPk + (0.6)*(0.025/1.05) + 0.6*dPlo';
eq9='dKy_Ky - dLy_Ly = -0.6*dPk + (0.6)*(0.025/1.05) + 0.6*dPlo';

158

eq10='dX_X = -.5*dPx - .3*dPy + 0.08*(1/3)*dKx_Kx + 0.08*(4/3)*dKy_Ky +
0.08*(5/3)*dPk + 0.08*(10/3)*dPlo - 0.036*(1/3.15)*dKx_Kx - 0.036*(4/3.15)*dKy_Ky
- 0.025*0.08*(5/3.15)';
eq11='dY_Y = -.1*dPx - .8*dPy + 0.8*(1/12)*dKx_Kx + 0.8*(1/3)*dKy_Ky +
0.8*(5/12)*dPk + 0.8*(10/12)*dPlo - 0.025*0.8*(5/12.6)';
s=solve(eq1,eq2,eq3,eq4,eq5,eq6,eq7,eq8,eq9,eq10,eq11,'dKx_Kx','dKy_Ky','dLx_Lx','d
Ly_Ly','dPk','dPlo','dPx','dPy','dX_X','dY_Y','dKz_Kz');
dKx_Kx= s.dKx_Kx
dKy_Ky = s.dKy_Ky
dLy_Ly = s.dLy_Ly
dPlo = s.dPlo
dLx_Lx = s.dLx_Lx
dPk = s.dPk
dPx = s.dPx
dPy = s.dPy
dX_X= s.dX_X
dY_Y = s.dY_Y
dKz_Kz = s.dKz_Kz
Kx = (1/3.15)*20
Ky = (1/3.15)*80
Ly = (2/3)*80
Kz = (1/3)*(700/3)
Lx = (2/3)*20
dKx = dKx_Kx*Kx
dKy = dKy_Ky*Ky
dLy = dLy_Ly*Ly
dKz = dKz_Kz*Kz
dLx = dLx_Lx*Lx
GDPO = 100
dGDPO = (1.05)*(dKx + dKy) + (1.05)*(Kx + Ky)*dPk - (0.025)*(Kx + Ky) + (Lx +
Ly)*dPlo
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Xo = 8
Yo = 80
Zr = 221.3333333
Zo = 12
Xr = 12
LASO = 1 + (dPx*0.08) + (dPy*0.8)
WELFO = 1+ (dGDPO/GDPO) - LASO
GDPR = 700/3
dGDPR = -dKx -dKy
LASR = 1 + dPx*(36/700)
WELFR = 1+ (dGDPR/GDPR) - LASR
SOURCESR = 1+ (dGDPR/GDPR)
SOURCESO = 1+ (dGDPO/GDPO)
%RESULTS%
dKx_Kx =0.0095238095238095238095238095238095
dKy_Ky =-0.0023809523809523809523809523809526
dLy_Ly =-0.0023809523809523809523809523809524
dPlo =-0.023809523809523809523809523809524
dLx_Lx =0.0095238095238095238095238095238096
dPk =(-3.7844965146552448139749727051315)*10^(-35)
dPx =-0.023809523809523809523809523809524
dPy =-0.023809523809523809523809523809524
dX_X =0.0095238095238095238095238095238096
dY_Y =-0.0023809523809523809523809523809525
dKz_Kz =5.6767447719828672209624590576973*10^(-35)
Kx = 6.3492
Ky = 25.3968
Ly = 53.3333
Kz = 77.7778
Lx = 13.3333
dKx =0.060468631897203325774754346182917
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dKy =-0.060468631897203325774754346182922
dLy =-0.12698412698412698412698412698413
dKz =4.4152459337644522829708014893201*10^(-33)
dLx =0.12698412698412698412698412698413
GDPO = 100
dGDPO =-2.3809523809523809523809523809524
Xo =

8

Yo = 80
Zr = 221.3333
Zo =

12

Xr = 12
LASO =0.97904761904761904761904761904762
WELFO =-0.0028571428571428571428571428571429
GDPR = 233.3333
dGDPR =4.4522829799670587500411415562129*10^(-33)
LASR =0.9987755102040816326530612244898
WELFR =0.0012244897959183673469387755102041
SOURCESR =1.0
SOURCESO =0.97619047619047619047619047619048
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CHAPTER V – DATA

BASIC ECONOMY DATA
In this section we report the data to be used as parameters in the four models,
obtaining data from existing studies and standard data sources. At the outset, it is
clarified that following the standard literature on which this dissertation is based
(Harbereger 1962, 1995 and 2008; Gravelle and Smetters 2001, 2006 and Randolph
2006) we use data for the U.S. to represent the OECD country, and the ROW includes all
other countries in the world. The only country of comparable size in the world in our
opinion that can have an impact similar to the U.S. would be the E.U. or Euro-Zone
countries taken together and perhaps China in the not-too-distant future.
While it seems that lumping all other countries - developed, NICs and LDCs
together as ROW may be a bit of a stretch, we can always isolate the major trading
(investment) partners of the OECD country and have them represent ROW instead. This
group may be more homogenous. Both characterizations of the OECD country and ROW
are standard in most important models of this type that we have come across in the
literature, and so we follow the same route in the dissertation.
The objective is to substitute out those parameters for which estimates are
available in the literature so that we can concentrate on analyzing the solutions dependent
on parameters which fall in the “unknowable” category. To begin with, the sources of
information for basic economy data from Randolph (2006) are:
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Table 5 Initial Assumptions Randolph (2006)
Share of Value Added in Sector
Labor
Capital
Land
Corporate Sectors
Sectors 1 and 2: Tradable
Sector 3: Nontradable
Non-Corporate Sectors
Sector 4: Tradable, agriculture
Sector 5: Nontradable
Total

Share of
Output

82%
76%

18%
24%

…
…

28%
45%

49%
47%
70%

17%
53%
29%

34%
…
1%

3%
24%
100%

Domestic (OECD) economy's share of world output
30%
Domestic (OECD) ownership share of world capital
30%
Partial elasticity of substitution, capital and labor
0.6
Source: Randolph (2006), Based on Gravelle and Smetters (2006).

Randolph (2006) also reports (implied) calculated statistics form Harberger
(1995) for the same variables.

Table 6 Shares Consistent With Harberger (1995)
Share of Value Added in Sector
Labor
Capital
Land
Corporate sectors
Sectors 1 and 2: Tradable
Sector 3: Nontradable
Non-corporate sectors
Sector 4: Tradable, agriculture
Sector 5: Nontradable
Total

Share of
Output

71%
82%

29%
18%

…
…

25%
40%

49%
57%
70%

17%
43%
29%

34%
…
1%

3%
32%
100%

Domestic economy's share of world output
37.5%
Domestic ownership share of world capital
37.5%
Partial elasticity of substitution, capital and labor 0.6
Source: Randolph (2006) and Based on Harberger (1995)
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The data above have been derived to be consistent with results in Harberger
(1995), although all the variables have not been specified in the paper itself. This is
especially apparent in the case with the labor share for nontradable corporate sector
which yields a figure of 82% consistent with the results. While this figure is consistent, it
should not be interpreted as intentional since this sector (consisting of items like housing)
is generally taken to be more capital intensive than the labor share of 82% suggests.
Further, we need to clarify what constitutes the corporate tradable sector since we
know that the non-corporate tradable sector refers to agriculture. Harberger (2008)
classifies the corporate tradable sector to include manufacturing, the corporate nontradable sector to include utilities and transport, and the non-corporate non-tradable
sector to include services. However, without a clear specification of exactly which sectors
go where and how the output of sub-sectors is allocated we cannot hope to replicate the
results. For example, we may argue that with the advent of the internet, some services
such as higher education are now tradable, and could constitute a major export
(invisibles).
The distinction is between goods actually traded and those potentially tradable.
While goods actually traded might be a specific fraction of GDP in the U.S. (exports and
imports), tradables refer to a different class of goods. To illustrate, let us follow a strict
interpretation of the Harberger (2008) typology using 2007 BEA data and see what we
get. Here, the tradable sector includes manufacturing, agriculture and mining. The nontradable sector includes everything else, services, utilities and transport, government et al.
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There does not appear to be a good source to estimate the world‟s total stock of
capital, even though there is an exact estimate of U.S. capital stock from BEA. The
elasticity of substitution of 0.6 is based on Hamermesh and Grant (1979) and common to
both sectors, but as reported by Randolph (2006), results are not very sensitive to change
within the range 0.6 to 1.0. We will use this elasticity as negative (- 0.6) since it was
defined as such in our model.
Table 7 Initial Assumptions Following Harberger (2008)

Tradable Sector
Manufacturing
Mining
Agriculture
Non-tradable Sector
(Everything else)
Total

Share of Value Added in Sector
Labor Capital (= 1- labor)
52%
48%
60%
40%
23%
77%
25%
75%
57%
43%
57%

Domestic economy's share of world output

43%

Share of
Value Added
15%
11.7%
2%
1.2%
85%
100%

29% (WDI 2007)

Therefore, there does not appear to be any reason based on WDI estimates for
2007 to dispute the Randolph/GandS estimates of:
Domestic economy's share of world output

30%

However, there is no straightforward source for the next statistic:
Domestic ownership share of world capital

30%

Issues with basic economy data: tradables and nontradables
There are several well-documented issues in the literature on each one of these
figures. First we will briefly review the discussion on the issue of what constitutes
tradables. DeGregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) summarize one dominant view thus:

165

“The theoretical literature on real exchange rates relies upon a neat division of
commodities into “tradables” and “nontradables”. Unfortunately few real world
commodities fall easily into the nontradable category. Indeed, as Roy Harrod pointed out,
virtually all commodities are tradable within some area, with the extent of the area
determined by transportation cost. Notwithstanding, most economists would argue that
certain commodities are in some sense inherently “less tradable” than others.”(pg 1231)
They proceed to define a sector as tradable if more than 10% of its output is
exported, and find that for a sample of 14 OECD countries for the period 1970-1985,
manufacturing, mining and agriculture are tradables and services are nontradables.
However, within nontradables they find that transportation has higher export content, and
thus include transport in tradables (this could be due to the higher tradable component of
international airlines and shipping). Everything else, summing to about 50-60% of GDP
is treated as nontradable. The authors report that this coincides with the classification of
Stockman and Tesar (1991) as well, and find that the export threshold of 10% chosen
does not affect the results qualitatively when varied in the range 5%-20%.
However, a more recent strand followed by Benetrix and Lane (2009), Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (1999), Galystan and Lane (2008) and Obstfeld (2009) presents a
slightly different classification. As described in Benetrix and Lane (2009):
“real output in the nontradable sector is the sum of the real added value in „Construction‟,
„Wholesale and Retail Trade‟, „Hotels and Restaurants‟, „Transport and Storage and
Communication‟, „Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services‟, „Public
Administration and Defense; Compulsory Social Security‟, Education‟, „Health and
Social Work‟ and „Other Community, Social and Personal Services‟. Real output in the
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tradable sector is the aggregate of the real added value in „Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry
and Fishing‟, „Mining and Quarrying‟, „Total Manufacturing‟ and „Electricity, Gas and
Water Supply‟.” (Page 5)
The share of “utilities” in BEA 2007 is 2% and for “transport” is 2.9%. Either
way, the total tradables do not add up to more than 20% of total value added if we do not
exclude other items such as taxes and government value added from the total or add other
services to tradables. The relevant figure for Harberger (1995) is 28%. The share used in
GandS/Randolph is 31% for tradables. Based on BEA 2007 and either definition above,
there does not seem to be a strong case for a tradables ratio above 20%.
A recent study by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007) also supports a tradables ratio of
25% for the U.S. Even if we add traded goods to the total from sectors otherwise
classified as tradable, we have to remember that the classification into tradables and
nontradables is different from traded and nontraded. For the U.S., exports and imports
constitute around 13% to 17% of GDP respectively, including invisibles. Exports
constitute around 13%- 14% in the last two years or so, but have averaged around 12%
over the recent decade, going by WDI data.
Exports in this model correspond to Xr and imports to Zo. If we want to avoid
issues of trade deficits, we have to assume that they are equal. Therefore, taking 12% as
actually traded ratio, tradables constitute the sum of value added of the sectors from
which traded goods are taken from. If exports are well-diversified, potentially, the entire
economy could be included in tradables. However, if there were 20 sectors and each
contributed 5% of own output to exports, this would lead to an overall export ratio of 5%
but a tradables ratio of 100%. This would imply that each sector produces an output
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consumed potentially by the ROW, and that the price for this product is determined in
world markets as well as at home. Therefore, the essential distinction is between those
sectors whose demand price is affected by the home country and those whose demand
price is determined by the ROW as well as the home country. What those sectors are, in
my opinion, is a matter of judgment, and several ratios are possible.
LABOR SHARES
The next issue concerns the share of labor in each sector of the U.S. economy.
Here the debate really pertains to the relative shares of capital and labor in each sector, as
well as the relative shares of each factor across tradables and nontradables.
Unfortunately, estimates from different sources vary substantially. Can we go ahead and
use the BEA 2007 figures in the following manner?

Table 8 U.S. Shares Based on BEA (2007)

Tradable Sector
Non-tradable Sector
Total

Share of Value Added in Sector
Labor Capital (= 1- labor)
52%
48%
57%
43%
57%
43%

Share of
Output
15%
85%
100%

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis Website: GDPbyInd_VA_NAICS_19982008.XLS; available at: http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm; accessed on
5/1/2010.

These figures have been obtained by dividing total compensation of employees by
value added in each category. The problem with this approach has been well documented
by several authors. In a recent ILO report, Lubker (2007) explains the issue thus:
“…this commonly used calculation of the labour share is bound to be lower estimates
since national accounts do not include incomes generated from self-employment under
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total compensation, but record them as “mixed income.” Their attribution to either labour
or capital is unclear due to the fact that they reflect both the returns on labour inputs and
on capital investment.”(pg 1)
Another recent ILO study has suggested an alternative method of calculating the
labor share. According to ILOs World of Work Report (2008)
“To adjust for the fact that “compensation of employees” only captures the income of
salaried workers (not of self-employed persons), for a number of countries,
“compensation of employees” was divided by the ratio of employees to total
employment. As such, the assumption is that self-employed persons earn, on average, the
same as employees…… Total labour cost divided by nominal output, where: Total labour
cost = (compensation per employees * number of employees * hours worked
employment)/ (hours worked employees), and nominal output refers to annual current
price value added compiled according to the System of National Accounts 93.”(pg 32)
According to the World Economic Outlook 2007, the 2005 share of income of
employees to GDP for U.S.A. was around 57% while the share of total labor income to
GDP was around 60%. The comparable figures for G-7 countries as a whole was around
55% and 62% respectively (pg 168, chap 5).
Gomme and Rupert (2004) conduct a detailed analysis of what this means for the
U.S. economy. In addition to the issues raised in the ILO and WEO above, they identify
several other differences between labor‟s share and BEA‟s simple ratio:
“Unfortunately, the deeper one digs into the national income and product account, the
more one discovers that this simple calculation is woefully inadequate. Some important
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considerations that should be kept in mind when interpreting measures of the income
shares include:
● How should proprietors‟ income be divided between labor and capital...
● How should the government sector‟s lack of capital income be handled...
● How should the housing sector‟s lack of labor income be handled...
● How should indirect taxes less subsidies be handled...
● Should output (income) be measured on a gross or net basis?” (pg 5)
The authors then provide their own calculations for the shares of labor, net taxes
and capital income (profits plus interest) for 1950-2004 for the corporate nonfinancial
sector in the U.S., and the shares for the final quarter of 2004 are approx 74% labor, 11%
for net taxes and 15% for capital. Using methodologies discussed elsewhere the authors
derive a similar series for the economy and come to the conclusion that the relevant labor
share for the economy as a whole is around 72%.
Unfortunately, this is not the end of the story either. Buchele and Christiansen
(2007) use the data developed by Piketty and Saez (2003) to calculate the labor share
series based on the work of Gomme and Rupert (2004), Krueger (1999) and Poterba
(1997). They find that the relevant share for 2005 is 69%. However, they point out that
this is inclusive of the compensation of top executives, whose pay includes stocks and
options which are more akin to capital income than labor income. By making an
adjustment for the top 0.5% of earners from the Piketty and Saez (2003) data, they find
that the relevant figure for 2005 is 61%. This is similar to the WEO (2007) estimate.
Similar figures are reported in Guscina (2006) and Harrison (2002) for different time
periods.
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However, none of these studies provide estimates for labor share broken down by
tradables and nontradables, so the relative positions have to be estimated elsewhere. The
most detailed recent estimates available are presented in Valentinyi and Herrendorf
(2008) who have provided several different classifications. At producer prices they
estimate the share of capital income to be 37% for tradables, 32% for nontradables and
33% for the economy as a whole. This implies that the ratio of tradables to GDP is taken
as 20%. This also yields labor ratios (if capital plus labor shares add to 1) of 63% for
tradables, 68% for nontradables and 67% for the economy as a whole. Applying the
methodology to BLS data, the authors find that the shares for capital are for tradables is
35%, 34% for nontradables, and 34% for the entire economy, again at producer prices.
Using purchaser prices for traded goods (imports plus exports) does not substantially
change the shares. Using purchaser prices, capital shares are 33% for tradables and
nontradables 34% and 33% overall.
We can summarize the main conclusions as:
1. Capital gets around 1/3 in tradables and nontradables when we take purchaser
prices, labor gets 2/3
2. The share of capital is almost the same in both sectors and the economy as a
whole when different data sources and prices are accounted for
3. The implied ratio of tradables to nontradables is estimated at 1:4.
There are some issues with using these data. Firstly, the ratios and coefficients are
based on data covering a wide period in some cases extending from 1990-2000. Second,
the sectoral breakdown of tradables and notradables is not completely specified in terms
of the BEA 2007 data, the authors use a slightly different classification.
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Based on the above discussion, it appears that a labor share of around 67% for
nontradables is justified, as is the 1:4 ratio between tradables and nontradables. The
problem arises with the share of tradables. The preferred estimates in Randolph (2006)
based on Gravelle and Smetters (2006) imply a 78% share for labor in tradables. The
Harberger (1995) estimate is 68% going to labor in tradables. Both studies also do not use
the same ratio for labor in the tradable sector vis-a-vis nontradables, where the Gravelle
and Smetters (2006) estimate is 67% for labor and the Harberger (1995) estimate is 72%
for labor. This also means that the two studies have different capital intensities in the two
sectors. Their ratios of tradables to nontradables in value added are also closer to 30%
than 20%.
If we use the lower of the labor ratios in each case, we get results as noted above.
Labor gets around two-thirds. More importantly, while there are studies that estimate
higher labor shares in the corporate sectors, there is no evidence that shows labor shares
substantially different from the average of two-thirds to 70% for nontradables. To correct
one and not the other implies changing capital-labor intensities between the two sectors,
for which there does not appear to be clear empirical support, at least in the magnitudes
the authors have suggested. There also does not appear to be any justification provided to
take the ratio of tradables at above 20%.
WORLD AND U.S. CAPITAL STOCKS
We now turn to the ratio of U.S. capital to world capital. The relevant measure for
assets is the SNA 93 balance sheet entry – National wealth. This is available as a series
for the U.S., but not for ROW. While several flow measures are available, such as gross
fixed capital formation and FDI (as well as FDI stocks), we need a consistent

172

methodology to convert the GFCF flows into a stock measure. The preferred
methodology employed by the OECD is detailed in Mienem, Verbiest and de Wolf
(1998) to estimate the stock of capital for countries for which such data is available. The
method of aggregation is known as the “Perpetual Inventory Method”: it involves taking
the stock of capital at a point of time ( opening balance), and adding to it the GFCF and
major new additions such as subsoil assets, subtracting depreciation and losses due to
disasters etc. and lastly accounting for revaluations. The important decision variables are
service lives, discard patterns and depreciation methods.
Since such details for the world as a whole are not available the WDI GFCF series
for 31 years (1965-2006) was used instead. The total of 31 years of GFCF was used as a
proxy for the stock of capital in each case. For U.S. and the World the ratio of total GFCF
comes to 23%. As a further proxy check, the 2007 WDI ratio of U.S. market
capitalization of listed companies is around 30% of world market capitalization, but the
ratio in the two preceding years is around 38%. This means that the Harberger (1995)
estimates of 37.5% are probably at the highest end of the range and the WDI rough
estimate of 23% at the bottom. The Randolph (2006) preferred figure of 30% is
somewhere at the midpoint, so we will proceed with the 30% assumption for the ratio of
U.S. capital to world capital.
The last item in this table is the elasticity of substitution of U.S. capital for labor
in tradables and nontradables. A recent paper by Klump, McAdam and Willman (2007)
has found estimates for 1953-1998 for U.S. of the same magnitude for the elasticity of
substitution, with preferred estimates around the 0.6 mark. Several other studies have also
used elasticities of substitution of less than one, such as Hamermesh (1993), Guscina
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(2006), Decreuse and Maarek (2008) and Checchi and Penalosa (2007). Summarizing the
discussion above gives:
Table 9 Shares Based On Literature Review
Share of Value Added in Sector
Labor Capital (= 1- labor)
Tradable Sector
67%
33%
Non-tradable Sector
67%
33%
Total
67%
33%
Domestic economy's share of world output
30%
Domestic ownership share of world capital
30%
Partial elasticity of substitution, capital and labor - 0.6

Share of
Output
20%
80%
100%

INTERPRETATION OF TAX RATES
For the capital income tax, we can proceed by noting that a strict interpretation of
the tax rate Tko as the total tax rate on capital imposed only by the OECD country is not
necessary. Every country imposes some taxes on capital (with perhaps a few resource
rich countries being exceptions), and very few countries tax all capital at the same
constant average rate. In practice, average and marginal rates for many taxes vary
substantially due to exemptions, allowances etc. It is more intuitive to think of Tko as a
differential tax rate. This represents, for a country that taxes capital at a higher rate than
other countries, its excess tax rate on capital income. Tax competition implies that the
OECD country might seek to reduce or eliminate this differential. This differential tax
could simply be the difference between the average tax rate on the income from capital in
all sectors in the OECD country and the average tax rate on capital income in the rest of
the world.
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There are several different ways of looking at this differential tax rate on capital
income. First, we can note that Corporate Income Tax rates (combined federal and local)
vary widely between even the OECD countries. For 2009, the combined rate for the U.S.
at 39.1% was the second-highest within the OECD, exceeded only marginally by Japan in
2008. The OECD average for the same year was 26.3% (Source: The Tax Foundation
website; available at: http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/23473.html ).
Further, the combined U.S. average rate for tax on dividends that combines the effects of
the Corporate Tax and Income Tax is 49.6%, and only two countries, Denmark and
France had a rate above 50%. (Source: OECD website; available at:
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_37427,00.ht
ml#cc)
Secondly, there is an even more interesting way of looking at this issue. Auerbach
(2008) has pointed out that taxation of capital is not uniform. In addition to the wellknown issue of double taxation of dividend income and the existence of the noncorporate sector, exemptions, thresholds, tax shelters and differential treatment of
different forms of capital income ensure that the effective tax rate after including the
excess burden of distortions due to non-uniform tax treatments is higher than the average
tax rate assuming uniform taxation. Auerbach (1989) calculates that this differential
could be of the order of 9% of capital income in the U.S.
Therefore, a reduction in the effective tax rate could take the form of a
rationalization of the tax structure to remove distortions, and this could mean a reduction
in the effective tax rate on capital income. Perhaps this rate is of the order of 5%, even if
the complete distortion is not removable, tax reform could seek to rationalize capital
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income taxation in a way to make it uniform and reduce distortions, and have the same
effect in practice as reducing the tax rate on an imaginary uniform rate applied to all
capital. Note that it does not apply to a specific tax on one form of capital, such as the
corporate income tax, but rather to taxes on income from capital. This includes income
taxes on capital income (dividends, profits and interest), property taxes on that part of
assessable property value not accounted for by land and tax on capital gains. A
government may seek to eliminate all the differential tax.
Since we have abstracted away from risk differentials and other distortions
including transport costs, the only difference between prices in OECD and ROW is the
tax wedge. This need not be interpreted literally as saying that one country has a tax and
the other has none, it is perfectly reasonable to say that it represents only the difference in
the average tax rate between the two countries. Since there are no exemptions, the
average rate also equals the marginal rate.
In the capital income tax model, we have made the assumption that the difference
between OECD and ROW is the differential tax on capital income. There is no difference
in the rates of taxation of labor income. Let us proceed with the assumption that this
difference is Tko = 5%. We can treat this not as the actual difference, but as one that is
hypothesized. If we are willing to assume that the policymaker is interested in removing
half this differential, we can further assume that dTko = - 2.5%. This policy combination
could also accommodate any other ratio of the total differential.
In practice, the differential may be greater or less than 5% (as discussed above),
and the change aimed at may also be greater or less than the differential assumed. The
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equations have been derived in general form and any combination of numbers can be
used. Any combination is possible, although changes in the average tax rate of an order
greater than 5% will be extremely rare for a large country. This also implies that in the
case where the country tries to get rid of the entire estimated differential in the average
tax rate at one go, Tko = - dTko.
This set of assumptions and data are enough to derive several key variables in our
analysis, given our assumption that all prices were equal to 1 to begin with (without
taxes).
RATIOS AND SHARES USED IN OECD AND ROW FOR CIT
In the previous chapters on the capital income tax we had defined θkx =
, θky =

=

, θly =

, b = θkz =

and (1-b) = θlz =

where Lz =
Now we can use the ratios in our table to get:
θkx =

θlx =

= θky =

= θly =

= 1/5 and

This implies that:

= 1/4 and

= 1/3

= 2/3

= 3/10 and

= 3/10

, θlx
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= 3/7 and

=

We also know from our tables above that

= 1/3

And we had assumed Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output prices) are all
equal to 1 and to each other to begin with.
Substituting X + Y = 3*Z/7 and Kx + Ky = 3*Kz /7*(1+

above, we get

= b = θkz =

This calculation is very sensitive to the assumption of the ratio of U.S. capital
stock to world capital stock as well. If we had taken the WDI ratio of 0.22, we would
have b = 0.50. That these shares are not so far off the mark for the ROW has some
support from several sources such as ILO (2008) and Harrison (2002). They have
generally found that the share of capital income in non-OECD countries is much higher
on average than in developed countries, and has grown with globalization and increasing
FDI. However, we have to remember that the observed share for the ROW will include
the risk premium. If the risk premium is constant, we can isolate the return to capital from
the risk free rate of return as b, and club the rest with labor income. This will reconcile
the higher observed ratio in Harrison (2002) for capital share in the ROW with b = 1/3.
Next noting that we get (1- 1/3) = 2/3 = (1-b) = θlz =

And that

= 2/3 and that

= 3/7, we get

where Lz =

= 3/7
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With some further simple manipulations we get:

( ) = 3/35*(1+

; ( ) = 12/35*(1+

) = 5/3*(1+

;

) = 5/12*(1+

; ( ) =1/12*(1+

and ( ) = 4

= 1/5;

= 4/5 and

and

= 10/3

= 10/12 and ( ) =

4/3*(1+

By assumption,

= -1/2, and

= - 0.02381 (any other combinations are

possible)
ELASTICITIES OF INCOME USED IN THE MODELS
The next sets of parameters we require are:
Єxx , Єxy,

,

, Єyx , Єyy and

We have two further parameters other than these as well: the elasticity of output
in the OECD country with respect to the public good. However, since this is ex-ante an
“unknowable,” we shall put this aside for the time being and review what we know about
the other parameters. We can begin by reminding ourselves what they stand for:
Єxx = [

*

+

*

]

Єxy = [

*

]

Єyx = Eyx

Єyy = Eyy

Since Xr is the amount of X consumed by ROW, it is equivalent to OECD or U.S.
exports. Xo is the consumption of OECD tradables at home. As a proportion of GDP,
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U.S. exports have averaged around no more than 12% in the 2000-06 periods, although
according to Department of Commerce (2009), for 2008 the figure is 13.1%. In our
model, there is no scope for a trade deficit, so even though we have U.S. imports
averaging around 16-17% of GDP in the relevant periods, we have to assume that imports
(or Zo in our model) equal exports or Xr. It should be pointed out that the model has been
derived with sufficient flexibility to incorporate deficits, non-constant returns and risk
premia, etc. The marginal propensities to consume can be derived from elasticities of
income and some manipulation of identities. The elasticity of U.S. exports with respect to
ROW income can be written as:

=

*

, so

=

*

Since the OECD country can consume only Xo, Yo (or Y) and Zo, and there is no saving
and no trade deficit, and prices Px, Py and Pz are = 1 to begin with, then we get:

+

=

+

= 1, and that the U.S./OECD import elasticity with respect to income is

*

, so

=

*

, we get

+

= 1-

The empirical trade literature has been interested in estimating price and income
elasticities of trade for a long time, and most researchers point to the seminal early
contributions for the U.S. starting with Orcutt (1950), Adler (1945), Chang (1945), Ball
and Marwah (1962), Houthakker and Magee (1969), Leamer and Stern (1970) and Stern
et al. (1976). A recent comprehensive study, including discussion of theoretical issues
and empirical estimation is available in Marquez (2002). Mann and Pluck (2007) provide
a literature review of the development of these models, and note that the single log linear
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equation often used in the past also assumes that domestic and foreign tradable goods are
also imperfect substitutes, as we have. This is in line with the vast literature documenting
the “home bias” in consumption, Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) provide
comprehensive surveys.
As pointed out by Mann and Pluck (2007), there has been some consistency in
estimates for the U.S. for import and export income elasticities:
“Houthakker and Magee estimated the U.S. income elasticity for total imports of 1.7
(auto-correlation corrected estimate in the appendix) and the foreign income elasticity for
U.S. exports at around 1. In their survey of import and export demand elasticities for the
United States, Sawyer and Sprinkle (1996) find income elasticities for total merchandise
imports ranging from 0.1322 (Welsch 1987) to 4.028 (Wilson and Takacs 1979).
Estimates for foreign income elasticities for U.S. exports do not vary quite as much; still
they range from 0.374 (Stern, Baum, and Greene 1979) to 2.151 (Wilson and Takacs
1979). The median (mean) estimate of the 24 studies on total U.S. imports referenced in
Sawyer and Sprinkle is 2.02 (2.14). The median (mean) estimate of the 17 studies on total
U.S. merchandise exports referenced in Sawyer and Sprinkle is 1.12 (1.02). In one of the
more recent studies, Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000) find that the long-run income
elasticities for U.S. exports and imports are 0.8 and 1.8, respectively, and are stable over
time” ( Footnote 1 on pg 4).
The regularity observed by them is that:
“The sizes of the coefficients on income and relative price vary greatly by study, time
period, countries analyzed, coverage of commodity groups, and as to whether different or
additional explanatory variables are in the model. Most studies estimate that the income
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elasticity for U.S. exports is smaller than the income elasticity for U.S. imports and in
this regard replicate the earliest and most well-known finding by H.S Houthakker and
Stephen Magee. Subsequent studies often estimate higher export and import elasticities
than the original findings but surprisingly find that the ratio of the import to export
elasticity varies relatively little from the 1.7 found by Houthakker and Magee in 1969.”
(Pg 4)
The main results found are that the ratio of 1:1.7 for export to import elasticity
persists, and that the average of long-term and short-terms elasticities for different studies
and methodologies yields a figure somewhere near 1.2 for exports, and 2.0 for imports.
Both Marquez (2002) and Mann and Pluck (2007) found that correction for the use of
GDP and GDP related price indices as well as introduction of other variables and
methods of calculations substantially reduce the estimation of short and long run
elasticities. These estimates are on the higher side for short-run elasticities, much closer
to those we would see in the long-run. They are also very close to an average of U.S.
elasticities for the short and long run reported in Marquez (1990), Marquez, Hooper and
Johnson (2000) and Senhadji (1998) and Senhadji and Montenegro (1999).
We then come to the issue of

and

. These are the U.S./OECD

propensities to consume tradables and nontradables respectively. When multiplied by the
inverse of income shares, we get income elasticities. A comprehensive survey of the
relative sizes for the U.S. is available in Schettkat and Yocarini (2006). Several authors
have classified tradables (main component being agriculture and manufactured goods) as
“necessities.” The fact that the function relating tradables consumption to income has a
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positive intercept at zero income for subsistence implies that the income elasticity of
consumption of tradables has to be less than one.
Similarly, since nontradables include mainly services, the income elasticity for
this category is thought to be above one. This view (implying non-homothetic
preferences) is supported by Bergstrand (1991), Kravis et al. (1982), Hunter and
Markusen (1988) and deGregorio, Giovaninni and Wolf (1994) as well. Schettkat and
Yocarini (2006) provide several detailed estimates for the U.S. over time by different
authors for the two elasticities. The most recent estimates quoted therein, by Kalwij et al.
(2006) have a tradable elasticity of 0.8 and a nontradable elasticity of budget
expenditures for the U.S. of 1.38. Some care has to be taken while using these values
since services has been used for nontradables and budget expenditure for income.
However, we must be careful in using these data. If the income elasticity of
tradables is taken as 1.3, and the income elasticity of imports taken as 2.0, we can see that
given the low residual weight of domestic tradables, it will take negative income
elasticity for the weighted income elasticities to sum to one. It might be that this is
precisely due to the growth of the U.S. deficit and imports over time that such data
estimates have arisen, but in our model we cannot have a trade deficit without a change in
relative prices that will force alignment; a deficit cannot persist.
Therefore, if we believe that the import elasticity estimate is higher than unity,
and that the share of nontradables does not decline over time, we have to assume that the
marginal propensities to import stays at no more than 0.14 to avoid a fall in the share of
domestic nontradables, a sharp rise in the real exchange rate and a fall in the domestic
terms of trade against nontradables prices.
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Even if the elasticity for nontradables is taken at unity, it has to be higher than the
elasticity of domestic tradables (which is less than one) whenever the elasticity of imports
is greater than one and the share of total tradables cannot rise. The neutral course gives us
MPCs of 0.12, 0.8 and 0.08 for imports, nontradables and domestic tradables
respectively, corresponding to elasticities of 1.0 for all leaving relative shares unchanged,
and does not affect the trade balance. To avoid choosing one strand of the literature over
another, and to also avoid choosing between long and short run elasticities, it is best to
assume neutrality: elasticities of income are such that trade will continue to be balanced
and relative shares unchanged. If all income elasticities are assumed to be = 1 (we can
think of this as a base, or neutral case), this gives us

+

+

= 1 = 0.08 + 0.8 +

0.12.
The non-constant share of U.S. services over time assumption is not without
critics as well as supporters. Summers (1985), Baumol (2001) and Heston et al. (2002)
have all maintained that the share of services for the U.S. has been constant, and
indirectly challenged the luxury- necessity classification.
The choices we made are:

= 0.08,

= 0.8 and

= 0.12

Thus, the choices above have allowed us to retain 3 features: (1) Share of services
(nontradables) have not declined (2) share of imports have not increased and the trade
balance is not disturbed – it should be noted that we could have built in this feature as
well, one extra equation would be required for trade balance, and the income elasticity of
imports would have been greater than one, and the income elasticity of domestic
tradables consumption less than one (3) income elasticity of nontradables is the same as
for domestic tradables. In fact, we have taken all elasticities as 1.
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This further allows us to automatically satisfy a proposition required by Walras‟s
Law (Mas-Collel et. al. 1999). The weighted sum of income elasticities in a Walrasian
system of demand equations must add to one. As long as the total weights add to one, this
requirement is met when all income elasticities are equal to one. Given that exports are
12% of OECD/U.S. output and that U.S./World output is 30%, we get
implies in turn that

=

*

= 0.036. This

= 1.0*0.036 = 0.036.

OWN-PRICE ELASTICITIES USED IN THE MODELS
Now we can turn to the price elasticities we require. First, to relate these to
Harberger (1962) we need to note that the elasticities we have in previous chapters are
Marshallian and not the Hicksian (“Harbergerarian”) elasticities used in Harberger
(1962). Second, in Harberger (1962), since there were two sectors, the prices of the two
commodities were expressed as a relative price:

. Thus there is a single elasticity in

relative prices and this obviates the need for a separate own-price and cross-price
elasticity. Technically, the same could be done in this model.
With Pz as the numeraire, both Px and Py are expressed relative to Pz with the third
relationship: relative price between X and Y, assuming no change in the relative prices
with respect to Z. International economists have usually termed the relative price of
imports and exports (Zo and Xr) the “real exchange rate,” and the relative price of
tradables and nontradables (X and Y) the domestic or internal “terms of trade,” although
the distinction is not always explicit in the literature since many models do not have all
three sectors. However, we have chosen to have Marshallian elasticities in own and cross
prices, all relative to the numeraire.
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Second, these elasticities are elasticities of demand and not substitution or
“Armington” elasticies. A short survey of the literature will help us decide on possible
values of these parameters. We note that given certain assumptions, there is a relationship
between the elasticity of substitution in demand and the price elasticities as discussed by
Gravelle (2008). Neglecting outside substitutes, and considering Hicksian elasticities, she
shows that the elasticity of substitution in consumption between two goods is equal to
either the sum of the two own price elasticities, or the difference between an own price
and cross price elasticity. This also implies a relation between the cross and own price
elasticties. Taking the sum of the two own price elasticities (Hicksian), as the substitution
elasticity, and noting that they both have to have the same sign, this has to imply that a
high value of this elasticity implies that the two goods considered are almost perfect
substitutes in consumption. While we have maintained that capital is perfectly mobile, we
have not made any such assumption yet in consumption between any of the three sectors.
Krugman (1989), using data for the 1970s and 1980s, finds the U.S. export
elasticities with respect to relative prices to be low, with absolute magnitudes less than
0.5. Mann and Pluck (2007) comparing two methods in their own study and two previous
studies report elasticities of relative price for both exports and imports with the correct
sign, but extremely low magnitudes, most cases the elasticities are well below 0.5. They
also do not find, unlike previous authors that export price elasticities facing the U.S. are
higher than U.S. import elasticities. Senhadji and Montenegro (1999) report average
short-run export demand price elasticities of -0.21, and average long-run elsticities of 1.0. The sample includes 53 countries for the period 1960-93. Senhadji (1998) finds for a
sample of 77 countries that the short-run price elasticity for imports is also low, at around
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- 0.26. Though long-run price elasticities have been found to be much higher by most
researchers for both incomes and prices,
Senhadji (1998) points out that the time it takes for a short run elasticity to reach
90% of its long-run value is on average around 5 years. Hooper and Marquez (1995) find
an average price elasticity of total imports for the U.S. of - 0.5, and which goes down to
- 0.3 when services are included. Hooper, Johnson and Marquez (2000) find short-run
elasticities for the U.S. for both imports and exports close to - 0.5.
Goldstein, Khan and Officer (1980) find that most previous calculations generally
aggregate tradable and nontradable goods while calculating import price elasticities.
While the existence of the three separate categories of purchases in the bundle implies
that there is a three way relationship, that imports and domestic tradables are substitutes,
imports and nontradables are substitutes, this does not say automatically that domestic
tradables and nontradables are also substitutes. If foreign tradables and domestic
tradables are substitutes, and domestic tradables and nontradables are weak complements,
then foreign tradables and domestic nontradables could still be Marshallian substitutes.
As expected, they find that imports have the expected negative price elasticity of around
- 0.7 for the U.S. with respect to the prices of domestic tradables, but the relationship
between domestic tradables and nontradables is not so clear.
Bems (2008); notes that several researchers using a CES framework have used the
elasticity of substitution in consumption between tradables and nontradables as a
parameter in their research. Following the earlier literature estimating directly he uses a
less than unitary elasticity, since a rising relative price level as well as a rising
expenditure share on nontradables implies such a less than unitary elasticity. Given the
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relation in Gravelle (2008) this implies that the own price elasticities of the right sign
(Hicksian) must significantly be less than unitary elasticity as well. However, as we have
noted elsewhere, the finding that the relative share of nontraded goods has increased is
not without its critics either.
Matsumoto (2007), in a recent survey of findings defines the elasticity of
substitution between traded and nontraded goods in consumption as θ > 0 and the
elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic traded goods ( the Armington
elasticity) as ω > 0. He finds that
“The elasticity of substitution between nontraded goods and traded goods, θ, is set to be
0.7. Ostry and Reinhart (1992) estimate θ in the range 1.22-1.28 for all regions and 0.66 1.44 for each individual region. Stockman and Tesar (1995) find that θ = 0.44 and claim
that θ tends to be low among industrialized countries. Mendoza (1995) estimates θ = 0.74
for industrialized countries. While θ can potentially alter the moments in general, given
other parameter values in this section, important correlations hardly responds to changes
in θ.” (pp 15-16)
His position on the Armington is not readily apparent from the paper, however.
He has cited the range of 0.6 to 0.8 as reasonable in the literature, but cited estimates of
1.5 as well as 2.0 in various contexts in the same paper. Hunt (2009) using the IMF GEM
model for Australia and New Zealand uses an elasticity of substitution for manufactures
and nontradables of 0.5. Bergstrand (1991), as discussed above, in addition to preferring
non-homothetic preferences and income elasticities for tradables (necessities) less than
one, and for nontradables (luxuries) greater than one, finds that the elasticity of
substitution in consumption between tradables and nontradables is around 0.9.
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CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITIES USED IN THE MODELS
The final issue in the price elasticities section concerns cross price elasticities.
Carlton and Perloff (2005) and Hubbard and O‟Brien (2008) lay out some basic
characteristics of these. First, Hicksian compensated cross-price elasticities are
symmetric, Marshallian cross price elasticities need not be equal and symmetric. This is
clear when we note that the Marshallian elasticity includes the income effect. The Slutsky
decomposition (Mas-Collel et al. 1999) reveals that the weighted income effect of a
change in the price of Y (Nontradables) on consumption of X (Tradables) is greater
simply because of the greater weight of nontradables in consumption, even if we assume
the marginal propensities to consume are equal.
The Hicksian substitution effect implies that when the prices of nontradables rise
(fall), more (less) tradables are consumed since their relative prices are lower (higher)
and less (more) nontradables are consumed. However, higher prices of nontradables
imply a greater effect on the budget since 80% of consumption is nontradables. Thus less
of both goods will be consumed, reversing the substitution effect of nontradables on
tradables. The dampening effect of a price change in tradables should be lower simply
because the relative share is lower. All this is further complicated by the fact that
marginal propensities to consume out of income may not be the same for both categories.
Also, noting that Єxy = [

*

] but Єyx = Eyx, we further find that one of the

elasticities is share weighted. Further, it is not quite clear that tradables and nontradables
are Marshallian substitutes. Given that domestic and foreign tradables are more likely to
be better substitutes for each other than nontradables and tradables of any kind it is far
more likely that domestic tradables and nontradables are weak complements and foreign
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goods and domestic tradables are substitutes. This is further complicated by the fact that
in a Walrasian system, the weighted sum of cross price elasticities and expenditure share
for any commodity bears a specified relation (Mas-Collel et. al. 1999): Bx* Exx + By*Eyx
+ Bz*Ezx + Bx = 0

where B is the share in total (world) income, and this holds

separately for any good. Also,
By*Eyz + Bz*Ezz + Bz= 0

Bx*Exy + By*Eyy + Bz*Ezy + By = 0

and

Bx*Exz +

have to hold as well for the chosen values where Bk refers to

the share of the good K in OECD consumption (since consumption = income and the
budget constraint has to hold separately for each country).
It is a well-known argument in anti-trust theory that the narrower the definition of
the market, the higher the demand elasticity is likely to be (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). A
broad definition such as tradables and nontradables will yield lower absolute price
elasticity than a narrow definition within industries. It is not even clear that once income
effects are taken into account, the goods remain substitutes.
Heim (2007) finds that:
“Rising exchange rates can lower prices on imported consumer goods. The lower prices
have two effects. A substitution effect shifts in demand from domestically produced
goods to imports. An income effect also allows more import purchases. It also allows
some income previously spent on imports to be shifted to domestic spending. This shift
may or may not increase total demand for U.S. consumer goods. This paper finds it does,
and that increases in demand for domestically produced consumer goods and services are
about five times as large as the increase in demand for imported consumer goods and
services. The paper also finds that the increase in demand for domestic goods is about
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three times as large as the increase in the trade deficit resulting from the higher exchange
rate” (pg 1).
Therefore, given the Gravelle (2008) relation, and the evidence on demand price
elasticies discussed above (for tradables, imports and nontradables), the two own price
elasticities are taken to be - 0.5 for tradables and - 0.8 for nontradables. This serves as an
average of short and long run elasticities found in the literature. Textbooks such as
Hubbard and O‟Brien (2008) recommend that luxuries should have higher absolute price
elasticity than necessities, given the evidence above such a guess is made while noting
that these elasticities are somewhere at the mid-point of short and long run elasticities,
but the extent to which nontradables are more elastic is debatable. The model itself, it
should be noted is sensitive to elasticity assumptions that incorporate this assumption.
The cross price elasticities are likely to be low.
If domestic tradables and nontradables are Marshallian complements, then the
elasticities are negative and income effects complement the substitution effect. There is
still no reason to believe that X and Y are good substitutes or good complements. If X
and Y are complements, and the Hicksian cross-effects are equal, (say they are equal to 0.1 given very weak complementarity) we have a higher income effect of Y on X
balanced by the weighting of X, but the smaller income effect of X on Y is unweighted.
We have assumed that the income effects are more important, given that the literature
allows for traded goods to be both substitutes and complements.
Following the literature also does not help us much in choosing the size of cross
effects since there is only one study in my knowledge where (Goldstein, Khan and
Officer, 1980) where the three sector model has been explicitly used to derive elasticities.
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Therefore we proceed with Єxx = - 0.5 and Єyy = - 0.8, and we say that X and Y are
gross complements, with Єxy = - 0.3 (Implying

= - 0.75) due to the stronger income

effect and weighting, and Єyx = - 0.1 with no weighting and a much smaller income
effect. This allows us to retain foreign and domestic tradables as weak substitutes, and
keep our Walrasian regularity condition equations intact. We have also used Exz = 0.5 in
the OECD (Marshallian substitutes) and Eyz = - 0.1.
PRODUCTIVITY OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
The very last set of issues is the values of the elasticities of output with respect to
government input. How productive is government expenditure? The issues arise with
respect to expenditure at the margin, and the type of expenditure. Without knowing
something about the programs likely to be cut first when tax revenues fall, we cannot
conclude anything about the productivity of government expenditure for the U.S. keeping
other factors constant at the margin, or about how the elasticity would vary across
tradables and nontradables. We could proceed therefore assuming that the elasticity is
less than one (0.5) to begin with and is the same for both tradables and nontradables,
noting that different values could be used depending on what we think the efficacy of
expenditure is at the margin.
We have to remember that when increasing returns to scale prevail, the partial
elasticities of output with respect to all factors add up to more than one, but how much
more than one at the margin is an unknown. If we agree with the tax reduction lobby,
then surely it is the case that they think of the elasticity of government input at the margin
to be substantially less than one and that total revenues will increase with a rate
reduction.
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RATIOS FOR CONSUMPTION TAX MODELS
We now have to recalculate some of the ratios for our consumption tax models. Where
we use different figures, we will specify them, but where we do not, we assume that they
are the same as in the capital income tax case.
First, the revenue neutral rate TCo is 1/3 of the capital income tax rate Tko since it
is applied to all consumption and not just capital. We had taken Tko to be 0.05, so this
implies that TCo = 0.016667. We assume that θkx =
b = θkz =

=

and (1-b) = θlz =

, θlx =

, θky =

, θly

where Lz =

Now we can use the ratios in our table to get with assumptions modified where
necessary:
θkx = θky = 1/3
θlx = θly = 2/3

= 1/5 and

= 1/4 and

= 3/10 and

= 3/10

This implies that:

=

and

=

We also know from our tables above that

= 1/3

And we had assumed Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output prices) are all
equal to 1 and to each other to begin with.
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Substituting X + Y =

and Kx + Ky = *Kz above, we get

= b = θkz =

Next noting that we get (1- 1/3*

= (1-b) = θlz =

) = 2/3*

where

Lz =

And that

= 2/3 and that

=

, we get

= 3/7

With some further simple manipulations we get:

( ) = 3/35 ; ( ) = 12/35

)=

)=

;

= 1/5 ;

; ( )=

By assumption,

and ( ) = 4

and

= -1/2, and

= 4/5 and

=

= 10/12 and ( )=

= - 0.081967 (any other combinations are

possible). To get Tc we note that 100*(1+TCo)*(1- Tc ) = 100, so Tc in our case =
0.016393.
The marginal propensities to consume are all the same as in the previous section,
as are the figures for elasticities of output and demand. We need two extra elasticities,
which are

and Eyz. We take

as = + 0.5 and Eyz = - 0.1. This does not violate any
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of the restrictions from the Walrasian conditions, and we note that the literature can
support reversing the signs of the some of the cross price elasticities as well.
EFFECTS OF TAX CHANGES ON TERMS OF TRADE
The final issue that we need to highlight before we proceed to discuss results is to
remind ourselves of the link between the uses side of income and trade theory, which is
also the source of this type of general equilibrium theory. As discussed in Randolph
(2006), in a world with no international investment and no international mobility of
capital, the relative prices of goods between countries can also serve as a vehicle to
transmit burdens internationally. We also remind ourselves that not all authors support
the uses approach to measuring income as a proxy for welfare. An extensive critique of
this approach is available in Whalley (1984) who feels that using the uses and sources of
income with an appropriate choice of parameters allows a researcher to generate almost
any result desired. However, when we use the price of Z (Pz) as our numeraire, we
express OECD prices relative to the world price. For at least the price of OECD
tradables, this allows us to account for effects of taxation that are conveyed through the
terms of trade, and not through input prices alone.
Randolph (2006) discusses the results in Melvin (1982); a model where there is
no international investment but there is international trade, and both capital and labor are
immobile internationally. The economy is a small open economy and cannot affect
international prices. The analysis shows that when the small open economy imposes a
corporate income tax the burden of this tax can be shifted to domestic labor. He also finds
that in the open economy case the terms-of-trade effect could partially offset the tax
effect.
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Whalley (1980) considers a general equilibrium model of the U.S., the 9 member
EEC and Japan to analyze the effects of removing distorting domestic factor taxes. In his
model, factor supplies are fixed by country, and he does not assume an international
capital market where the rate of return to capital is equalized across trading blocks. He
finds that “For the United States existing factor taxes yield a significant terms-of-trade
gain. Results indicate that the abolition of existing discriminatory features of distorting
taxes in the United States, while leading to a domestic gain in production efficiency,
would lead to welfare losses because of the movement in the terms of trade against the
United States. A similar feature is also present for Japan, although it is not as
pronounced. In the EEC, this terms-of-trade effect, while present, is milder; small gains
occur from the removal of distortions in factor taxes with losses occurring when capital
tax distortions are removed.” (pg 1200)
In a more recent work Whalley (2002)2 has further discussed the role and
mechanisms by which different types of taxes (trade and non-trade) can have
international effects. While trade taxes obviously are thought of as causing international
burdens, he points out that non-trade taxes can also have international burdens; “Non
trade taxes impact trade indirectly through forward shifting of production taxes into costs,
including taxes on inputs such as fuels. The more that such taxes are backwards shifted,
the smaller their impacts on trade” (pg 29)
Therefore, it should be clear that using the sources and uses of income to analyze
non-trade taxes not only has a history, it helps capture effects of non-trade domestic taxes
including factor taxes that work on the international terms of trade (in our models the

2

Whalley, J. (2002) “Taxes and Trade” (revised draft). Available online at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTPA/Resources/WhalleyPaper.pdf, accessed on 6/1/2010.
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uses of income relative price indices) as well as on production and input prices (the
sources of income). The results presented in the next chapter should be viewed with this
aspect in mind.

PARAMETERS USED TO DERIVE SOLUTIONS

Table 10 Summaries of Parameters Used in CIT Models, Sources and Simulations
PARAMETER
Tax inclusive
share of K in X
Share of L in X
Tax inclusive
share of K in Y
Share of L in Y
Elasticity of X
with respect to G
Elasticity of X
with respect to G
Differential CIT
in OECD
Change in CIT

Share of K in
ROW

Elasticity of
substitution of K
and L in X
Elasticity of

SYMBOL

INITIAL
VALUES

ALTERNATIVE
VALUES

θkx

1/3

None

θlx

2/3

None

θky

1/3

None

θly

2/3

None

Assumed

*

0.5

0.3, 0.1

Assumed

*

0.5

0.3, 0.1

Assumed

Tko

0.05

None used

Assumed
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters
Klump,
McAdam and
Willman
(2007)
Klump,

dTko

-0.025

-0.0125, -0.0375

θkz

1/3

None

Sx

-0.6

-0.8, -1.0

Sy

-0.6

-0.8,-1.0

SOURCE
Valentinyi and
Herrendorf
(2008)
Valentinyi and
Herrendorf
(2008)
Valentinyi and
Herrendorf
(2008)
Valentinyi and
Herrendorf
(2008)
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substitution of K
and L in Y

Elasticity of
OECD demand
for X in terms of
price of X
Elasticity of
ROW demand for
X in terms of
price of X
Elasticity of
OECD demand
for X in terms of
price of Y
Marginal change
in OECD demand
for X with respect
to change in
OECD income
Marginal change
in ROW demand
for X with respect
to change in
ROW income
Elasticity of
demand for Y
with respect to
price of X
Elasticity of
demand for Y
with respect to
price of Y
Marginal change
in OECD demand
for X with respect
to change in
OECD income
Weighted total
elasticity of

McAdam and
Willman
(2007)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature

-0.5

-0.8

-0.5

-0.8

-0.75

-0.7

0.08

None

0.036

None

Eyx

-0.1

None

Eyy

-0.8

None

0.8

None

-0.5

-0.8

Єxx = [

*
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demand for X
with respect to
price of X
Share weighted
total elasticity of
demand for X
with respect to
price of Y
Elasticity of
demand for Y
with respect to
price of X
Elasticity of
demand for Y
with respect to
price of Y

OECD capital as
proportion of X

OECD capital as
proportion of Y

OECD labor as
proportion of X

OECD labor as
proportion of Y

Capital in X as
proportion of Y

survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Based on
literature
survey above
(average
value)
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and

+

*

]

Єxy = [

*

-0.3

-0.28

Єyx = Eyx

-0.1

None

Єyy = Eyy

-0.8

None

5/3*(1+

None

]

5/12*(1+

None

10/3

None

10/12

None

1/12*(1+

None
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Capital in Y as
proportion of X

Gravelle and
Smetters
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters

4/3*(1+

None

Table 11 Summaries of Parameters Used In Consumption Tax Models, Sources
and Simulations
PARAMETER
Tax exclusive
share of K in X
Tax exclusive
share of L in X
Tax exclusive
share of K in Y
Tax exclusive
share of L in Y
Elasticity of X
with respect to
G
Elasticity of X
with respect to
G
Differential
Consumption
tax in OECDtax exclusive
rate
Differential
Consumption
tax in OECDtax inclusive
rate
Change in

SYMBOL

INITIAL
VALUES

ALTERNATIVE
VALUES

θkx

1/3

None

θlx

2/3

None

θky

1/3

None

θly

2/3

None

Assumed

*

0.5

0.3, 0.1

Assumed

*

0.5

0.3, 0.1

Assumed

TCo

0.016667

None used

Assumed

TC

0.016393

None used

Assumed

dTCo

-0.00833

-0.004167,

SOURCE
Valentinyi and
Herrendorf
(2008)
Valentinyi and
Herrendorf
(2008)
Valentinyi and
Herrendorf
(2008)
Valentinyi and
Herrendorf
(2008)
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Consumption
tax – tax
exclusive rate
Change in
Consumption
tax – tax
exclusive rate as
percentage of
original rate

Share of K in
ROW

-0.0125

Assumed

Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters
Klump,
McAdam and
Willman (2007)
Klump,
McAdam and
Willman (2007)
Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)
Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)
Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)
Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)
Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)

Elasticity of
substitution of
K and L in X
Elasticity of
substitution of
K and L in Y
Elasticity of
OECD demand
for X in terms of
price of X
Elasticity of
ROW demand
for X in terms of
price of X
Elasticity of
OECD demand
for X in terms of
price of Y
Elasticity of
OECD demand
for X in terms of
price of Z
Elasticity of
OECD demand
for Y in terms of
price of Z
Marginal change
Based on
in OECD
literature survey
demand for X
above (average
with respect to
value)
change in

dTc

-1/2

θkz

-1/4, -3/4

None

Sx

-0.6

-0.8, -1.0

Sy

-0.6

-0.8,-1.0

-0.5

-0.8

-0.5

-0.8

-0.75

-0.7

+0.5

None

-0.1

None

0.08

None
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OECD income
Marginal change
in ROW demand
Based on
for X with
literature survey
respect to
above (average
change in ROW
value)
income
Elasticity of
demand for Y
with respect to
price of X
Elasticity of
demand for Y
with respect to
price of Y
Marginal change
in OECD
demand for X
with respect to
change in
OECD income
Weighted total
elasticity of
demand for X
with respect to
price of X
Share weighted
total elasticity of
demand for X
with respect to
price of Y
Elasticity of
demand for Y
with respect to
price of X
Elasticity of
demand for Y
with respect to
price of Y

Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)
Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)

0.036

None

Eyx

-0.1

None

Eyy

-0.8

None

0.8

None

-0.5

-0.8

-0.3

-0.28

Єyx = Eyx

-0.1

None

Єyy = Eyy

-0.8

None

5/3

None

Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)
Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)
Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)

Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)
Based on
literature survey
above (average
value)
Derived in
chapter 5
OECD capital as based on BEA,
proportion of X
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters

Єxx = [
+

*
*

]
Єxy = [

*

]
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OECD capital as
proportion of Y

OECD labor as
proportion of X

OECD labor as
proportion of Y

Capital in X as
proportion of Y

Capital in Y as
proportion of X

Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters
Derived in
chapter 5
based on BEA,
WDI and
Gravelle and
Smetters

5/12

None

10/3

None

10/12

None

1/12

None

4/3

None
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CHAPTER VI – RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

The “Thought Experiments” From Chapters 1-5
To begin with, we shall briefly review what we did in the previous chapters and
summarize the main points.
We started by asking ourselves the question: if a large, open developed economy
were to contemplate reducing its taxes to attract mobile capital from the rest of the
world, would it benefit both the OECD country as well as the ROW? Since
imposing a tax results in an excess burden, reducing the tax should lower the
burden. Is the burden reduced for the ROW as well as the OECD, or does the
large country corner a disproportionate share of the benefit at the cost of the
ROW?
We decided that to answer this question we first need to define the terms
“spillovers” of the burden of the tax in the OECD country on the ROW ; and how
we define and measure this “burden” (benefit) and see if they can be quantified in
some way. We define “spillovers” of the burden of the OECD tax as a situation
where; as a result of the OECD country lowering its tax rate to compete for
mobile capital, the sources and uses measure of GDP for the ROW declines,
thereby effectively spillovers a burden. We constructed a measure of the sources
and uses of GDP for both the OECD and ROW to answer this question, and chose
the simplest possible method of combining the sources and uses sides to arrive at
the measure of “spillovers” of the OECD tax burden.
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We asked the following question: is the effect of lowering a tax on the relative
sources and uses of GDP measure for OECD and ROW different for different
taxes?
We also asked: does the use to which the tax revenue (expenditure) is put to
qualify the answer to the previous question?
We set up four different models to answer the preceding questions. Two of the
models used a tax on all capital in the OECD country and two used a tax on all
consumption in the OECD country. For each tax, we used two different
expenditure patterns; a passive government that returned all revenues to the
OECD economy, and an active government that spent the revenues on a public
input that increased productivity within the OECD country.
After specifying the models, we searched for data based on the existing literature
that could be used to represent a large, open OECD economy (large enough to
influence the worldwide return to capital on its own). We considered the U.S. as
the best example of this economy and chose data for the U.S. that we considered
both reasonable and representative to provide numerical solutions to our models.
We compare the results on the sources and uses of GDP for the OECD country
and ROW from reducing the excess tax rate in the OECD by half. When the net
impact is positive for any country, we surmise that it benefits, and vice-versa.
We check whether the results are sensitive to changes in the some of the key data
used including the size of the tax change. We find that imposing the very
reasonable and standard restriction of neo-classical utility maximization and the
HOD Zero demand curve that follows from it on the tradable goods sector in
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OECD yield the most believable results. The results are not very sensitive to most
other data assumptions tested.
Under the HOD zero assumption, we find that the OECD country may be gaining
at the expense of the ROW when it lowers its tax rate if the taxes are returned
through transfer. When we consider the input models for both taxes, both the
OECD and ROW lose when the tax is lowered if the government input is
productive although in all cases the loss or gain to the OECD is proportionately
much larger for the OECD country.
We find that this “gain” to the OECD in the tax and transfer cases is less
pronounced in the case of the consumption tax than the capital income tax, as
should be expected since the factor tax is more distorting. The plausible reason for
the losses to the ROW in all 4 cases and the gains to the OECD only in the
transfer cases is that a productive government input lowers the cost of production,
and when withdrawn increases it. Therefore, reducing taxes that reduce a
productive input will not benefit either country. This effect on relative prices,
similar to a terms-of-trade effect, counteracts many of the benefits of attracting
more capital to the OECD country. The loss of capital in the ROW reduces its
GDP and the productivity of its labor, and thus impacts it negatively in all four
cases. Where no input is provided, the OECD country gains through effects on
lower prices of output from lower taxes, while the ROW still loses overall since
the loss of capital outweighs the benefits of lower import prices.
It appears from the results in our models that correct specification of expenditure
and estimation of its productivity should be important to answering this type of
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question. While we are relatively exact on the tax side, since we model different
taxes differently and relatively precisely, we tend to be less specific about the
expenditure to be cut, its nature, and its impact on the production function. The
models show that when government is active, the total impact depends on both
aspects-benefits or burdens depend on correctly modeling both expenditure and
taxes, and the taxes side alone should not be expected to yield the answer on its
own.
These results may explain another phenomenon of concern. Tax competition
theory predicts a tax-cutting “race to the bottom” between jurisdictions competing
for mobile capital. This has not happened recently since most OECD countries
have retained relatively high tax rates. In our models, the OECD country did not
benefit from cutting taxes when the revenue was used to provide an active
government input. The benefits were marginal in the transfer cases. The ROW did
not benefit in any case studied. If cutting tax rates implies a fall in the level of
overall revenue and therefore of productive public goods, there is no incentive to
cut taxes.
Most models that have considered the case of the government that we am aware
of are not in the Harberger format, or have not considered the case of a productive
government input being cut when taxes are lowered. The general approach seems
to have an implicit underlying assumption that the program to be cut is wasteful
or unproductive expenditure. There are obviously merits in doing so, even without
cutting taxes. The tendency has been to mostly model the effects of one action
(either cutting taxes or wasteful expenditure).The fact is that in practice, there is
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no guarantee that “pork” will be eliminated first, and that productive government
inputs will not be when taxes are reduced. Once we allow for the fact that cutting
taxes can be accompanied by reduction in expenditure of a productive public
input, we get the result that the benefits from reducing taxation may be
outweighed by the negative effect of losing a productive public good, and that this
effect need not be confined to the country cutting its taxes. In addition to
modeling the effects of taxation isolated from effects of expenditure, we need to
study the combined effect of both.
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The specific research questions we asked in chapter one was:
(1) Can the extent of “spillovers” in the case of a capital income tax (CIT) and a
consumption tax be estimated using reasonable assumptions and believable data
in situations of tax competition? This involved two steps. First, we decided that
we do not explicitly model various forms of tax competition, but instead choose a
tax rate reduction in the OECD as a proxy for several major forms of tax
competition. Second, we define what we mean by “spillovers”. We do not model
it as foreigners‟ paying the OECD tax, but as a net reduction in ROW GDP from
the sources and uses sides as a consequence of the OECD country lowering its
tax.
(2) How large are these effects we have defined above and how are they distributed
between the taxing country and the rest of the world?

208

(3) Does the type of tax (consumption or tax on capital) or the use to which tax
revenues are put to (expenditure assumptions) matter in measuring the extent and
type of spillovers?
(4) Are results very sensitive to parameters used, or to reasonable restrictions on
behavior?
(5) What policy implications may be drawn from the results?
The answer to our first question is yes. We note that we have analytical
expressions for sources and uses side changes in welfare in both the ROW and OECD.
Even without using actual data, it is clear that we have computed burdens and benefits for
both.
The models derived analytically can accommodate several variations such as price
inflation for government; non-constant returns to scale in capital and labor, a risk
premium for capital, different factor shares and elasticities and even different functional
forms. They are thus robust in this sense to different assumptions and analytical
specifications. While parameters have been chosen keeping the existing literature in
mind, this does not restrict the theoretical models since minimal assumptions have been
made while deriving the equations and several variations are possible. Each reduced form
model is a system of four equations in four unknowns and can be solved analytically.
The answer to the second question is also yes. To answer question two and make
a firm prediction about what we can expect, however, we need to use data given the
extremely complicated results. Given the choices made and the data available, we have
simulated answers to the questions. We have used several simulations to check the

209

robustness of our results, and indicated where more are possible. The reasons for the
answers to one and two are explained below.
The burden on the sources side of GDP is expressed for the ROW as: dMr =

- Kx*

- Ky*

which is the same as dMr = - dKx - dKy regardless of the tax and

expenditure type. This is an answer to the first question only at this stage. The ROW
burden on the sources side of GDP is unambiguously negative as long as capital is
attracted away by the importing country (OECD in this case); the burden is simply the
amount of capital attracted away by the country lowering its taxes. We cannot say
whether this is large or small. We also cannot be sure that capital is attracted away from
ROW to OECD without knowing the relevant parameters since it is possible to generate
the opposite movement by choosing extreme parameters in this model. Further, we also
need to compare relative sizes of burdens and not just the signs. Both burdens could be
negative, but one may be larger or smaller. This is not possible to gauge without
parameters.
This specific expression for the sources side burden for the ROW is the
consequence of how we have chosen to measure burdens, the choice of numeraire and
other model choices. Other formulations would yield expressions that use other variables.
Once we take the uses side into account, the relationship between capital outflow and
ROW GDP is no longer so stark. If the price of the imported good falls to a very large
extent, this could potentially make up for the loss of capital. Given the low overall weight
of the imports in ROW total consumption, this is also very unlikely. We have not made
the distribution of burdens and benefits between labor and capital the main focus of our
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work and chosen to concentrate on aggregate country effects instead. The addition of the
uses side could also have a significant impact on the measurement of the distribution of
burdens within countries and between factors.
The simple additive version of the measure of sources and uses of GDP (our
proxy for welfare) function that we use is:
OECD net sources and uses of GDP impact measure Wo = 1 + dGDPo/GDPo - LASo
and ROW net sources and uses of GDP impact measure Wr = 1 + dGDPr/GDPr - LASr
LAS is the Laspeyre‟s index of consumer price changes for each country and
represents the impact on the uses of GDP. The Laspeyre‟s index does not measure
Consumer‟s Surplus, only the weighted price change. Consumer‟s surplus changes
combined with producer‟s surplus measures could have been used to measure welfare
changes. Since we have production functions that are CRS in L and K and there is no
producer‟s surplus in CRS, it is difficult to consider producer‟s surplus for the models
with G alone. We have instead measured the sources and uses of GDP and added the two
ratios instead of explicitly measuring changes in consumer‟s surplus. While we have tried
to avoid any confusion between the two, wherever we use the term welfare to save space,
it means the sources and uses of GDP and not consumer‟s surplus or any other version of
“welfare.” Our measure is closer to a measure of real income.
To answer questions three and four, we used the results from all four models and
the data discussed in chapter 5. We present first the results for all 4 models using the
baseline data discussed in chapter five. We will then elaborate the answers to the other
research questions and proceed to test sensitivity to data assumptions.
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS FROM THE BASELINE CASE
We consider first the exercise: the OECD country has an excess tax rate of 5% for
the CIT and an excess rate of 1.6667% for the consumption tax. In the baseline case, it
seeks to cut in half this excess rate, and lowers the CIT by 2.5% points or the
consumption tax by 0.83333% points. We compare results across taxes, i.e. the two
transfer models with the two input models. Then, we compare what happens in the CIT
model with input to the CIT model with transfer, and the consumption tax model with
input with what happens in the consumption tax model with transfer.
The next step will be to impose a key restriction on the demand for X. When we
drop the necessity-luxury classification and use an HOD zero restriction on the demand
for X in OECD (the Y sector was already restricted to be HOD zero), the general
direction and order of results changes and make intuitive sense. Since demand curves are
usually constructed with this restriction in mind, we proceed to discuss the results using
the HOD zero restriction as our preferred results, since they are more plausible than
results obtained using the baseline data.
For the very first table (12), using baseline data we present the results in the
following way: the impact of two taxes with transfer models are presented first. The
results for the two taxes with input models are presented next (13). This is followed by
repeating the main results with our preferred parameters, when X is HOD zero (14 and
15). We discuss what these results are and some implications.

212

Following this, we present the results of simulations using baseline data, and
some simulations using the preferred data. The last section is used to discuss implications
and possible future models.
We remind ourselves that “sources” in the header of each table stands for changes
in the sources side of GDP and are measured by 1 + dGDP/GDP. When the figure in this
column is less than one, it means the GDP has fallen on the sources side of income.
“Uses” stands for the uses of GDP and stands for the change in the Laspeyre‟s price
index for each country of consumer goods. For the OECD country, all 3 goods are
consumed and enter the index, using base year quantities as weights. However, since we
chose the price of Z (Pz) as our numeraire, there is a change only in the prices of X and Y
relative to this price. For the ROW, only X and Z enter the index as Y is not consumed by
ROW. The only price change is therefore the price of X.
When the number in any table under the uses side is less than one, it means that
the prices of goods consumed have fallen, weighted by initial consumption. “Welfare” is
defined as the net change in the sources and uses of GDP, and is equal to sources minus
uses. Consider the case when the sources of GDP fall by 5%. This will be reflected as a
95% sources side measure, or 0.95. Suppose the uses side price index fell by 6%. The
uses side final figure or (LAS) would be 0.94. The net result is 0.95 - 0.94 = 0.01. This
basically indicates that relative consumption prices fell by more than real factor income,
so the country should be better off in some sense.
Let us begin by considering the case of lowering a CIT with public input (first
row of table 13). There is a 2.6% real improvement in the net sources and uses of GDP
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for the OECD country and a 5.3% loss on the net sources and uses of GDP for the ROW.
The hypothetical excess tax rate (the difference between the total tax rate in OECD and
ROW assumed, to be 5%) was reduced by half from 5% to 2.5%. This implies a tax rate
reduction of 2.5 percentage points for the CIT in the OECD country. The sources side
burden was calculated as the proportional change in GDP for each country, or 1 +
dGDPo/GDPo for the OECD country and 1+ dGDPr/GDPr for the ROW.
When the change in GDP is negative for any country, the sources side measure
falls below one. On the uses side, if prices fall, then the LAS measure also falls below
one. The difference between the sources side measure and LAS gives us the net change,
i.e. have sources fallen more than uses. If instead prices rise, then the LAS measure
becomes greater than one. If GDP has fallen, then this is subtracted from sources (less
than one), making it an even larger negative number. If both increase to a number greater
than one, the net result is negative whenever the price increase is relatively greater than
the income increase.

Table 12 Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half (With
Transfer) on Sources and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare)
Using Baseline Data
TAX and
EXPENDITURE

OECD
SOURCES
0.976

CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION 0.991
and TRANSFER

USES
0.979

WELFARE
-0.0029

ROW
SOURCES
1.000

0.991

-0.0003

1.000

USES
0.999

WELFARE
0.001225

0.999

0.00013
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Table 13 Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half (With Input)
on Sources and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare) Using
Baseline Data
TAX and
EXPENDITURE

OECD
SOURCES
1.3793
CIT and INPUT
CONSUMPTION 1.3939
and INPUT

USES
1.3535
1.3193

WELFARE
0.02583
0.07457

ROW
SOURCES
0.96805
0.96792

USES
1.0207
1.01899

WELFARE
-0.05261
-0.05107

The figure from the first row of the table 13 above in the sources column for
OECD is 1.3793. This implies a 38% gain on the sources side for the OECD country. The
figure 0.96805 from the first row of table 13 for the sources side of the ROW implies a
3% loss for the ROW. Next we consider changes in the uses of income, which we had
defined to be the change in the relative cost-of-living index. Thus a figure of 1.3535 in
the first row of table 13 for OECD implies that consumption prices increased 35% for
OECD, and the corresponding figure of 1.0207 implies that consumption prices increased
2% for ROW.
We have used the simplest version of net change in the sources and uses of
income-the difference of GDP and price changes (Wo = 1 + dGDPo/GDPo - LASo for
OECD and ROW welfare Wr = 1+ dGDPr/GDPr - LASr where LAS refers to the
Laspeyre‟s index of consumer price changes). The fourth column in the first row of table
13, or net change for OECD is simply the difference between the sources and uses side
figures. It means that although GDP in OECD rose by almost 38%, a price rise of 35%
wiped out part of that net gain resulting in an improvement in net income of 2.6%.
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Note that this last number is purely the result of the manner in which we have
chosen to combine price and GDP changes. Therefore, care has to be taken while
interpreting the net change figure. The changes in the uses and sources are all
proportionate changes, and the way we have combined them is also artificial in some
sense and should not be taken literally. We can however discuss these changes in relative
terms and avoid comparing absolute magnitudes.
Similarly, the effect of a GDP decline for ROW of 3% in the first row of table 13
is further exacerbated by the inflation of 2%, and that implies that ROW net sources and
uses of GDP fell by 5%. For the ROW, the change in GDP expression is dMr = - dKx dKy in all 4 models. This specific expression arises once we have chosen our numeraire
as Pz, and we have opted to fix factor shares and maintain full employment in ROW. The
loss to ROW on the sources side of GDP is the amount of capital lost. This capital loss
and the fixed full employment labor assumption directly translate to lost output. When we
add to it the increase in the relative price of X consumed by ROW, the welfare loss of
lost income is exacerbated.
We also note that since ROW does not consume Y, and consumes X in a much
smaller proportion than OECD, the loss on the uses side is smaller for ROW in the first
row of table 13 than it is for the OECD. Even this need not be taken literally. We can say
that the proportion of nontradables (Y) consumed by ROW is so small as to not matter for
price formation of Y, while most of Y is consumed by OECD. Further, since the
consumption of ROW is much larger than OECD overall, the small amount of Y
consumed by ROW is negligible in terms of ROW overall consumption and thus does not
affect its uses of GDP. However, since the sources side of ROW GDP falls due to loss of
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capital, only a major fall in the price of X could have compensated for this in the welfare
equation. (We have assumed that Z is the numeraire, so Pz is always equal to 1). Given
the small weight of X in the consumption of ROW, it is highly unlikely that the price of
X will fall enough to make up for the loss in welfare on the sources side.
Intuitively, therefore, in the case of the CIT with input (first row of table 13),
ROW‟s loss is dominated by the sources side effect- the loss of capital to OECD. OECD
therefore gains through the extra capital it attracts away, but loses most of the benefit to
inflation in the prices of X and Y.
The burdens are reversed in the transfer model (table 12) with the same
parameters, although welfare effects are well below 1% in both cases. We remind
ourselves that the excess tax rate is halved in all four models. The excess CIT is halved
from 5% to 2.5%, and the excess consumption tax is halved from 1.667% to 0.8333%. No
assumption has been made about the size of the tax revenues in these cases, only the tax
rate changed is the same. Although we have not combined the models, the result of
considering the four models is similar. First, we can look at the effects of the tax change
on the two input models. Then, we consider the same tax change on the two transfer
models. Since we have one input model with each tax and one transfer model with each
tax, it is equivalent to considering two policy changes; a tax change and a switch from
input to transfer.
In the CIT and Transfer case (first row of table 12), changes are much smaller in
magnitude than the CIT and Input case since the tax collected was returned to the
consumer in OECD- the only real change is in the excess burden caused by distorting
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factor prices. Since the sources side burden is so small (almost zero) in the CIT and
transfer case for the ROW (first row of table 12), this implies that given these parameters
the ROW is likely to gain from the reduction in distortion caused by lowering the tax in
the OECD country.
The sources side impact for the OECD country is negative (first row of table 12),
which is counterintuitive. The addition of capital, and the rise in net return to capital
should have lowered sources on income in ROW and increased it in OECD. This may be
the result of the non-HOD zero demand curve in X in the baseline case. This assumes that
while consuming X, consumers experience some form of “money illusion,” and weight
income changes more heavily than total price changes. When we consider the fact that
the transfer payment is reduced as the tax is reduced, and the income effect depends on
the transfer, this result might have been induced by the parameters. When we have not
imposed a HOD Zero restriction on X; we allowed demand elasticities of X with respect
to prices of X and Y to sum to less than income elasticity plus the price elasticity of X
with respect to price of Z. We have weighted changes in a certain direction that may have
let the income effect dominate. This can be confirmed by repeating the same exercise
with HOD zero demand for X.
However, since the input improved productivity and lowered the cost of
production in X and Y, we also see a price rise. The fact that we see expected changes
directly in table 13 and not directly in table 12 also leads us to consider the effect of the
luxury-necessity restriction, and whether we should replace it with the more standard and
reasonable HOD Zero restriction instead.
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When we consider the consumption tax (second row of table 13), we find that the
results with a public input are similar to the CIT case with input, with one major
exception. The improvement in sources and uses of GDP for the OECD country is around
7.5%, nearly 3 times the CIT case and the effect on ROW is virtually unchanged. Taking
the transfer results (second row of table 12) we find that effects again get reversed as in
the CIT case, but they are even more negligible, this time less than 0.1% on either side.
This too is largely the effect of not imposing a HOD Zero restriction on the demand curve
for X. Though we have not explicitly imposed the restriction on Y either, our choice of
elasticities for Y does not violate the restriction Eyx + Eyy + Eyz + EM,Y = 0 that is required
for such curves. However, our choice of elasticities for X violates the condition for X.
Therefore, we get three central results for the baseline data chosen in chapter five:
Lowering the tax rate allows the OECD country to gain (positive net change in
sources and uses of GDP) while imposing a burden ( loss in net sources and uses
of GDP) on the ROW when the tax was used to provide a public input
The OECD country gains a lot more when the tax being lowered is a consumption
tax rather than a CIT, if revenue was used to provide a public input
When revenues are used for transfer payments, it is not clear any longer that the
OECD country benefits at all. When lowering the CIT, it is the ROW that may
benefit more.
The exact figures are obviously dependent on the parameters and the form of the
sources and uses of GDP function and how we choose to weight changes in earnings and
changes in user prices. At the moment, it suffices to note that (in table 12 and 13) the

219

increase in earnings from attracting capital into the OECD that the OECD country
achieved was choked off considerably by inflation in the case of the CIT with input. In
the both the transfer cases (12), the sources of GDP loss was zero for the ROW but the
net sources and uses of GDP improved to the extent that some price deflation took place.
When compared to the input case, roles were reversed in the two transfer cases and the
OECD country actually lost in terms of net sources and uses of GDP.
DISCUSSION OF THE PREFERRED RESULTS WITH HOD ZERO
Now we turn to the results after imposing the restriction that X is also HOD Zero
and there is no luxury-necessity dichotomy between Y and X. All other assumptions of
the baseline case are unchanged other than this restriction. Specifically, we consider the
situation where we impose an HOD Zero restriction on demand curves in X, as we have
done for Y. In doing so, we also eliminate the difference in the own price elasticity of
demand in X and Y for the OECD country. We assume that Єxx = - 0.8 and Єyy = - 0.8
unlike Єxx = - 0.5 and Єyy = - 0.8 assumed in the base case. We also revise
to

= - 0.7, while leaving

= - 0.75

= 0.5 as in the baseline case. We can quickly check

that the demand curve for X in OECD is HOD Zero since
0.7 + 0.5 + 1.0 = 0, as is the demand curve for Y =

+

+
+

+

+

= - 0.8 -

+

= - 0.1 - 0.8 -

0.1 + 1.0 = 0 in this case as well as the baseline case.
This also removes the necessity vs. luxury classification between tradables and
nontradables that we had assumed in the baseline case. We note only at this stage that
given the wide range of values for both short and long run elasticities available in the
literature and the very wide categories of goods included in different sectors,
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conservative or neutral elasticity estimates seem far more plausible than those based on
theory that have no support in the empirical literature. No other assumptions have
changed here, such as the fact that X and Z are substitutes while X and Z are both weak
complements for Y. The only difference between tables 12 and 13 and tables 14 and 15
is that in tables 14 and 15 both X and Y have been restricted to be HOD Zero, while in 12
and 13, X is not HOD Zero.
It is clear that this has a major effect on the nature of the results from the model,
in some ways making it more intuitive. First, in every case in both tables 14 and 15, the
tax reduction has a negative impact on the sources side for ROW, although in the case of
the consumption tax and transfer case (second row of table 14) the effects are very small
for both OECD and ROW. However, in the case of the input (table 15), which is very
productive when we assume the elasticity of output is 0.5 as in the baseline case:
reduction of the tax reduces welfare for both OECD and ROW regardless of the type of
tax but more so for the OECD. This is more intuitive since the reduction of the tax results
in reduction of the quantity of the public good which causes inflation in X and Y, while
attracting away capital from the ROW and lowering the marginal product of labor which
declines in ROW.
Table 14 Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half (With
Transfer) on Sources and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare)
Using HOD Zero & Other Baseline Data
TAX and
EXPENDITURE

OECD
SOURCES
0.994

CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION 0.994
and TRANSFER

USES
0.992

WELFARE
0.002308

ROW
SOURCES
0.999

0.994

0.000699

0.999

USES
0.999

WELFARE
-0.00092

1.000

-0.00029
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Table 15 Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half (With Input)
on Sources and Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare) Using HOD
Zero & Other Baseline Data
TAX and
EXPENDITURE

OECD
SOURCES
1.152
CIT and INPUT
CONSUMPTION 1.167
and INPUT

USES
1.266
1.262

WELFARE
-0.11462
-0.09414

ROW
SOURCES
0.986
0.968

USES
1.0156
1.0156

WELFARE
-0.02947
-0.02926

In table 15, the sources side of GDP improves for the OECD country for both
taxes, while there is considerable price inflation. The greater the reduction in the public
good, the more inflation there is, and this chokes off the improvement in the sources of
GDP in OECD. The ROW experiences loss of capital as well as a fall in the marginal
product of labor. When combined with price inflation in X, this results in a net loss to
ROW as well. Thus, with a very productive government input, neither ROW nor OECD
benefit when the tax rate is cut by half and tax revenue overall shrinks. It is a matter for
speculation, however, that we could find such highly productive inputs that would be in
line for cutting. That is why we have performed simulations (tables 16-17) with lower
values of this elasticity to see if the results hold for more moderately productive inputs.
We have not considered the case of unproductive inputs.
At the same time, the reduction of the tax in the transfer cases (table 14) removes
some excess burden without resulting in a price increase and so benefits the OECD
country. There is a negligible change in the net sources and uses of GDP in the ROW, so
we may say this is close to zero. This is an intuitive result as well; if no public good was
being provided the only result of a CIT would have been distortion of factor prices in
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OECD. This would have led to the outflow of some capital and reduced the worldwide
rate of return. This is corrected when the tax is reduced, but some capital also then flows
back to the OECD country and the worldwide return also rises slightly. The loss of
capital in ROW leads to a decline in marginal product of labor and a shrinkage of output.
In the case of the consumption tax with transfer (second row of table 14), effects
are so small that we can almost ignore them. Since no factor prices were distorted with a
consumption tax, the assumption of HOD Zero will result in a negligible change as a
response to the change in the tax rate; the only distortions are the wedge between prices
of X and Z in OECD and ROW and rounding errors.
SIMULATIONS WITH THE PREFERRED CASE DATA
Taking the case of preferred demand elasticities noted above, we investigate only
one final set of issues: what are the effects of lowering 50% of the differential tax burden
on the OECD and ROW when government input is moderately productive at the margin
( *
*

=

*

=0.1) and quite productive ( *

= *

=0.3), treating the

*

=

=0.5 ( the baseline case) reported above as too high for the marginal government

spending programs.
The results from this set of simulations are more intuitive in several ways. We
note first that the results from the transfer models are not affected by changes in the
elasticity of output with respect to the government input and are the same in all three
tables 16, 17 and 18.
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Table 16 Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half on Sources and
Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare) Using HOD Zero &
*

= *

= 0.5 [This is table 14 &15 combined]

TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

SOURCES
0.993948

OECD
USES
0.991639

WELFARE
0.002308

0.994219

0.993520

1.15163
1.167395

CIT and
INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT

SOURCES
0.99859

ROW
USES
0.999511

WELFARE
-0.000919

0.0006998

0.999803

1.000098

-0.000295

1.26625

-0.11462

0.98609

1.01556

-0.029465

1.261533

-0.094138

0.986368

1.01563

-0.029263

Table 17 Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half on Sources and
Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare) Using HOD Zero &
*

= *

= 0.3

TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER
CIT and
INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT

SOURCES
0.993948

OECD
USES
0.991639

SOURCES
0.99859

ROW
USES
0.999511

WELFARE
0.002308

WELFARE
-0.000919

0.994219

0.993520

0.0006998

0.999803

1.000098

-0.000295

1.0986

1.1739

-0.07529

0.99029

1.01016

-0.019865

1.114179

1.1801

-0.06592

0.990701

1.01091

-0.02021
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Table 18 Impact of Lowering the (Excess) OECD Tax Rate by Half on Sources and
Uses of GDP & Net Sources and Uses of GDP (Welfare) Using HOD Zero &
*

= *

= 0.1

TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER
CIT and
INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT

SOURCES
0.993948

OECD
USES
0.991639

SOURCES
0.99859

ROW
USES
0.999511

WELFARE
0.002308

WELFARE
-0.000919

0.994219

0.993520

0.0006998

0.999803

1.000098

-0.000295

1.03297

1.05961

-0.026634

0.99549

1.00348

-0.007984

1.04069

1.06766

-0.026974

0.996686

1.00439

-0.007709

There is a loss in net sources and uses of GDP to both the OECD country and
ROW when the tax rate is reduced in the presence of a government input regardless of the
type of tax and productivity of input (third and fourth filled row of tables 16, 17 and 18).
This loss in net sources and uses of GDP has different reasons for each country. In the
OECD, the gain comes from the sources side in the input models since capital is attracted
away from the ROW and this leads to an increase in the marginal product of labor as
well. This is offset in each case by the rise in prices; since taxes were used to provide an
input in X and Y that increased productivity and reduced output prices. The net result of
lowering taxes in the OECD in the case of an input was a decline in net sources and uses
of GDP in the presence of an input.
In the transfer cases (first and second rows of tables 16, 17 and 18), since we have
assumed that there are no extra beneficial effects of transfers, taxation simply imposed an
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excess burden in and a reduction in taxes thus has a small positive effect due to the
reduction in consumption prices caused by a decline in the tax rates.
The loss in net sources and uses of GDP to the OECD increases with the elasticity
of output of the marginal government input (third and fourth filled row of tables 16, 17
and 18), and the effect is negligible for the ROW. This is to be expected, since the more
productive inputs are in X and Y in terms of lowering supply prices, the greater the loss
to OECD when they are cut. The ROW loses on the sources side in every single case due
to the loss of capital when OECD cuts taxes and the resulting decline in the product of
labor. The slight overall gains or losses to ROW are determined by the changes in the
uses side price index. Since the weight of X in ROW consumption is so small, the effects
on the uses of GDP are very small for ROW and increasing with elasticity of G, noting
however that the ROW loses net sources and uses of GDP overall in all cases.
The best results occur when the HOD zero restriction applies and the rest of the
data are in conformity with the baseline case (while allowing elasticity of output in
OECD with respect to G to vary between 0.1 and 0.5 as in tables 16-18, third and fourth
filled rows). OECD loses by cutting the tax rate when tax revenues are used to provide
productive inputs. The loss is smaller when productivity of government input is smaller
since this leads to a smaller price increase. The loss to OECD originates mainly on the
uses side in the inputs cases. There is a sources side gain to the OECD when taxes are cut
in the presence of an input. This sources side gain also falls with the elasticity of output
with respect to government input. This is the result of the fall in tax revenues and G being
greater for lower values of the elasticity.
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Losses to the ROW also increase in the input models with productivity of input.
Since there are uses side losses to ROW in all cases, in the input models the greater price
rise in X due to productivity loss increases the ROW burden as well.
The OECD gains by cutting taxes (tables 16-18, first and second rows) when there
are transfers due to reduction in the excess burden. There is a sources side loss to ROW
always. In the transfer models, there is a small sources side loss to OECD, but a much
larger reduction in prices resulting in OECD gains overall, while ROW still loses overall.
The orders of magnitude also vary by elasticity of government input. In the
transfer cases, the welfare benefits depend on the excess burden reduced when taxes are
reduced, and the effects are small in this model. The benefit or loss to the OECD country
is always larger regardless of expenditure pattern than the effects on the ROW. This
should not surprise us since the OECD economy and ownership of capital are both 30%
of that of the ROW. In the low productivity of input case (table 18), the loss to the OECD
overall is around 3-4% for a reduction in the tax rate of 50% of the excess tax. This goes
up to 6.5-7.5% in the medium productivity (table 17) case. Since good planning implies
that the most distorting taxes should be cut first, and if tax revenues fall with the cut in
the tax rate, then the least productive inputs should be cut first. We should then expect the
lower elasticity case to be more realistic. The total tax revenue falls in each case with
input, so this implies that when the tax rate is cut, it leads to less public goods, not more.
In the CIT case we should also expect an improvement in the net return to capital
and that capital flows from the ROW to OECD. When both sources and uses are taken
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into account, this implies a combined loss to the OECD in the input case that can vary
from 3%- 4%.
The transfer case improvement cannot be taken literally either, since we know
that taxes impose an excess burden unless they correct an externality including distortions
caused by existing taxes. If redistribution had no welfare effects, there can never be a
justification for taxation, since we will always improve GDP by lowering taxes.
Therefore, we have to consider the following facts.
In both input models, there is a sources side improvement for OECD. The uses
side effect is used to compensate for the fact that in the international case, the goods
consumed by the two countries are different, so relative price changes that effect one
country and not the other lead to a loss for one country.
The sources side shows losses to both countries of very small amounts when taxes
are lowered in the transfer models. The reason for this is that the tax revenue was part of
an income effect we have included in the demand curves. Since we have relatively priceinelastic demand curves, the reduction in transfers in OECD will initially reduce demand,
while the reduction in tax rates will lower prices. In these cases as well, the results are
reversed overall for the OECD due to the larger uses side effects.
If we were to account for the loss in relative welfare due to the loss in
redistribution benefits, we could very well have an overall loss to the OECD in the
transfer case as well. This effect is hidden in the transfer case since we have assumed one
consumer per country.
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The main point that is brought out by the comparisons above is that when tax
revenues are used to provide inputs, using the same parameters in the models for inputs
and transfers and regardless of the type of tax, a reduction in rates that leads to a fall in
revenues can make the competing country worse off. A reduction in rates regardless of
the use of revenues makes the ROW worse off since it loses capital resulting in a decline
in the product of labor. The loss to the OECD country depends on how productive its
expenditure was, and the same parameter affects the ROW in the same way. The loss and
gain of benefits in relative terms are three times larger for the OECD country since it is
30% of the size of the ROW.
We also clarify that this should not be interpreted as an exercise in comparing tax
revenue neutral changes. The tax revenue change in the two input cases is dependent on
the elasticity of output with respect to government input assumed. If we assume that the
tax base for each tax is the same to begin with, with the same tax rate the revenue is also
the same initially. The consumption tax rate is taken to be 1/3 the CIT rate since capital in
OECD is 1/3 the total product (the consumption tax base). The rate is halved in all cases.
However, the change in tax revenue, and therefore G is not the same as a proportion of G
across different assumptions of the elasticity of output with respect to G (table 19).
Unfortunately, when we reduce the tax rate by the same proportion (1/2 of the initial
excess tax rate), even with the assumption of similar initial bases and therefore revenues,
we do not get revenue-neutral changes. Therefore, our exercise compares similar tax rate
changes across models. Since we assume similar shares and bases to start with, similar
rates should also result in similar starting revenues across models.
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Table 19 Changes in Tax Revenue (and the Government Input G) as Percentage of
G When the Excess Tax Rate is Reduced by Half in the OECD Country and
Demand is HOD Zero
ELASTICITY OF
OUTPUT
IN SECTORS X and Y
WITH RESPECT TO G
0.5
0.3
0.1

CHANGE IN G AS
PROPORTION OF G IN
THE CASE OF CIT
-0.369986
-0.409281
-0.457915

CHANGE IN G AS
PROPORTION OF G IN
THE CASE OF
CONSUMPTION TAX
-0.3326
-0.38582
-0.4593

An examination of the assumptions about dPk and the price of the government
good may provide a clue to this result. The proportionate reduction in G consequent to a
reduction in the tax rate is smaller as the elasticity of output with respect to G increases.
With the baseline elasticity at 0.5, the reduction in G is the lowest as a proportion of G
when the tax rate is halved. This may be due to the following reasons.
First, we have modeled G as an input that is not produced. This has allowed us to
abstract away from inflation in G. The price of G is assumed not to vary. Thus, greater G
is available when we have more K in the case of CIT, a higher tax rate or a higher Pk
since the rate is ad valorem. However, if G required K and L to produce, and had a price
formation equation, higher Pk and Plo would also imply that the price of the government
good goes up, and the amount of real G is reduced. The real increase in G would have
come about due to increases in the tax rate and capital movements only. Ignoring the
price of government goods has however allowed us to capture one feature that we would
like to highlight: a reduction in the excess tax rate by 50% led to a 33-37% decline in the
provision of the public good in the highest productivity case, and a 45% decline in the
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lowest productivity case. The decline in the excess tax rate is accompanied by an increase
in the base; especially if we ignore the inflation effect on government- the increase in the
base is highest when government input is most productive. This is line with results in
Bénassy-Quéré, Gobalraja and Trannoy (2007) and the growing “investment climate”
literature.
It is relatively easy to introduce inflation in government by turning the
government input into a produced input, with its own production and price formation
equation, and with its supply determined by the tax revenue collected. For reasons
discussed earlier this is left to future versions of the model.
The second research question about the size and distribution of effects is
answered to the extent that we agree with the data. What becomes clear is that the
country reducing taxes is likely to benefit to the extent it can attract capital, and to the
extent the rise in prices caused by reducing government services does not remove these
gains. The central question of whether tax rate reduction implies that “spillovers” occurs
has been answered as well. It is also clear from the answers that the same set of data can
produce different effects for different assumptions and that some parameters chosen
clearly affect results. The exact numerical measure of the burdens is both dependent on
model assumptions and data.
The third research question about expenditure patterns qualifying tax change
effects is also answered in the affirmative. This becomes clear from the difference in
results using baseline parameters in the two different models. Not only is the sign of the
welfare changes reversed, it also becomes clear that the type of use to which taxes are put
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to does matter. This holds true for both cases of tax change individually. The extent to
which these results are a function of particular assumptions made about the productivity
of government expenditure is another issue.
We also get some answer to the question of the impacts with respect to the type of
tax considered. Taking the case of neutral expenditure as in the transfer models (first and
second columns of tables 16-18), we see that the overall effect of reducing the excess tax
by half in the OECD is much greater in the CIT case than the consumption tax. We
should expect this to happen since the factor tax is expected to be more distorting than the
consumption tax, so lowering the CIT should benefit the OECD country more.
Not only can we model changes in the values of many parameters, it is quite easy
to model other expenditure patterns as well. For instance, a tax and spend model can be
assumed with the same parameters with different types of expenditure, and the
differential results of this model would constitute the difference due to expenditure
patterns alone. Possible variations in the types of expenditure are a produced government
input; a government provided final good that may or may not be produced, a public good
that is an input as well as a consumption good (perhaps education) or even infrastructure
investment that lasts beyond one period.
The final question is the impact of the data used. For the moment we ignore the
issues of the aggregation of the impacts on the sources and uses sides. While our
analytical expressions were enough to show that the burdens on the sources side would
favor the importing country and harm the taxing country as long as capital is attracted
away, it is also clear that the burdens on either side can be reduced or enhanced

232

considerably when changes in consumption prices are taken into account. How we
combine the sources and uses sides impacts can change the numerical calculations of the
burden. 3
Finally, there are at least two important gaps in the data. First, there are no recent
and reliable studies on the issues of cross-price elasticities. Second, studies of the
elasticity of output with respect to government spending by sector are also limited, in my
opinion, for our purpose. Without at least some sort of agreement in this area, the
numerical calculations can only be specified within a range. The analytical solution are
enough to show that tax competition (proxied by a tax rate reduction by the OECD) can
and does result in “spillovers” that is dependent on the type of expenditure, and provide
another important justification to limit this kind of inter-jurisdictional competition by
large countries. At the same time, it also shows that under very general assumptions, the
country that reduces taxes can gain considerably even if it is at the cost of the rest of the
world, but it loses when the tax results in variations of expenditures on public goods and
the reverse in the case of transfer payments.
SIMULATIONS USING THE BASELINE DATA TO CHECK SENSITIVITY
Do these results hold when some key parameters which we have assumed due to
lack of data are varied? Does imposing the HOD zero result give us the preferred results,
or can we get the same result by varying other parameters? To answer this question, we

3

Changing the capital intensities in OECD to reflect the dominant neo-classical vies expressed in Randolph
(2006) that the tradables in OECD is more labor intensive has no material effect on the direction of overall
results, and has effects only in the relative distribution between OECD and ROW. In all the tables, OECD
and ROW still lose overall. The difference is that the relative loss to OECD is greater in all cases and the
relative loss to ROW is smaller in all cases. The full analysis is provided in the appendix B.
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perform some simulations, varying the elasticity of output with respect to government
input, the elasticities of substitution in production, the quantum of tax change, imposing
HOD Zero restrictions on demand and some key demand elasticities. However, we do
this using the baseline data from chapter 5, repeated in tables 12 and 13, without
imposing the HOD Zero restriction on X.

Table 20 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and * = * = 0.1
TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
INPUT
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

SOURCES
1.1306

OECD
USES
1.12248

WELFARE
0.008134

SOURCES
0.98776

ROW
USES
1.007158

WELFARE
-0.019397

0.97619

0.97905

-0.00286

1.0

0.998776

0.001225

1.21035

1.17063

0.03972

0.98287

1.01037

-0.0275

0.99067

0.99100

-0.0003

1.0001

0.99995

0.00013

Table 21 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and * = * = 0.3
TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
INPUT
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

SOURCES
1.29399

OECD
USES
1.27423

SOURCES
0.97481

ROW
USES
1.016026

WELFARE
0.01976

WELFARE
-0.04121

0.97619

0.97905

-0.00286

1.0

0.998776

0.001225

1.344697

1.27947

0.065223

0.971929

1.01668

-0.04475

0.99067

0.99100

-0.0003

1.0001

0.99995

0.00013

234

Table 22 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and * = * = 0.5 [This is the Same
Table as 12&13 Combined]
TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
INPUT
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

SOURCES
1.3793

OECD
USES
1.3535

WELFARE
0.02583

SOURCES
0.96805

ROW
USES
1.0207

WELFARE
-0.052605

0.97619

0.97905

-0.00286

1.0

0.998776

0.001225

1.3939

1.3193

0.07457

0.96792

1.01899

-0.05107

0.99067

0.99100

-0.0003

1.0001

0.99995

0.00013

The results are counter intuitive. The higher the output produced by the input
(table 22 compared to 21 and 20), the greater the welfare gain to the OECD country by
reducing taxes and input, and the greater the losses inflicted on the ROW. The losses on
the sources side in the case of the ROW arise due to the amount of capital attracted away
by lowering the tax rate and the resulting fall in the product of labor. The sources side
loss to the ROW is unchanged in the transfer models since the productivity of G does not
matter. The sources side loss increases for the ROW with productivity of G in both tax
models. This implies that the more productive the G was in OECD, the greater the loss to
ROW due to capital leaving ROW for OECD when the tax was reduced.
It does not appear rational that for the same tax rate reduction, the gains to the
OECD country on the sources side increase as the government input is more productive.
Higher tax revenues imply more G and more G implies more output when G is
productive. When G is less productive, lower tax revenue and therefore less G implies a
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smaller loss in output than when G is more productive. However, the general orders of
changes in welfare are not affected in any way in tables 20 to 22, making it clear that it is
not the productivity of input that drives the direction of the results. For the transfer
models, the elasticity of output with respect to input does not enter these functions at all
since no input is being provided.
Next we simulate results for different values of the elasticity of substitution in
production between capital and labor in OECD (X and Y sectors only). We still use the
baseline case of chapter 5 where X is not HOD Zero. Since there is only one ROW sector
(Z) and we have assumed full employment, there is no elasticity of substitution in
production in Z. We use values of -0.8 and -1.0 for comparison with the base case of -0.6,
and note that these elasticities enter both the input and transfer models.

Table 23 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X (Sx= Sy = - 0.6) [This is the Same Table as
12&13 Combined]
TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
INPUT
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

SOURCES
1.3793

OECD
USES
1.3535

SOURCES
0.96805

ROW
USES
1.0207

WELFARE
0.02583

WELFARE
-0.052605

0.97619

0.97905

-0.00286

1.0

0.998776

0.001225

1.3939

1.3193

0.07457

0.96792

1.01899

-0.05107

0.99067

0.99100

-0.0003

1.0001

0.99995

0.00013
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Table 24 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X (Sx= Sy = - 0.8)
TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT
and INPUT
CIT
and TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

SOURCES
1.31405

OECD
USES
1.29604

SOURCES
0.96805

ROW
USES
1.01730

WELFARE
0.018005

WELFARE
-0.04925

0.97619

0.97905

-0.002857

1.0

0.998776

0.001225

1.36597

1.30028

0.06568

0.964479

1.01789

-0.05341

0.990983

0.99125

-0.00027

1.00008

0.999968

0.000112

Table 25 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X (Sx= Sy = - 1.0)
TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
INPUT
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

SOURCES
1.27491

OECD
USES
1.26160

SOURCES
0.96805

ROW
USES
1.01529

WELFARE
0.013309

WELFARE
-0.04724

0.97619

0.97905

-0.002857

1.0

0.998776

0.001225

1.346124

1.28675

0.05937

0.962034

1.01710

-0.05507

0.991131

0.991367

-0.00024

1.00007

0.999975

0.000099

Again we find that the elasticity of substitution does not change the order of
effects at all in tables 23-25. The elasticity has no effect at all in the CIT and transfer case
with the tax unchanged. In the consumption tax case, increasing the elasticity reduces the
welfare gain for the OECD country but has a varying impact for the ROW. Thus within a
reasonable range, we can hypothesize that this parameter has no large effect on the
direction of the results.
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We now turn to the question of the range of the proposed tax change. We will
examine two cases, where the tax change is 25% of the existing tax and the case of 75%
change. Our base case of 50% change lies in between. All other baseline assumptions are
unchanged.

Table 26 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and Tax Change is 25% Points
TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
INPUT
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

SOURCES
1.189639

OECD
USES
1.176722

WELFARE
0.012916

SOURCES
0.984025

ROW
USES
1.010327

WELFARE
-0.026302

0.988095

0.989523

-0.001428

1.0

0.999387

0.000612

1.196952

1.159670

0.037282

0.983961

1.009496

-0.025535

0.995335

0.995499

-0.000164

1.000046

0.999976

0.000069

Table 27 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and Tax Change is 50% Points [This is the
Same Table as 12&13 Combined]
TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
INPUT
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

SOURCES
1.3793

OECD
USES
1.3535

WELFARE
0.02583

SOURCES
0.96805

ROW
USES
1.0207

WELFARE
-0.052605

0.97619

0.97905

-0.00286

1.0

0.998776

0.001225

1.3939

1.3193

0.07457

0.96792

1.01899

-0.05107

0.99067

0.99100

-0.0003

1.0001

0.99995

0.00013
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Table 28 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data from Chapter 5
with No HOD Zero Restriction on X and Tax Change is 75% Points
TAX and
EXPENDITURE
CIT and
INPUT
CIT and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION
and INPUT
CONSUMPTION
and TRANSFER

SOURCES
1.568918

OECD
USES
1.530168

SOURCES
0.952076

ROW
USES
1.03098

WELFARE
0.038749

WELFARE
-0.078907

0.964285

0.968571

-0.004285

1.0

0.998163

0.001836

1.590858

1.47901

0.111847

0.951883

1.02849

-0.076607

0.98600

0.986499

-0.00049

1.00013

0.999930

0.000207

The results of this simulation are fairly simple. The quantum of tax change
amplifies results proportionately without changing any orders or directions. Changes are
almost 50% less with the tax change being 50% less than the baseline case, and changes
are around 50% more when the tax change contemplated is 50% more. Thus, the choice
of how much tax change to consider, like the choice of elasticities of output and
substitution, does not materially affect results, except in terms of size.
CONCLUSIONS
The discussion above reveals that most of the parameters chosen do not materially
affect the results of our models, with the exception of the demand elasticities. Despite the
wide range of results reported in the literature, the choice of neutral elasticities close to
one and to each other (all income elasticities are one, own price elasticites equal to each
other and close to one, at - 0.8, and demand in OECD is HOD Zero ) produce the most
intuitive results. The choice of HOD Zero is also considered standard and is the direct
consequence of neo-classical utility maximization. These values chosen are the average
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of the ranges reported in the literature as well as the average of the long and short run
elasticities.
Conflicting estimates do not allow us to take the position that one set of estimates
dominates another, and we do not have evidence to support either the luxury-necessity
theory or strong complementarities or substitution. Thus, given the evidence, the best
estimates of elasticities in my opinion are unitary elasticities of income (although a case
may be made for the U.S. elasticity of income for imports to be higher than for exports,
this is not pursued in this model due to the theoretical set-up); own-price elasticities close
to one (we have chosen - 0.8 for both OECD sectors); fairly low cross-price elasticities
for tradables and nontradables and slightly higher cross-price elasticities for OECD
tradables and ROW consolidated output.
Assuming that the elasticity of demand for tradables is substantially less than for
nontradables produces results that are almost opposite to this neutral case. Due to the lack
of recent studies that provide evidence that this is the case or good estimates of crossprice elasticities, there is not much basis for such assumptions.
Further refinements to the model are possible and not very difficult. The most
obvious ones are the addition of a second ROW sector, making G a produced input in
OECD, using GNP instead of GDP, introducing balance of trade imbalances with a BOP
condition and estimating cross-price elasticities using recent data. These are not
attempted at this stage and are left for future studies.
In my opinion, the results are important for policy since they illustrate that:
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In line with existing literature on the subject, there can be a justification for
lowering taxes through tax competition potentially leading to a “race to the
bottom” based on improvements expected through increases in tax revenue,
reduction of excess burdens, or a fixation on the sources side (attracting mobile
capital) exclusively.
These arguments are shown to have a weak basis when we consider that reducing
taxes that result in a reduction in revenues actually lead to less public goods, and
that efficiency arguments have small effects that may easily be outweighed by
redistribution effects, and may rely on considering uses side effects in addition to
sources of income effects. Similar observations made by Wilson and Wildasin
(2004).
Taking a holistic view of burdens on the sources and uses of GDP by including
effects on the rest of the world, considering the uses as well as the sources sides
of GDP equally important and considering possible redistribution losses can lead
to a reversal of effects expected by the “reduce taxes” lobby. On the other hand,
there are existing critiques of including the uses side burdens (Whalley, 1984) as
an instrument that allows one to generate results in any direction that one wants
by choosing appropriate measures. Further, since all sources side burdens are
already measured in real terms, this is not likely to deter the advocates of tax
reduction, who may argue that such adjustments are unnecessary.
Reductions in tax rates that are “too high” relative to the ROW can be beneficial
only when we consider that the reduction may not actually raise but lower ad
valorem tax revenues depending on the elasticities of demand for goods and
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factors, and that this reduction in revenues may lead to a reduction in the
provision of public goods. As pointed out in Bénassy-Quéré, Gobalraja and
Trannoy (2007), we have to take into account both the reaction of mobile capital
with respect to the tax rate, and the total provision of public goods with respect to
the tax rate. Once we have parameters that show that tax revenues (and therefore
public goods) fall with the reduction in that tax rate, we have to consider issues of
how productive those public goods were. Analogously, we cannot ignore how
productive the redistribution resulting from taxation was in the transfer models.
In terms of orders of magnitude, the results depend on the choice of elasticities,
and methods used to calculate burdens. To be a strict guide to policy, one has to
have a reasonable consensus on the range of these elasticities. At present, the
plausible range is too vast to allow definitive predictions, since the choice of
reasonable figures within the range can generate results of any type we choose.
We need better and more recent, reliable estimates of these specific elasticities for
policy analysis.
Introducing country specific variations in the choice of elasticities and features
such as balance of trade deficits, produced inputs, nontradables in ROW, risk
premia etc. will certainly give more confidence in estimating the size of effects.
When we consider the alternative in the form of CGE models, these involve much
stronger assumptions such as specific functional forms for demand and supply
curves. Models based on the Harberger analysis at least have the benefit of not
having to make as many assumptions.
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There are at least three areas where improvements are possible. First, it will be
useful to have a good estimate of the size of the stock of U.S. capital relative to
the ROW. Second, the estimates of cross-price elasticities of demand are almost
pure guesses. Third, we have assumed that production is CRS in OECD for both
sectors. It would be useful to have better price formation equations based on
recent estimates of the returns to scale in the relevant range for tradables and
nontradables in the OECD and ROW, especially ones that take into account the
role of government. Without these, we can have confidence in the general
direction of results: to extend that to the magnitudes would be wishful thinking.
The results are not that far from existing opinions on tax competition effects. For
example, the OECD report for 2004 on “Harmful Tax Practices” (available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf; accessed on 5/1/2010) clearly
highlights that the criteria enumerated in 1998 for determining whether a preferential tax
regime was harmful had at the very top of the list “the regime imposes low or no taxes on
the relevant income (from geographically mobile financial and other service activities).”
However, the conclusion that a regime is harmful also depends on the breadth of the
welfare measure used. The fact that taxation imposes an excess burden and that a
reduction in that burden will increase GDP is not in dispute; what is debated is whether it
will do so at the cost of the rest of the world, and whether it will do so after expenditure
effects are considered.
We also have to consider that for many countries such as the U.S.A, and partially
India, taxation by sub-national authorities is an important component of the total tax rate
faced by a firm. The analysis above is from the view of a purely federal tax regime.
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When we have large and strong sub-national jurisdictions waiting to occupy the fiscal
space vacated by the federal government, or ones that compete amongst themselves, then
the analysis has to be modified accordingly. Further, models of this kind can equally well
be used to analyze competition between sub-national jurisdictions themselves for mobile
resources (Wallace, 1993).
This also brings us to the next question: if the effects of tax competition (rate
reductions) are global (spillovers of burdens), should tax policy be considered a strictly
domestic issue? The question is not as far-fetched as one may think. “Beggar thy
neighbor” effects in trade involve raising trade tariffs on imports to improve domestic
agents‟ welfare. Trade tariffs, like all taxes, may be thought to be strictly in the domestic
policy domain of any country. Yet, the WTO and the GATT before it, has had
considerable success in reducing the general level of tariffs across the globe, and may
take some of the credit for the increase in world trade and consumption levels that this
has brought.
With the exception of a world body like the OECD (and only partially the IMF),
there does not appear to be a “World Tax Organization” that is in a position to perform
the World Trade Organization‟s role for other tax issues. The OECD tax unit already
deals with such issues as tax competition, transfer pricing, evasion etc. The extent to
which it has the ability to influence non-OECD countries is questionable. The Fiscal
Affairs Department of the IMF is another body that may have considerable influence on
debtor countries. Given the global effects of tax competition and the spillovers of burdens
that can result, perhaps it is time to think about international cooperation in this field;
setting up of a body that deals with the issues that the OECD‟s tax unit does with the
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structure of a truly world body such as the WTO. The WTO already deals with several
other policy issues other than tariffs that affect relative prices, such as wage supports,
agricultural price supports, as they apply to international trade. It also deals for example
with intellectual property rights and customs valuation. However, there is still a role for a
World Intellectual Property Rights Organization and World Customs Organization. Both
the international tax (public finance) organization and WTO and other bodies could
peacefully co-exist.
Such a body would have the knowledge, capacity and global membership of a
world body to deal with tax issues (competition, coordination, treaties, transfer pricing,
spillovers of burdens, harmful practices, uniform tax codes and disclosure norms, etc.).
Such a body will have to deal with the following rejoinder from advocates of tax cuts:
higher distorting taxes in the OECD forced mobile capital out of the OECD into the
ROW in the past. This raised ROW labor productivity and lowered OECD output.
Reducing those taxes brought back capital that had been driven out previously. Therefore
the loss in ROW welfare is simply a correction of past distortions, not a freshly spilt over
burden.
This is precisely where a multilateral agency, on the lines of WTOs dispute
resolution mechanism can be useful. That such an idea (of an international tax
coordination and policy advisory body) is not completely far-fetched is evidenced by a
recent article by J. Attali in the New York Times global edition (available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/27/opinion/27iht-edattali.html?hpw) that calls for a
“European Ministry of Finance” to coordinate tax and fiscal policy as an inevitable
consequence of a common Euro-zone.
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The choice of the four models in this dissertation has been motivated in part by
the desire to separate the effects of taxes on “exporting” and “burdens” (or benefits) and
the effects of expenditures on the same. The models can be thought of as four parts of the
same model of an economy where there are two possible types of distortion. The question
of examining the effects of a tax involve isolating the effects due to the tax itself by
assuming that the expenditure pattern before and after the tax remains the same. In our
presentation, we can make at least two additional types of comparisons. First, the
consumption tax with transfer may be thought of as a non-distorting tax and can serve as
a base case (except for rounding errors). This can be compared with the capital income
tax (which is a factor tax and therefore distorting, though probably less distorting than a
partial factor tax like the corporate income tax). Further, the consumption tax with
transfer may be compared to the consumption tax with input to isolate the effects of the
input itself, since the tax is non-distorting. Presenting this in a simple schematic
framework:
TAX and INPUT
NO EXPENDITURE
DISTORTION
EXPENDITURE
DISTORTION

NO TAX DISTORTION
CONSUMPTION TAX and
TRANSFER
CONSUMPTION TAX and
INPUT

TAX DISTORTION
CIT and TRANSFER
CIT and INPUT

The advantage of presenting it in this manner (at the suggestion of Dr Randolph)
is that we can further isolate sub-categories while thinking of the work itself as four
aspects of one model instead of four separate models.
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The second aspect is related to some results from the investment climate literature
that shows how the model can shed light on some more policy implications. As an
example, Bennasy-quere et al. (2007) split their sample of European countries into higher
and lower income countries and find that investment is less responsive to tax cuts in
richer countries that cut government expenditure, while low tax rates are important for
the less rich countries for attracting investment. This says something about the
productivity of government expenditure paid for out of tax revenues. If investors view the
investment climate as relatively poor (and government expenditure as relatively
ineffective or wasteful), they are likely to go for the location with a lower tax rate ceteris
paribus; and when they view government expenditure as effective and productive, they
are more willing to support a high tax rate and a higher level of provision of public
goods. While we have not modeled expectations or the perceived productivity of
expenditure in our model, it can provide some theoretical basis for these results. Cutting
tax rates that result in cutting marginally productive public inputs does not benefit anyone
in our models, while cutting tax rates in neutral expenditure situations does.
Finally, we can examine the question of whether this is really a situation that can
exist in the real world. From a theoretical perspective, it is correct to analyze the effects
of a tax separately from expenditure. In the real world, taxes can be an end in themselves
only if the objective is redistribution. If we adopt the more modern view that taxes are a
weaker tool for redistribution than expenditures and that the major objective of taxation is
to provide public goods; we should then focus on the combined effect of both on welfare.
In a developing country like India, it is not necessary that the government will cut
wasteful expenditures first if it needs to reduce the level of taxation. The problem is more
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likely to be a low tax-GDP ratio to begin with, compounded by high marginal rates on
easy-to-tax activities.
The marginal productivity of basic input expenditure can also be very high in
these countries. If tax rates are cut and overall revenues fall, most developing countries
do not have extensive social security systems or transfer systems to mitigate the
conditions of those affected. Salaries and other current expenditures are not pruned much,
what suffers is “development expenditure.” Delayed projects, lack of maintenance, lack
of spending on capacity-building, cutting programs aimed at improving the overall
investment climate etc., are likely to suffer. If the planned inputs were productive in the
first place, the overall benefit to the country would be lower.
We can then think of some further policy implications that flow from this.
Tax cut proposals that are based on analysis of taxation assuming neutral transfers
should be supplemented by an analysis of the “excess benefit” of expenditures.
We normally deal with the tax side considering the tax revenues separately from
the “excess burden,” it is only symmetric to deal with policy analysis using excess
burdens and benefits of both.
Comparisons of taxes that rely on “revenue neutral changes” are correct in theory.
In the real world, as our models have shown, revenues depend on the productivity
of expenditures. Therefore, if tax cuts cause changes in spending, then the effects
on revenue depend on the productivity of spending. The more appropriate design
is to consider actual proposed cuts, their revenue implications and the full analysis
of what is likely to happen on the expenditure side.
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Many countries already require an accounting for “tax expenditures” as part of
budgeting. If this implicitly implies the tax revenue effects of a tax change, it
follows that it should include an analysis of the expenditure impact with the same
degree of precision. This is not just confined to the level of expenditure change.
Its source, method of financing and excess burden need to be accounted for with
the same degree of precision as the tax side.
One can also suggest that doing the above will help with clarity of thought and
better policy analysis by separating the muddled thinking that conflicting
objectives create. As an illustration, if we think that “tax exporting” means that
non-residents are paying our taxes when they deploy their capital or labor in our
jurisdiction; and that this is good-we should follow through with only this analysis
and not consider Harbergarian issues of changes in the sources and uses of
income other than the tax revenue itself. In the real world, this is what is typically
done. Citizens do not like to pay taxes, and the idea that a non-citizen pays part of
our taxes while “we” (residents) get to benefit from the public goods is always an
attractive proposition. Therefore tax cuts that allow this to happen are attractive.
Further, the expectation from the above analysis, if we are focused exclusively on
tax revenues has to be that we will eventually not lose revenue, since this would
imply a cut in the level of public goods. In the best case, if we assume that the
change contemplated is revenue-neutral, then it is no longer clear why the tax
change is necessary except to redistribute the payment of the revenue to nonresidents. If this is the case, a clear analysis should concentrate on only these
effects and the tax revenue itself, not “welfare.”
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The primary contribution of the Harbergerarian analysis is to show that even if we
eliminate tax revenues from consideration, there are changes in overall income
due to tax effects. The same is obviously true of expenditure effects.
Consider the case of a small jurisdiction that cannot change the overall rate of
return to capital trying to account for the effects of a tax reduction to attract capital
from non-residents. Under a GNP system, the only effect could be an increase in the
net return to capital owners who deploy capital in their jurisdiction when taxes are
cut. This is ruled out for a small economy since it cannot affect the net rate of return
to capital. Residents may have deployed a part of their capital elsewhere, but their
overall returns cannot fall. Labor in the domestic area benefits whether they are
residents or non-residents; due to raised marginal productivity. If we further assume
that tax revenues do not fall as a result and there is no change in public good
provision, this means that in the Harbergarian sense there must have been no decline
in the overall income of owners of capital of that jurisdiction on a GNP basis, and an
increase in the productivity of labor in the jurisdiction, but on a GDP basis.
This further implies that a revenue-neutral change in these circumstances is very
attractive whether we look at the tax revenue exclusively. For policy analysis, we
have to consider other issues. First, will tax revenues change or not? To assume that
they will not change is to say that the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to the tax
rate is exactly zero. For most budgets around the world, tax cuts proposals are
accompanied by revenue implications and these have expenditure effects. The
analysis of these expenditure effects proposals should at the very minimum be as
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sophisticated as the tax analysis. If taxes fall, exactly what expenditures are to be cut?
What is the total impact of both?
Second, we should in advance choose the basis of analysis. Are we focused on the
tax revenue itself (and GNP) or overall changes in the sources and uses of income? If
on the former, it is natural to ignore the expenditure side, since we are worried only
about who paid the tax and whether the change is tax revenue neutral. If the latter
methodology is adopted, it becomes clear that GNP is important for looking at
incomes of owners of capital, but not necessarily for labor, since labor has often to
live where it works, or consume where it lives. It is also clear that who paid the tax is
largely irrelevant since the person paying the tax may simultaneously benefit from an
increase in the net return to capital. Expenditure effects are important, and
considering transfers as neutral is also not valid where the purpose of a transfer is to
redistribute income.
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APPENDIX

B

The traditional and dominant view in the literature, as expressed in Randolph
(2006) and others is to use different capital intensities in the tradables and nontradable
sectors. As discussed in chapter 5, the figures from Gravelle and Smetters (2006)
preferred by Randolph (2006), representing the dominant neo-classical literature have
used the following data (with approximation):

Table B1

U.S. Shares Based on Randolph (2006)
Share of Value Added in Sector
Labor Capital (= 1- labor)
Tradable Sector
78.8%
21.2%
Non-tradable Sector
65.9%
34.1%
Total
69.9%
30.1%
Domestic (OECD) economy's share of world output
30%
Domestic (OECD) ownership share of world capital
30%
Partial elasticity of substitution, capital and labor
- 0.6
Source: Randolph (2006), Based on Gravelle and Smetters (2006).

Share of
Output
31%
69%
100%

It should be noted that the nontradables figure is almost exactly the same as in the
table we chose to use. However, tradables are more labor intensive and have a larger
weight. For convenience, we can round these figures off to:
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Table B2

Adjusted Shares Based on Randolph (2006)

Share of Value Added in Sector
Labor Capital (= 1- labor)
Tradable Sector
80%
20%
Non-tradable Sector
66%
34%
Total
70%
30%
Domestic (OECD) economy's share of world output
30%
Domestic (OECD) ownership share of world capital
30%
Partial elasticity of substitution, capital and labor
- 0.6
Source: Randolph (2006), Based on Gravelle and Smetters (2006).

Share of
Output
30%
70%
100%

Now we can use the ratios in our table to get:
θkx =
θlx =

= 1/5

θky =

= 4/5

= 3/10 and

= 1/3

θly =
= 3/7 and

= 2/3

= 3/10 and

= 3/10

This implies that:
= 3/7 and

=

We also know from our tables above that

= 3/10

And we had assumed Pk, Plo and Plr (factor prices) and Px, Py and Pz (output prices) are all
equal to 1 and to each other to begin with.
Substituting X + Y = 3*Z/7 and Kx + Ky = 3*Kz /7*(1+

above, we get

= b = θkz =
Next noting that we get (1- 3/10) = 7/10 = (1-b) = θlz =
And that

= 7/10 and that

= 3/7, we get

With some further simple manipulations we get:

where Lz =
= 3/7
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( ) = 27/308*(1+

; ( ) = 105/308*(1+

) = 44/45*(1+

;

) = 44/105*(1+

; ( ) =3/35*(1+

and ( ) = 35/18

= 9/44;

= 35/44 and
and

= 106/45

= 106/105 and ( ) =

7/9*(1+
By assumption,

= -1/2, and

= - 0.02381 (any other combinations are

possible)
Using these, we have also to recalculate the trade ratios and marginal income
effects used in chapter 5. MPC of imports = 0.12, MPC of domestic tradables is now 0.18
and MPC of domestic nontradables is now 0.7.

= 0.036 still holds since exports are

still 12% of domestic GDP and OECD is still 30% of world output and that

=

*

= 1.0*0.036 = 0.036. Єxx = - 0.8 and Єyy = - 0.8, and we say that X and Y are gross
complements, with Єxy = - 0.42 (Implying

= - 0.7) due to the stronger income effect

and weighting, and Єyx = - 0.1 with no weighting and a much smaller income effect.
Now let us see what effect this has on the results. We have taken the preferred
HOD zero case of the CIT with input since this is the very first model we derived in
chapter two. To ensure that the results are not driven by the elasticity of output with
respect to government, we present results of all three versions of the government input
elasticity. The only difference is that the OECD tradables sector is more labor intensive
using the data in Randolph (2006) discussed above.
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Table B3 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data From Chapter 5
and Adjusted Factor Shares in OECD With HOD Zero Restriction on X and
* = * = 0.5
TAX and
OECD
EXPENDITURE SOURCES USES
1.15163
1.26625
CIT and
INPUT WITH
DISSERTATION
CAPITAL
INTENSITY
1.0093

CIT and
INPUT WITH
OECD
TRADABLES
LABOR
INTENSIVE

ROW
WELFARE SOURCES USES
-0.11462
0.98609
1.01556

1.208269 -0.198975

1.0000

WELFARE
-0.029465

1.012071 -0.012028

Table B4 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data From Chapter
5 and Adjusted Factor Shares in OECD With HOD Zero Restriction on X and
*

= *

= 0.3

TAX and
OECD
EXPENDITURE SOURCES
1.0986
CIT and
INPUT WITH
DISSERTATION
CAPITAL
INTENSITY
CIT and
INPUT WITH
OECD
TRADABLES
LABOR
INTENSIVE

1.00546

ROW
USES
1.1739

WELFARE
-0.07529

SOURCES
0.99029

USES
1.01016

WELFARE
-0.019865

1.12690

-0.121438

0.99979

1.00737

-0.00758
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Table B5 Sources, Uses & Total Net Changes Using Baseline Data From Chapter 5
and Adjusted Factor Shares in OECD With HOD Zero Restriction on X and
*

= *

= 0.1

TAX and
OECD
EXPENDITURE SOURCES USES
1.03297
1.05961
CIT and
INPUT WITH
DISSERTATION
CAPITAL
INTENSITY
CIT and
INPUT WITH
OECD
TRADABLES
LABOR
INTENSIVE

1.001466

1.04196

ROW
WELFARE
-0.026634

SOURCES
0.99549

USES
1.00348

WELFARE
-0.007984

-0.040495

0.99953

1.002468

-0.002936

As we can see, the change in capital intensities in OECD to reflect the dominant
neo-classical vies expressed in Randolph (2006) that the tradables in OECD is more labor
intensive has no material effect on the direction of overall results, and has effects only in
the relative distribution between OECD and ROW. In all the tables, OECD and ROW
still lose overall. The difference is that the relative loss to OECD is greater in all cases
and the relative loss to ROW is smaller in all cases.
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